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\ 41160 "^ " ^

PREFACE.

P==^^ HE author had,defigned thefe d'tfertarions

([ 2" )) for ths puMgl viezu ; and wrote them out

\ ^_^^ as they ncu>'%ppear : though His probable,

tVat if*his life ^d" been fpared, he zuould have revifed

them, and rendmh them in fome refpe6ls more compleat.

Some new /ent'iments, here and there^ might probably

have been added; and fome paffages brightened zuitb

farther illulihtions. This may be conjectured f onr

Jom-^ubriefhinfs^ or fentiments minuted down, on loofe

papers/fmnd in the manufcripts,

BUT' thofe fentiments concifely fketched out, •which, Uis thought, the author intended to ^nlarge,

and digefl into the body of the work, cannot be

fo amplified by any other hand, as to do juflice to the autbor ; 'tis therefore probably befl that nothing of this kin4 foould be attempted, * '

^ S thefe di[TerfaiTons were wore efpecially defgnd

for the learned and inquifitive, 'tis expected that the

judicisus and candid zvill not be difpofed to object that

the manner in zuhich thefe fubje^s are treated-^ is

fometJfing above the level of commoi readers, . For

though a fuperficial way of difcourfe and loofe har^

rangues may well enough fuitjc?nefubjeLls,. and anfwer

fome valuable pnrpojes ; yet otherfubjeils demand more

clofenefs and accuracy: ^nd if an author Jhould nc-

gleEl to do juflice to afubject, for fear that the fimpler

fort fJyould not fully under [land hi ju, he might expect

U bs dssmed a trifler by the raore inUlUgcnt,

A 2 OVK

'^

me

«• E F A C E.

^ OUR autb^hadarme iaUnt it peretraf, dee*^ tr. fcarco ^f truth ; to take nn txterfi-ze furiey ^a J^jfa, orui look thr.uib it Into rtmoU coriif^erces Hcrrf ma-y tkt<fr,mr.tbat a-p eared lard and bar rfl> iz:toers, uere U him plfafint and fruitftU fi^ldc -iiorrc hii mtrd ^zuld txpntiate -^itb ptcuifur ta}e\ pTOj.t and enUrtaznment. Jbc/e jiudies, -which ic^f--^ 'Mere tjoJatigiungti> the mind, and -a^earin^ tottt

cpd '.vh.ch k's m:r.d t^ifhrut^^^^u/d freely and

/-'""""'" ^^'f-rm. ^ chfi a^£onc{uf-e icay of /.-.,.;;. a C7n:rcuerfial p^lnr%3 eafy and na-^ tWGi to b:m, ^

/T/Z/S may ferrr^, tis conceh'd, to tj^courA fer his

ua! raar.r.fr 9' treating abjlrvfe and contnrcertedjub^

- ' - ^^J^rns haze thought has been fo^ ^aphy.

^ .: thr truth is, that his critical tfiHrj^d of

g through tbt nature of his fuhjecl / h'ls accuracy

zd pr^c:fion in ccmafing truth, comparing ideas,

• 'oriffquinces, punting cut and expofng ab/ur^

^ ^*'*^^ naturally led him to reduce the B-jtderce in

'^-" if truth into the form -f demonftraiiGn, IVhich 'tkfs, where It can be obtained^ is the mofl eligible^ 'ffar the mofl fatisfying to great and noble mtrdi 'nd though f:m^ readers may find the labor hard, to 'ppace rvitb the writer, in the advances he makes, -ere fheafcertis arduous ; yet in general all it-as *. ,j tz hm : fuch zvas his peculiar love and dijcern--ment cf truth cui natural proper.fity to (earch^after f^ hiscTin ideas -were clear to him, -u. here feme rea-^MJre thcii^ht them cb/cure, Thus many thirds gff the zrorkf 9f Kewrcn and Loclce^ -which apptat t'other quite i-rirdeili^ihle, cr lery dfc-jre to the itlite-tc.te -ere dear and bright tc. thofe tllujlrious authors^ 4iYj *hi:r Itarr.ed readers*

THE

The PREFACE.

T^HKfuhjf^s here handled arefuhhme end impdr* fant, l^ke end -zi^hicc God had ir. rVVtv in creating the tt^orld, "Ofas dmbtUfs zvorthy of him ; and confequentiy the moil excellent and ^ior'iras fojfible, This there^ fore mul be -u; or thy to be kn:^n by al! tbf intelligent creation,as excellent in iffelfMnd -worthy cf ib^ir pur^ fdit. ^nd as truf vi'^fue i.v/'- -^ • --f j the inhabitantr of heaven and all the h2pt>^ ci . . ites for that -world

^'^^lory, from all others ; ^ there cannot furcly he

a. Tno^e interefling fubjeci*

T'HH ri'tion: 'vh:ch fome men entertain c:rcernin9 God^s e::d in creating the zvorld, and concerning true virtue, in c^r late author's opinion, have a natural tendency to^corrupl chrijtianity, xtnd to deftroy tl gzfpHof our divine redeemer. It-zvas therefore jio doubts ii the ex'.'-cife of a pio'ds concern for the honor and glory cf God, and a tender refpecl to the be (I interefls Qf his fello'of men^ that this de-ocut and learned writer undertook the foIhz:;ing -work,

Afy4 T the father of lights, fmile u^ontbe plsuf and bcKtvoIeni airzs and labors of bis ferzc

Jf/,r*-1 The Editor.

ERRATA.

T>Ag« Inline 24.b€f3rc m^'f/ add 99. p.4* I.2«. f'n^'rve/sjrJe^ff.VL 4 3.'.29 afrer ap*mT.aj to,p 47 L^.f.f^j.ehMs.^ii2J.2^ju^^» Jisni O-12S.L2 2 r.JM/ar* p. 151 Vz-j^Jbi^zTf.

"^^

Tfie ; U IN 1' fc, N T S.

Sect VI. Wherein is confidered what is meant by theglo-

j^,ry of God, and the name of God in fcripture, when fpoken

of as God's end in his works. p. ^j.

Sf-CT. VII. Shewing that the uhimate end in the creation

of the world, is but one, and what that one

END IS. p. ic6.

C O N T E N T S of the II. DifTej tation.

t-.-^

Chap. L CHewing wherein the effence of true vir

*^ confifts. f }^^-

Chap. II. Shewing how that love whereiti true virtue confifts, refpeds the divine Being and created Beings. . P-. 1/5-^

Chap. III. .Concerning the fecandary ^ud inferior kind Oi beauty. , P- ^34-

Chap. IV. 0(/elf-love and its variOiUS influence, to caufc^ love to others, or the contrary. \ P* 745.*

Chap. V. O^ naturalconfcience, znd thf,^^ moralfenfe, J! i^S*

Chap. VI. Of particular inftinds of n:V V.^ vvhich in fome refpe<5ts refembjc virtue. p. r68.

Chap. VII. The reafon why thofe things which have been mentioned, which have not the ej/ence of virtue have yet by many been mijiaken for true virtue. p. 175.

Chap. VIII. In what refpecSls virtue or moral ^ood is ^u^«d-

ed 'wkfeniimeni, and how far it is founded in the reajon anV^^

nature of things. p. 184'^,^,

md

ch

ab-

U'

Sf.

Concerning the End for which GOD created the World.

Jsj &§A^ ^3!*&^>Sa&

INTRODUCTION

Containing Explanations of Terms^ and general Pofttton$<,

jsf^i^\

rn tt

f^V

®5^!^i®!©^ avoid all confufion in our inquiries ani ^^^^^^^ reafonings, concerning the end for which ^^T "^^ God created the world, a diftintflion fhoirid "^V-^^<^' be obferved between the chief end for whicii W-'&'^W^^ an agent or efficient exerts any acSl-^nd per-©^i©©^ forms any work, and the ultimate trJ. Thefe two phrafes are not always precifely of the fame fig-nification : And tho' the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end.

A chief end is oppofite to an inferior end : An ultimate end, is oppofite to a fubordinate end. A fubordinate end ir. fomething that an agent feeks and aims at in what he does ; but yet don^t fee<c it, or regard it at all upon it's own account, but wholly ©n the account of a further end, or in order to fome other thing, v/hich it is confidered as a means of. Thus when a man that goes a journey to ob-

Mia

*-i><j^ - ^

tain a medicine to cure him of fome difeafe, and reflore his health,—the obtaining that medicine is his fubordinate end ; becaufe 'tis ret an end that he feeks for itfelf, or values at all upon its own account ; but wholly as a means of a further end, viz. his health : Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is efteemed good for nothing 5 nor is it at all defired.

An ultimate end is that which the agent fecks in what he does, for it's own fake : That he has refpeft to, as what he loves, values and takes pleafure in on it's own account, and not merely as a means of a further end : As when a man loves the tafte of fome particular fort of fruit, and is at pains and coft to obtain it, for the fake of the pleafure of that tafte, which he values upon it's own account, as he loves his own pleafure ; and not merely for the fake of any other good, which he fuppofes his enjoying that pleafure will be the means of.

Some ends are fubordinate ends, not only as they are fub-ordlnated to an ultimate end ; but alfo to another end that is itfelf but a fubordinate end : Yea, there may be a fucceffion or chain of many fubordinate ends, one dependent on another,—one fought for another : The firft for the next ; and that for the fake of the liext to that,—and fo on in a long feries before you come to any thing, that the agent aims at and feeks for it's own fake :■—As when a man fells a garment to get money—to buy tools— to till his land—to obtain a crop—to fupply him with food—to gratify the appetite. And he feeks to gratify his appetite, on it's own account, as what is grateful'in itfelf. Here the end of his felling his garm.ent, is to get money ; but getting money is only a fubordinate end : Tis not only fubordinate to the laft end, his gratifying his appetite ; but to a nearer end, viz. his buying hufbandry tools : And his obtaining thefe, is only a fubordinate end, being only for the fake of tilling land : And the tillage of land, is an end not fought on it's own account, but for the fake of the crop to be produced : And the crop produced, is not an ultimate end, or an end fought for itfelf, but only for the fake of making bread : And the having bread, is not fought oh it's own account^ but for the fake of gratis fying the appetite.

Heri

Here the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end ; becaufe 'tis the laft in the chain, where a man's ainn and purfuit ftops and refts, obtaining in that, the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his defire terminates and rcfts, it being fomething valued on it's own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or fhorter ; yea, if there be but one link or one flep that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the fake of the pleafure of the tafte, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end. which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate ^(id his ultimate end ; his next and his laft end. That end which is fought for the fake of itfelf, and not for the fake of a further end, is an ultimate end ; it is ultimate or laft, as it has no other beyond it, for whofe fake it is, it being for the fake of itfelf: So that here, the aim of the agent ftops and refts (without going farther) being come to the good which he efteems a recompence of it*s purfuit for it's own value.

Here it is to be noted, that a thing fought, may have the nature of an ultimate, and alfo of a fubordinate end , as it may be fought partly on it's own account, and partly for the fake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may feek the love and refpe^t of a particular perfon, partly on it's own account, becaufe 'tis in itfelf agreable to men to be the objecls of other's efteem and love : ^nd partly, becaufe he hopes, through the friendftiip of that perfon to have his affift-ance in other affairs j and fo to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.

A chief end or higheft end, which is oppofite not properly to a fubordinate end, but to an inferior end, is fomething diverfe from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is moft valued ; and therefore moft fought after by the agent in what he does. 'Tis evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the fame thing as to be an end valued u]timately,or for it's own fake. This will appear, if it be confidered.

I. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends,-and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for

B 2 their

their own fake, and both fought in the fame work or a£ls, and yet one valued more hfghly and fought more than another : Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreabie to him in themfelves confidered. and fo both may be what he values on their own account and feeks for their own fake ; And )et one may be much more agreabie than the other: And fo be what he fets his heart chiefly upon, and feeks moft after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the pofleflion and enjoyment of a biide that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiofity in looking in a telefcope, or fome new-invented and extraordinary optic glafs : Both may be ends he feeks in hi5;^ourney, and the one , * * not properly fubordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another ; and therefore both may be ultimate ends : But yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glafs, his inferior end. The former may be what he fets his heart vaftly moft upon 3 and fo be properly the chief end of his journey.

2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, becaufe fome fubordinate ends may be more valued and fought after than fome ultimate ends. Thus for inftance, a man may aim at thefe two things in his going a journey j one may be to vifit his friends, and another to receive a great eftate, or a large fum of money that lies ready for him, at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the fum of money may be but a fubordinate end : He may not value the filver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleafure, gratifications and honor ; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is inore valued, and fo an higher end of his journey, than the pleafure of feeing his friends ; tho' the latter is what is valued on its own account, and fo is an ultimate end,

But here feveral things may be noted :

First, That when it is faid, that fome fubordinate ends iTiay be more valued than fome ultimateends, 'tis not fuppofed that ever a fubordinate end is more valued than that ultimate ^pA or ends to which it is fubordinate , becaufe a fubordinate

end

end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end : For that reafon it is called a fubordinate end, becaufe it is valued and fought, not for it's own fake, or it*s own value, but only in fub®rdination to a further end, or for the fake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a fubordinate en4 maybe valued more than fome other ultimate end that it is not fubordinate to, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that feries, or chain of ends. Thus for inflance : If a man goes a journey to receive a fum of mGney,not at all as an ultimate end, or becaufe he has any value for the filver and gold for their own fake, but only for the value of the pleafure and honor that the money may be a means of. In this cafe it is impoflible that the fubordinate end, viz. his having the money fhould be more valued by him than the pleafure and honor, for which he values it. It would be abfurd to fuppofe that he Values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the fake of the end, of which it is the means : But yet he may value the money, tho' but a fubordinate end, more than fome other ultimate end, to which it is not fubordinate, and with which it has no connedlion. For inftaDce,more than the comfort of a friendly vifit 3 which Was one end of his journey.

Secondly, Not only is a fubordinate end never fuperior to that ultimate end5to which it is fubordinate ; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) fuperior to it's fubordinate end, and more valued by the agent ; unlefs it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the fubordinate : So that he has no other means by which to obtain his laft end,* and alfo is looked upon as certainly connected with it,"—then the fubordinate end may be as much valued as the lafl end ; becaufe the laft end, in fuch a cafe, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for inftance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of her's, at a diftance ; and fhe goes a journey to go to her friend's houfe or garden, to obtain that fruit—the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that ftrong appetite : The obtaining that fruit, is the fubordinate end of it. If fhe looks upon it, that i\i.t appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit 5 and that it will certainly be gratified if Ihe obtains it,

then

then fhe will value the fruit as much as ftie values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwife, it will not be (o : If (he be doubtful whether that fruit will fatisfy her craving, then Ihe will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itfelf ; or if there be fome other fruit that fhe knows of, that will gratify her defire, at leaft jn part; v/hich fhe can obtain without fuch inconvenience or trouble as fhall countervail the gratification ; which is in efFedl, fruftra-ting her of her laft end, becaufe her laft end is the pleafure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that fhall countervail, and in effect deftroy it. Or if it be fo, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without fomething elfe to be compounded with it,—then her value for her laft end will be divided between thefe feveral ingredients as fo many fubordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the laft end.

Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a fubordinate end is equally valued with it's laft end ; becaufe the cbtaining of a laft end rarely depends on one fingle, uncom-pounded means, and is infallibly connedled with that means : Therefore, mens laft ends are commonly their higheft ends.

Thirdly, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does,and there be a great variety of operations, his laft end may juftly be looked upon as his fupreme end : For in fuch a cafe, every other end but that one, is an end to that €nd ; and therefore no other end can be fuperior to it. Becaufe, as was obferved before, a fubordinate end is never more valued, than the end to which it is fubordinate.

Moreover, the fubordinate effefts, events or things brought to pafs, v/hich all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their fhare towards the obtaining the one laft ^nd, are very various ; and therefore, by what has been now obferved, the ultimate end of all muft be valued, more thaa any one of the particular means. This feems to be the cafe with the works of God,as may more fully appear in the fequel.

From what has been faid, to explain what Is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be obferved concerning ultimate ends in the fexifs explained.

FoURTHLVj

Fourthly, Whatfoever any agent has in view in any thing he docs, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature ; and is agreable to him in itfelf, and not meerly for the fake of fome-thing elfe, is regarded by that agent as hi^ laft end. The fame may be faid, of avoiding of that which is in itfelf painful or difagreable ; For the avoiding of what is difagreable is agreable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By laft end being meant, that which is regarded and fcught by an agent, as agreable or de-fireable for it's own fake ; a fubordinate that which is fought only for the fake of fomething elfe.

Fifthly, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will be brought to pafs by what he does, that are agreable to him, confider'd in themfelves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account,—then he muft have more things than one that he regards as his laft ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent feeks, as the confe-quence of what he does that is agreable to him, on it's own account, then there can be but one laft end which he has in all his adiions and operations.

But only here a diftin6^1on muft be obferved of things which may be faid to be agreable to an agent, in themfelves confider'd in two fenfes. ( i.) What is in itfelf grateful to an agentf and valued and loved on its own account,y7w/»/v and abfolutely confidered, and is fo univerfally and originally, antecedent to, and independent of all conditions, or any fup-pofition.of particular cafes and circumftances. And (2.) What may be faid to be in itfelf agreable to an agent, hypothetic ally ?nd confequentially : Or, on fuppofition or condition of fuch and fuch circumftances or on the happening of fuch a particular cafe. Thus, for inftance : A man may originally love fociety. An inclination to fociety may be implanted in his very nature : And fociety may be agreable to him antecedent to all prefuppofed cafes and circumftances : And this may caufe him to feek a family. And the comfort of fociety may be originally his laft end, in feeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and mutual juftice and fricndfhip in his family, may be agreable to him,

and

and what he delights in for their own fake : and therefore thefe things may- be his laft end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with refpeiSt to his family. The juftice and pesfce of a family was not properly his laft end before he had a family, that induced him to feck a family, but confequentiaily. And the cafe being put of his having a family, then thefe things wherein the good order and beauty of a family confift, become his laft end in many things he does in fuch circumftances. In like manner we muft fuppofe that God before he created the world, had feme good in view, as a confequence of the world's exiftence that was originally agreable to him in itfelf confidered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the univerfe, with various intelligent creatures into exiftence in fuch a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and fuch and fuch intelligent creatures actually had exiftence, in fuch and luch circumftances, then a wife, juft regulation of them was agreable to God, in itfelf confidered. And God's'love of juftice, and hatred of injuftice, would be fufficient in fuch a cafe to induce God to deal juftly with his creatures, and to prevent all injuftice in him towards them. But yet there is no neceflity of fuppofmg, that God's love of doing juftly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally inducedGod to create the world, ?ind make intelligent beings ; and fo to order the occafion of doing either juftly or unjuftly. The juftice of God's nature makes a juft regulation agreable, and the contrary difagreable, as there is occafion, the fubje(5t being fuppofed, and the occafion given : But we muft fuppofe fomeihing elfe that ftiould incline him to create the fubjedls or order the occafion. -

So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulnefs, or his inclination to fulfil his promifcs to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world j nor could fuch a fulfilment of his promifes to his creatures, be his laft end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himfeif by promife to them, then that difpo-fition which is called his faithfulnefs may move him in his providential difpofals towards them : And this may be the e^d of many oi God's works ©f providence, even the exercife

. of

/;; the. Creation of the World. ^

of his faith^ulnefs in fulfilling his promifes. And may be in the lower (tn^Q his laft end. Becaufe faithfulnefs and truth, inuft be fuppofed to be what j.s in itfeif amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own -Take. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence,/which are ultimate ends in a lower fenfe, whicti were not ultimate ends of the creation.

So that here we have two forts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end ; the other confequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter fort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends : Becaufe, tho' their being agreable to the agent, or the agent's defire of them, be confequential on the exiftence, or fuppofi-tion of proper fubje6fs and occafion ; yet the fubjedt and oc-cafion being fuppofed, they are agreable and amiable in them-felves. We may fuppofe that to a righteous Being, the doing juftice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreable in itfelf, and is loved for it's own fake, and not merely for the fake of fome other end : And yet we may fuppofe, that a defire of doing juftice between two parties, may be confequential on the being of thofe parties, and the occafion given.

Therefore I make a diftin6lion between an end that in this manner is confequential^ and 2i fubordinate end.

It may be obferved, that when I fpeak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following difcourfe, 1 commonly mean in that higheft fenfe, viz. the original ultimate end.

Sixthly, It may be further obferved, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is a:one^ that which induces God to give the occafion for confequential ends, by the firft creation of the world, and the original difr pofal of it. And the more original the end is, the more cx-tenfive and univerfal it is. I'hat which God Iftid primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the world., muft be conftantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with refpe^l to every thing th^t he docs towards his creatures.

C Anp

And therefore,

Seventhly, If we ufe the phrafe ultimate end in this higheft fenfe, then the fame that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we fuppofe but one fuch end, muft be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every ihjDg he does either in creation or providence. But we muft iuppofe that in the ufe, which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he muft evermore have a regard to the end, for which he has made them. But if we take ultimate end in the other lower fenfe, God may fometimes have regard to thofe things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper fenfe be his laft end in creating the world.

Eighthly, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any fenfe, of his works of providence in general, that muft be the ultimate end of the work of creation itfelf. For tho' it be fo that God may adt for an end, that is an ultimate end in a lower fenfe, in fome of his works of providence,which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world : Yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may juftly look upon whatsoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the fame is alfo an ultimate end of the creation of the world ; for God's works of providence in general, are the fame with the general ufe that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we fee of the general ufe which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he defigned the world. Tho' there ma) be fome things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the laft end of the creation, which are in themfelves grateful to God in fuch particular emergent circumftances 5 and fo are laft ends in an inferior fenfe : Yet this is only in certain cafes, or particular occafions. But iftheyaie laft ends of God's proceedings in the ufe of the world in general, this ftiews that his making them laft ends don't depend on particular cafes and circumftances, but the nature of things in general, and his general defiga in the being and coriftitution of the ■univerf?,

Nll^ETHLY,

NiNETHLY, If there be but one thing that is originally^ and independent on any future, fuppofed cafes, agreable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one laft end of God's work, in this higheft fenfe . But if there are various things, properly diverfe one from a-nother, that are, abfolutely and independently on the fuppo-fition of any future given cafes, agreable to the divine being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were feveral ultimate ends of the creation, in that higheft fenfe.

CHAPTER I.

Wherein is confidcred, whar Reafon teaches concerning this Affair,

SECTION I.

Some Things obferved in general, which Reafon.

di£laies.

HAving obferved thefe things, which are proper to be taken notice of, to prevent confufion in difcourfes on this fubjed:, I now proceed to confider what may^ and what may not be fuppos'd to be God^s ultimate end in the creation of the world.

And in th$ firft place, I would obferve fome things which reafon feems to dictate in this matter. Indeed this affair, feems properly to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determined what was aimed at, or defign'd in the creating of the aftonifhing fabric of the univerfe which we behold, it becomes us to attend to and rely on what he has told us, who was the architetSt that built it. He heft knows his own heart, and what his own ends and defigns were in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be fuppofed that mankind, who, while deftitute of revelation, by the utmoft improvements of their own reafon, and advances in fcience and philofophy, could come to no clear and eftablifhed determination who the author of the world was,

C 2 would

Jl

would ever have obtain'd any tolerable fettled judgment of the end which the author of it propofed to himfelf in ^o vaft> complicated and v/onderful a work of his hands. And tho' it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, which has been in tlie world as a light {hiniiig in a dark place, has been the occafion of great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to ufe their reafon ; (in which regard, notwithftanding the noblenefs and excellency of the faculties which God had given them, they feem'd to be in thcmfelves almoft helplcfs.) And tho* mankind now, thro* the long continual afliRance they have liad by this divine jight, have come to attainments in the habitual exerciie of reafon, v»^hich are far beyond v/hatorherwife they would have arrived to ; yet I confefs it wou'd be reiying too much on reafon, to determine the affair of God's lait end in the creation of the world, only by our own reafon, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation, fmce God has given a revelation containing mftru£l:ions concerning this ftiatter. Neverthelefs, as in the difputes and wranglings which have been about this matter, thofe objections, which have chiefly been made ufe of againft v/hat i think the fcrip-tureg have truly/evealed,have been from the pretended dictates of reafon,— I would in the firJi place foberly conjtder in a few things^ what fiems rational to be fiuppos'd concerning this affair ^—^ and then proceed to conftder uJhat light divine revelation gives tis in. it.

As to the firfl of thefe, viz. what feems in itfelf ration**! to be fuppofed concerning this m.atter, I think the follov/ing things appear to be the dictates of reafon :

I. That no notion of God's lafl end in the creation of the world is agreable to reafon, which would truly imply or infer any indigence, infuiticiency and mutability in Qod ; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his penedion or happinefs. Becaufe it is evident, by both fcripture and reafcnj that God is infnitely, eternally, un-' changeably, and independently glorious and happy ; that he Hands in no need of, cannot be profited by, oi receive any thing from the creature ■; or be truly hurt, or be the fubjecl of any fufferings or inpair of his glory and felicity from any oth^r bcii^g. 1 need not ftand to produce the proofs of God's . ..< » . bein^

being fuch a one, it being fo univerfally allowed and maintained by fuch as call themfelvcs-chriiHans.—The notion of God's creating the world in ordtr to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconfiftent with the notion of creation ; v/hich implies a being s receiving it's exiftence, & all that belongs to it's being, out of nothing. And this implies the moft perfect, -abfolute and univerfal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives it's all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it poflVbie that it fhould have any thing to add to God, to make him in any refped more than he was before, and fp the Creator become dependent on the creature ?

2. Whatsoever is good U valuable in itfelf,is worthy that God (hou'd value for itfelf, & on it's own account j or which ~ is the fame thing, value it with an ultimate value or refpecSt. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately fought by God, or made the laft end of his aftion and operation j if it be a thing of fuch a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be fuppofed that lome things, which are va.uable and excellent in themfelves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation j becaufe they do not remain to be attaintd ; but their exift-ence in all poffible refpe6i:s, m.iilf be conceiv'd of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's exillence and iiifin^'^-perfecfi<..n, tho' infmitely valuable in themfelves, and in^ P^^" ]y valued by God, yet can't be fuppofed to be the end ^e molt: divine operation. For we can't conceive of them as in'^ova refpe6t confequent on any works of God :—^^But wkateveF^^' in itfelf valuable^ ahfolutely Jo^ and that is. capable of ieinp^ fgug^' and attained^ is worthy to be made a lafl end of: the diinne cp^ ration^ • Therefore,

3. Whatever that be which is initfelfmoft valuable, and was fo originally, prior to the creation of the world, and u^hich is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was fuperior in value,to all others, that mull be worthy to be God's jafl: end in the creation j and alfo worthy to be his higheft end.-—in confequence of this, it will follow,

4. That if God himfelf be in any refpecl properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then ' ■ it

it is reafonable to fuppofe that he had rcfped to himfelfzs his Jalt and higheft end in this work ;* becaufc he is worthy in himfelf to be fo, being infinitely the greateft and Ij^ of Beings. All things elfe, with regard to worthinefs, importance and excellence, are perfe(fi:ly as nothing in comparifon of him. And therefore if God efteems, values, and has refpe(St to things according to their nature and proportions, he muft neccflarily have the greateft refpeft to himfelf. It would be againft the perfection of his nature, his wifdom, holinefs, and perfc(5l rectitude, wheieb) he is difpofed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to fuppofe otherwife. At leaft a great part of the moral reilitude of the heart of God, whereby he is diipofed to every thing that is fit, luitable and amiable in itfelf, confifts in his having infinitely the higheft regard to that which is in itfelf infinitely higheft and beft : Yea it is in this that it feems chiefly to confift.—The moral redlitude of God's heart muft confift in a proper and due refpedl of his heart to things that are objecfts of moral refpedt : That is, to intelligent beings capable of moral adiions and relations. And therefore it muft chiefly confift in giving due refpedt to that Being to whom moft is due ; yea infinitely moft, and in effect all. For God is infinitely the moft worthy of regard. The worthinefs of others is as nothing to his : So that to him belongs all poftible refpecfl. To him belongs the whole of the refpe6l that any moral agent, either God, any intelligent Being is capable of. To him belongs all '.s ^'-art—^Therefore if mo^al rectitude of heart coufifts in .g the refpe(5l or regard of the heart which is due, or ch fitnefs & fuitablenefs requires, fitnefs requires infinite-t^he greateft regard to be pa>d to God ; and the denying .preme regard here, would be a conduct infinitely the moft unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitnefs of regard does infinitely moft confift in.— Hence it will follow— thai the moral rectitude and fityufs of the ciifpofition^ inclination or affeSiion of God's hearty dees chiefly con-fjl in a refpe£i or regard to hiirifelf infnitely ahcve his regard to all other beings : Or in other words, his holinefs confifts in this.

And if it be thus fit that God (hou'd have a fuprcme regard to himfelf, then it is fit that this fupreme regard {hou'd appear, in thofe things by which he makes himlelf known,

or

Chap. I. '« ^^^ Creation of the WorlJ, rj

or by his word 2ind worh ; i. e. in what he fays, and in what he does^ If it be an infin'tely amiable thing inGod, that he fhould have a fupreme regard to himfelf,then it is an amiable thing thar!ie itiou'd slS: as having a chief regard to himfelf; or ajt in fuch a manner, as to fliew that he has fuch a regard ; that what is higheft in God's heart, may be higheft in his a<R:ions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reafon to think it was, that his works ihould exhibit an image of himfelf their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper reprefentation of his divine excellencies, and efpecially his moral excellence, confifting in the dijpofition of his heart j then 'tis reafon able to iuppole that his workfs are fo wrought as to {hew this fupreme refpedt to hiinfeli, wherein his moral excellency does primarily confift.

When we are confidering with ourfelves, what would bc moft fit and proper for God to have a chief refpedt to, in his proceedings in general, with regard to the univerfaiity of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with the greater eafe & fatisfadlion to confider, what we can fuppofe would be judged and determined by fome third being of perfect wif-dom and recftitude, neither the creator nor one of the creatures, that fhouM be perfectly indifferent and difinterefled. Or if we make the fuppofition, that wifdom itfelf, or infinitely wife juflice and rerfitude were a diftin(?t difinterefted per-fon, whofe office it was to determine how things fhall be moft ficy and properly order'd in the whole fyftem, or kingdom of cxiftence, including king and fubjetfts, God and his creatures ;. and" upon a view of the whoie, to decide what regard Ihould prevail ?nd govern in all proceedings. Now luch a judge in adjufling the proper meafures and kinds of regard that every part of existence is to h^ve, would weigh things in an even balance , taking care, that greater, or jnore exiflence fhould have a greater Ihare than lefs, that a. greater part of the whole fhould be more looked at and re-fpefted. than the lefler in proportion (other things being e-quai) to the meafiire o exiftence,—-that the more excellent Ihould be more regarGeci than the lefs excellent :—So that the degree of regard^, fhould always be in a proportion^ compounded of t\\^ proporiiGu of exi/lence^ 2indproporucn of excellence^ or according to the degree of greatnejs SiDd goodnefs, confider'd

conjun^ly^"^

/

<, GOD's lajl End Sect. I.

(onjunSily. —Such an arbiter, in confidering the fyftem of created intelligent beings by itfeif, would determine, that the fyftem in general, confiiring of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater fhare of regard, than only one individual. For however confiderable fome of the individuals might be/o that they might be much greater and better, and have a greater ihare of the fum total of exiftence and excellence than another individual, yet no one exceeds others fo much as to countervail all the reft of the fyftem: And if this judge confider not only the fyftem of created beings, but the fyftem of being in general, comprehending the fum total of univerfal exiftence, both creator and creature ; ftill every part muft be confidered according to it's weight and importance, or the meafure it has of exiftence and excellence. To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the creator, and all his creatures taken together, both muft be as it were put in the balance ;— xhtfu-freme Beings with ail in him, that is great, confiderable, & excellent, is to be eftimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation : And according as the former is found to out-weigh, in fuch proportion is he to have a greater fhare of regard.—And in this cafe, as the whole fyftem of created beings in comparifon of the creator, would be found as the light duft of the balance (which is taken notice of by him that weighs) and as nothing and vanity ; fo the arbiter muft determine accordingly with refpe(ft: ta the degree in which God ftiould be regarded by all intelligent exiftence, and the degree in which he fhould be regarded in all that is done thro* the whole univerfal fyftem ; in all a6lions and proceedings, determinations and effedls whatever, whether creating, preferving, ufmg, difpofing, changing, or deftroying. And as the creator is infinite, and has all poftlble exiftence, perfection and excellence, fo he muft have all poilible regard. As he is every v^ the firft and fupreme, and as his excellency is in all refpecls the fupreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good ; fo he muft have in' ^11 refpe61:5 the fupreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly fubordinaie, and on whohi aH depend, wojrthy to reign as fupreme head with abfolute and univerfal dominion ; fo it is fit that he Ihou'd be fo regarded "by all & in all proceedings is. effects thro' the whole fyftem': Th^t this univerfality of things in their whole compafsand

feriss

Ghap. I. ^^ ^^^ Creation oj the World. ij

feries (hould look to him and refpecft him in fuch a manner as thai re<pec^ to him {hould reig,n over all refpeiSl to other things and that ret^ard to creatures fhuuld univerfally be iub-ordinate and lubjecl.

When I fpeak of regard to be thus adjufted in the uni-verfal fsfcem, or fum total of exiftence, 1 mean the regard of the fum total ; not only the regard of individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent exiftence,created, and uncreated. For 'tis fit, that the regard of the creator fhould be proportioned to the worthinefs of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus v/e mull: conclude fuch an arbiter, as i have fuppofed, would determine in this bufmefs, being about to decide how matters fhouM proceed moft fitly, properly, and according to the natu/e of things. He would therefore determine, that the whole univerfe, including all creatures animate and inanimate, in all it's actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire feries of events, fhould proceed from a regard and with a view, to God^ as the fupream and laft end of all : That every wheel, both great and fmall, in all it's rotations, fhou'd move with a conitant ia-variable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as per-fe6fly and uniformly, as if the whole fyftem were animated and directed by one common foul : Or, as if fuch an arbiter as i have before fuppofed, one poffefied of peife6t wifdom and re6fitude, became the common foul of the univerfe, and actuated and governed it in all it's motion^.

Thus I have gone upon the fuppofition of a third per-fon, neither creator nor creature, but a difintereftcd^erfon ftepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and ftate what is molt fit and proper between them. The thing fuppofed is impofilble ; but the cafe is neverthelefs juft the fame as to what is moft fit and fuitable in itfjlf.* For it is mo'l: certainly proper for God to a£t, according to the greateil 'fitnsfs^ in his proceedings, and he knows what the greateft fit?iefs is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a diftinct per-fon to dire£^ him. As therefore there is no third beingjbefide God and the created fyftem, nor can be, fo there is no need of any, feeing God himfelf is pofieffed of that perfe6t dif-eernment and rectitude which have been, fuppofed. It belongs to him as fupream arbiter, and to his infinite wifdom

D m^

and re£Htude, to ftate all rules and meafures of proceedings. And feeing thefe attributes of God are infinite, and moft ab-folutelv perfe6l, they are not the lefs fit to order and difpofe, becaufe they are in him, who is a being concern'd, and not a third pe.'Ton that is difinterefted.—For being interefted unfits a perfon to be an arbiter or judge, no other wife than as intereft tends to blind & miflead his judgment, or incline him to a6t contrary to it. But that God ftiould be in danger of either, is contrary to the fuppofition of his being pofleffed of difcerning and juftice abfolutely perte6t. And as there muft be fome fupream judge of fitnefs and propriety in the uni-verfality or things, as otherwife there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whofe are a^l things, who is perfe6tly fit for this office, and who alone is fo to ftate all things according to the moft perfeft fitnefs and re6litude, as much as ii perfe(5l rectitude were a diftin^l perfon. We may therefore be fure it is and will be done.

I SHOULD think that thefe things might incline us to fup-pofe, that God has not forgot himfelf, in the ends which he propofed in the creation of the world ; but that he has fo ftated thefe ends (however he is felf-fufiicient, immutable, and independent) ?s therein plainly to fhew a fupreme regard to himfelf. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, muft be confidered afterwards, as alfo what may be objedled againft this view of things.

5. Whatsoever is good, amiable and valuable in itfelf, abfolutely and originally, which facts and events ftiew that God aimed at in the creation of the world, muft be fuppofed to bt regarded, or aimed at by God ultimately^ or as an ultimate end of creation —For we muft fuppofe from the per-fe<5lion of God's nature, that whatfoever is valuable and arpi-able in itfelf, firhply and abfolutely confidered, God values fimply for itfelf; 'tis agreable to him abfolutely on it's own account; becaufe God's judgment and efteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing fimply, and abfolutely, for itfelf, and on it's own account, then 'tis the ultimate objeft of his value ; he don't value it merely for the fake of a further end to be attained by it» For to fuppofe that he values it only for fome farther end,

« is

is in clire£l con trad i(ftion to the prefent fuppofition, which \s^' that he values it abfolutely, and for itfeir.—Hence it moft clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately, and for itfelf, appears in fa(^ and experience, to be what he leeks by any thing he does, he muft regard it as an ultimate tnd. And therefore if he feeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, 'tis an ultimate end of the work of creation — Having got thus far, we may now proceed a flep farther, and afTert

6. Whatsoever thing is actually the efFe£l or confe-quence of the creation of the world, which is hmply and abfolutely good and valuable in itfelf, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world.—We fee that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world ; becaufe he has adualiy attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may juftly infer what God intends, by what headually does ; becaufe he does nothing inadvertently,or without defign. But whatever God intends to attain from a value for it; or in other words, whatever he aims at in his adions and works, that he values ; he feeks tliat thing in thofe afts and works. Becaufe, for an agent to intend to attain fomething he values by means he ufes, is the fame thing as to feek it by thofe means. And this is the fame as to make that thing his end in thofe means. Now it being by the fuppofition what God values ultimately, it mull therefore by the preceeding pofiti-on, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.

Sect. II.

SOme farther obfervations concerning thofe things which reafon leads us to fuppofe God aimed at in the creation of the world, fhewing particularly what things that are abfolutely good, are actually the confequence of the creation of the world.

From what was laft obferved it feems to be the moft proper and juft way of proceeding, as we ould fee what light reafon will give us refpeding the particular end or ends God

3D 2 h»4

hac! ultimately in view in the creation of the world, to con-fiticr what thing or things, are a£tually the efFe6t or confe-queuce of the creation of the world, that are fimply and originally valuable in themfelves. And this is what 1 would Cjire6lly proceed to, without entring on any tedious metaphy-fical enquiries wherein fitnefs, amiablenefs, or valuablenefs confifts ; or what that is in the nature of fome things, which is properly the foundation of a worthinefs ot being loved and ^fteemed on their own account. In this 1 muff at prefent refer what I fay to the fenfe ind dictates of the reader's mind, on fedate and calm reflettion i proceed to obferve,

I. It feems a thing in itfelf fit. proper and dcfirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which confiil: in a fufficiency to certain acts and efte6fs, fliould be exerted in the production Of fuch efl:'e6ts, as might maniftft the infinite power, wif-dom, rigliteoufnefs, goodnefs, he which are in God. If the world had not been created, thefe attributes never would have had any exercife. The power of God, which is a fufficiency ih him to produce great efredts, mull for ever have been dormant and ufelefs as to any effeCl. [ he divine wifdom and prudence would have had no exercife in any wife contrivance, -. any prudent proceeding or difpofal of things ; for there would have been no objects of coiu^ivance or difpofal. The fame nii;rbt be oblc-jvcd of God's juftice, goodnefs and truth.—> Iniiced God might have known as perfectly that he poflelTed theie a;rributes, if they had never been exerted or exprelled in ;r.y ^fftct. Bi^ then if the attributes which confift in a fufii^iency for correfpondent efftfts, are in themfelves excei-ler.'' :he exercifes of them muft likewife be excellent. If it be 'M\ trxcellent thing that there fhould be a fufficiency for a certain kir-d of action or operation,the excellency of fuch a fufficiency mull confifl iq it's relation to this kind of operation or eiictii ; but that could not be, unlefs the operation itfelf we;c excellent. A fufficiency for any .a£t or work is no farther valuable, than the work or ellecl is valuable.* AsQod therefore

* As we muiM conceive of thing?, the ^dA and perfefticn of ihefe attributes docs as it were cui fift in theii exercife : *• '^ \iQ fnd of wifdom (f-^ysMr.'-G Tenr.ent, m bis Seunon at the openmg rf the preibyterian church of Philadelphia) is defign ; ttie

" ' ■ end

fore efteems thefe attributes themfelves valuable, and deliVhts in them ; fo 'tis natural to fuppole that he delights in their proper exercife and expreflion. For the fame reafon that he efteems his own fufficiency wifely to contrive and difpofe eir'efts, he alfo will efteem the wife contrivance and difpufi-tion itfelf. And for the fame reafon as he delights in- his own difp fition, to dojuftly. and to difpofe of things accordino- to trutn and juft proportion \ fo he muft delight in fuch a righteous diipofai itfelf.

2. It feems to be a thing in itfelf fit and defirable, that the glorious pf^rfeftions ofGod fhouid be known,and the operations and expreflions of them feen by other beings befides himfeU". if it be fit, that God's power and wifdom, &c. fhou'd be exercifed and exprcffed in fome effects, and not lie eternnuy durmnnt, then it feem- proper that thefe exercifes fnould appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they aie, it will be juft the fame as to thQ above purpofe, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himfelf and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercifes and eftedts they were fufficient for, antecedently to any fuch aftual operations of them^ as fince. If therefore it be neverthelefs a thing in itleh valuable, and worthy to be defiredj that thefe glorious pcrfe6tions be actually expreifed and exhibited in their correfpondert eff"t(51:s ; then it feems alfo,that the knowledge of thefe perfections, and the expreflions and difcoveries thai are piade of them, is a thing valuable in itfelf abfolutely cojifidered ; and that 'tis dtfirable that tlij^ knowledge (hould exift. As God's perfections are things in themfeives excellent, fo the ^xpreftion of i hem in their proper a6ts and fruits is excellent , and the knowledge or thele excellent perfections, and of thefe gloiious expreiHons of them, is an excellent thing, the exiftence of which is in itfelf valuable and defira-b].'.—' ["is a thing infinitely good in itfelf that God's glory fliould be known by a glorious fociety of created beings.

And

f nd of power is aftion ; the end of gcodricfs is doing good To fup{jofe thefe perfedlions not to be ex?rted, woula b? to repre-fent them as inlignificant. Of what \i\^ wouklGod'^ wifd.m be, if it had nothing to defign oi dired ? To what purpofe his al-mightincf, if it never bro't any thing to pafs ? And of what avnil hi? gcocncf:, if it never did any good r'*

And that there fliould be in them an increafing knowledge of God to all eternity,is an exiftence,a reality infinitely worthy to be,and worthy to be valued and regarded by him,to whom it belongs to order that to be, which, of all things poflible, is fitteft & beft. If exiftence is more worthy than deted: and non-entity, and if any created exiftence is in itfelf worthy to be, then knowledge or underftanding is a thing worthy to be ; and if any knowledge, then the moft excellent fort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. The exiftence of the created univerfe confifts as much in it as in any thing : Yea this knowledge, is one of the higheft, moft real and fub-ftantial parts, of all created exiftence, moft remote from non-entity and defed:.

3. As it is a thing valuable and defirable in itfelf that God's glory {hould be feen and known, fo when known, it feems equally reafonable and fit, it ftiould be valued and cfteemed, loved and delighted in, anfwerably to it's dignity. There is no more reafon to efteem it a fit and fuitable thing that God's glory fliould be known, or that there fliouId be an idea in the underftanding correfponding unto the glorious obje6t, than that there fliould be a correiponding difpofition or afFc6lion in the will. If the perfe6lion itfelf be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and fo is the efteem and love of it excellent. And as 'tis fit thatGod fliould love and efteem his own excellence, 'tis alfo fit that he fliould value and efteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any-being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued and efteemed : And if it becomes a being highly to value himfelf, it is fit that he fliould love to have himfelf valued and efteemed. If the idea of GoH's perfection in the underftanding be valuable, then the love of the heart feems to be more efpecially valuable, as moral beauty efpeci-ally confifts in the difpofition and affection of the heart.

4. As there is an infinite fulnefs of all poflible good in God, a fulnefs of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happinefs. And as this fulnefs is capable of communication or emanation ad extra ; fo it feems a thing amiable and valuable in itfelf that it fhould be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good fliould fend forth ab^undant ftreams, that this infinite fountain of light

fliould.

{hould, diffufing it*s excellent fulnefs, pour forth light all around.-^-And as this is in itfelf excellent, fo a difpofition to this, in the divine being, muft be looked upon as a perfection cr an excellent difpofition, fuch an emanation of good is, in fome fenfe, a multiplication of it ; fo far as the communication or external ftream may be looked upon as any thing befides the fountain, fo far it may be looked on as an increafe of good. And if the fulnefs of good that is in the fountain, is in itfelf excellent and worthy to exift, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increafe, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exift. Thus it is £t, fmce there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light fhould ftiine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and underftanding : And as there is an infinite fountain of holinels, moial excellence and beauty, fo it fhould flow out in communicated holinefs.—And that as there is an infinite fulnefs of joy and happinefs, fo thefe fhould have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant ilreams, as beams from the fun.

From this view it appears another way to be a thing xn itfelf valuable, that there fhould be fuch things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and an high efteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it : This appears I fay in another way, viz. as thefe things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holinefs and joy.

Thus 'it appears reafonable to fuppofe, that it was what God had refptft to as an ultimate end of his creating the world,to com.municate of his own infinite fulnefs of good ; or rather it, was his laft end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulnefs of Good ad extra^ or without himfelf, and the difpofition to communicate him-felf, or difFufe his own fulness, * which we mufl conceive

of

* I (hall often ufe the phrafe God^sfulne/s, as fignifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happinefs : partly bccaufe I know of no better phrafe to be ufed in this general meaning ; and partly becaufe I am led 'ceto by fome of the infpircd writers, particularly the apoftle Paul; who often ufeth the phrafe in this ferfe.

of as being originally in God as a perfecflion of his nature, was what moved him to cieate the world. But here a^ much as poflible to avoid confufion, 1 obferve, that there is fome impropriety in faying that a difpofition in God to communicate himfelf/<? the creaiwe^ moved him to create the world. For tho' the diffufive difpoiition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubdefs inclines him to communicate himfeif to the creature, when the creature cx-ifts j yet this cant be all : Becaufe an inclination in God to communicate himfeif to an objeft, feems to prefuppofe the exiftence of the obje61:, at leaft in idea. But the difFufive difpofition that excited God to give creatures exiftence, was rather a communicative difpofition in general, or a d fpofition in the fulnefs of the divinity to flov/ out and difFule itfelf. Thus the difpofition there is in the root and ftock of a tree to diffufe and fend forth it's fap and life, b doubtlefs the rea-fon of the communication of it's fap and life to it's buds, leaves and fruits, after thefe exift. But a difpofition to communicate of it's life and fap to it's fruits, is not fo properly the caufe of it's producing thofe fruits, as it's difpofition to communicate itfelf, or difxufe it's fap and life in general. Therefore to fpeak more ftri6tly according to truth, we m2.y fuppofe, that a difpofition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of. his own infinite fulnefs., was what excited him to create the tvorld ; and fo that the emanation itfelf was aimed at by him as a laji end of the creation.

Sect. III.

WHerein it is confidered hovj, on the fuppofitlon of God's making the forementioned things his laft end, he manifefts a fupreme and ultimate regard to himfeif in all his works.

In the laft fedion I obferved fome things, which are a6lu-ally the confequence of the creation of the world, which f^cm abfolutely valuable in themfelves, and fo worthy to be made God's laft end in this work. I now proceed to enquire, how God's making fuch things as thefe his laft end ib confiftent with his making himfeif his laft end, or his manifefting an ultimate refpecf to himfeif in his aCis and works, Becaufe

this

this is a thing I have obferved as agreable to the di£lates of reafon, that in all his proceedings he fhould fet himfelf high-eft.—Therefore I would endeavour to fhew with refpe(5t to each of the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himfelf his end, fo as in all to fhew a fupreme and ultimate refpe6l to himfelf j and how his infinite love to himfelf and delight in himfelf, will naturally caufe him to value and delight in thefe things : Or rather how a value to thefe things is implied in his love to himfelf, or value of that infinite fulnefs of good that is in himfelf.

Now with regard to the firft of the particulars mentioned above, viz. God's regard to the exercife and expreflion of thofe attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and efFe£ls, which confift in a fufficiency for thefe operations, *tis not hard to conceive that God's regard to himfelf, and value for his own perfections, fhould caufe him to value thefe exercifes and exprefHons of his perfections ; and that a love to them will difpofe him to love their exhibition and exert-ment : Inasmuch as their excellency confifts in their relation to ufe, exercife and operation ; as the excellency of wifdom confifts in it's relation to, and fufHciency for, wife defigns and efteCts. God's love to himfelf, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that, Which is the ufe, end and operation of thefe attributes. If one highly efteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wifdom, juftice, &c. that have relation to adtion, this will make him delight in the exercife and, genuine efFeCts of thefe virtues : So if God both efteem, and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he can't but value and delight in the expreiEons and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expreflions of his perfections, he manifefts a delight in his own perfections themfelves : Or in other words, he manifefts i delight in himfelf; and in making thefe expreflions of his own perfections his end, he makes himfelf his efid.

And with refpeCt to the fecond and third particulars, the matter is no lefs plain. For he that loves any being, and hag a difpofition highly to prize, and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, muft from the fame difpofition be well pleafed to have his excellencies knov/n, acknowledged, e-fl^eemed and prized by others. He that loves and approves

E any

any being or thing, he naturally loves and approves the love and approbation of thai: thing, and is oppofite to the difap-probatioa and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves ariother, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it Ciould be, if it be fit that the other ftiould be beloved, and his qualification priz'd. And therefore thus it will ne-ceflarily be, if a being loves himfelf and highly prizes his own excellencies : And thus it is fit it ihould Ve, if it be -fit he ^ould thus love himfelf, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, 'tis fit that he fhould take delight in his own excellencies being feen, acknowledged, efteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himfelf and his own perfections. And in feeking this, and making this his end, he feeks himfelf) and makes himfelf his end.

And with refpedl: to the fourth and laft particular, viz. God's being difpofed to an abundant cofnmunication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fulnefs of good which he pofiefles in himfelf; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happinefs, in the manner which he does ; if we thoro'iy and properly confider the matter, it will appear, that herein alfo God makes himfelf his end, in fuch a fenie, as plainly to manifeft and teltify a fuprcme and ultimate regard to himfelf.

^3EERI'Y in this difpofitlon todiiTufe himfelf, or to caufe an emanation of his glory and fulnefs, which is prior to the exigence of any other being, and is to be confider'd as the inciting caufe of creation, or giving exiftence to other beings, God can't fo properly be faid to make the creature his end, as himfelf.—For the creafure is not as yet confider-ed as exK^ing, This difpofition or defire in God, muft be prior to the exigence of the creature, even in intention and forefight. For it is a difpofition that is the original ground of the exiftence cf the creature ; a: d even of the future intended and forefeen exiftence of the creature. -God's

love, or benevolence, as it refpeCts the creature, may betaken either in a iarger,or ftridlev fenfe. In a larger fenfe it may figi.ify nothing diverfe from that good difpofition in his nature to communicate of his own fulnefs in general ; as his knowledge, his holinefs, and happinefs ; and to give crea-turea- exiftence in order to it. This may be called benevolence

lence or love, becaufe it is the fame good difpofition that is exerciied in love : 'Tis the very fountain from whence Icve originally proceeds, when taken in the moft proper ftnfe ; and it has the fame general tendency and efFe6\ in the creature's well-being. But yet this can't have any particular

prefent or future*created exiftence for its objtd: ; becaufe it is prior to any fuch objedt, and the very fource ot the fu-turition of the exigence of it. Nor is it really diverfe from God's love to himfelf; as will more clearly appear afterwards, gi

But God's love may be taken more ftridly, for this general difpofition to communicate good, as direded to particular obje6ls : Love in the moft ftrid and proper ftnfe, preiuppofes the exigence of the objedl beloved, at lenfl in idea and expedation, and reprefented to the mind as future, God did not love angeU in the ftideft fenfe, but in confe-quence of his iniendmg to create them, and fo having an idea of future exifting angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excittd him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence flridt'y taken, prefuppofes an cxifting objed, as much as pity, a miferable fufFering objedt.

This propenfity in God to djffufe himfelf, may be confi-der'd as a propenfitv to himfelf diffufed ; or to hiS own glory exifting in \vs emanation. A refped to himfelf, or an infinite propenfi'y to, and delight in his own glory, is that which oaufcs him to incline to its being abundantly difFufed, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it pu^s torih buds, (hoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a difpofition tha cmi-nates in its own compleat felf. And lo the difpofition in the fun to (hine, or abundantly to diffufeits fulnefs, warmth and brightncls, is only a tendency to its own moft glorious and compleat ftate. So God looks on the communication of himfelf, and the emanation or the infinite glory and good -t- that are in himfelf to belong to the fulnefs and compleal-nefs of himfelf ; as tho' he were not in his moil compleat and glorious f^ate without it. Thus the church of Chrift (toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fulnefs) is called the fulnefs of Chrift : As tho' he were not in his compleat ftate

E 2 without

without her ; as Adam was in a defedlive ftate without Eve, And the church is called the glory of Chrift, as the woman is the glory of the man, i Cor. xi. 7.—Ifai. xlvi. 13. I will place faivation in Zion, for Ifrael my glory j'*' ——Indeed after the creatures are intended to be created,,^ God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to thefe creatures, in the ftridleft fenfe, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exercifing his goodnefs, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the i^pnng of all God's proceedings thro' the univerfe ; as being now the-de-termin'd way of gratifying his general inclination to diffufe himfelf. Here God's acting for himfelf, or making hirafelf ifll laft end, and his acting for their fake, are not to be fet in oppofition ; or to be confidered as the oppofite parts of a disjuncStion : They are rather to be conlidered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be confidered as firft and original in his regard ; and the creature is the objedl of God's regard confequenti-ally and by implication as being as it were comprehended in God 'y as fhall be more particularly obferv'd prefently.

But how God's value for and delight m the emanations of his fulnefs in the work of creation, argues;^ his delight in the infinite fulnefs of good there is in himfelf, and the fu-

preme

Very rcjnarkable is that place, Joh. xii 23, 24. " And Jefus an-fwered them faying : the hopr is come that the fon of man fkould be glorified. Verily I fay unto you, except a corn of wheat fail into the ground and die.it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." He had refpeft herein, to the blefTed fruits of Chrift's death, in the converfion, faivation, and eternal happinefs and holinefs of thofc tha: ihould be redeemed by him. This confequence of his death, he calls his glory ; and his obtaining this fruit he calls his being glorified : As the flourifliing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat fown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created : But from him by his death proceeds a, glorious offspring; in which he is communicaied, that is his fulnefs and glory : As from Adam in his deep fleep proceeds the woman a beaatii'ul companion to fill his emptmefs, and relieve his folitarirefs. By Chrift's death, his fulnefs is abundantly difFufed in many ftreams ; and exprefTed in the beauty and gJory of a great multitude of his fpiriiual ofFspring,

Chap. L ^'« ^^^ Creation of the WorJJ. 2j

preme refped and regard he has for himfelf; and that in making thefe emanations of himfelf his end, he does ultimately make himfelf hjs end in creation^ will more clearly appear by confidering more particularly the nature and cir-cumftances of thefe communications of God's fulnefs which are made", and which we have reafon either from the nature of things, or the word of God to fuppofe (hall be made.

One part of that divine fulnefs which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communxated knowledge which muft befuppos'd to pertain to God's laft end in creating the world, is the creatures knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge : And even th^^-culty of underftanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is moft properly a communication of God's inhnite knowledge which primarily confilfs in the knowledge of himfelf. God in making this his end,makes himfelf his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. 'Tis the image of God's own knowledge ot himfelf. 'Tis a participation of the fame : 'Tisas much the fame as 'tis poflible for that to be, which is infinitely lefs in degree : As particular beams of the fun communicated, are the light and glory of the fun in ^art.

Besides God's perfedions, or his glory, is the objc(5l of this knowledge, or the thing known ; fo that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is feen. As therefore God vahjes himfelf, as he delights in his own knowledge; he muft delight in everything of thit nature : As he delights in his own light, he muft delight in every beam of that light : And as he highly values his ov/n excellency, he muft be well pleafed in having it manifefted, and fo glorified.

Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fulnefs that is, and will be made in confequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holinefs to the creature. This is a communication of God's holinefs ; fo that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency ; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beautv, he muft necefTarily delight in the creatures hohnefs -, which is a

conformity

^'U ' I f

conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brlght-nefs of a jewel, held in the fun's beams, is a participation, or derivation of the fun's brightnefs, tho' immei]lly jefs in

degree-^ And then it muft be confidered wherein this

holinefs in the creature confifts ; viz. in love, which is the comprehenfion ot all true virtue ; and primarily Jn love to God, which is exerciled in an high efteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praife of them. All which things are nothing elfe but the hearts exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God ; which as 1 (hew'd before, God neceiTarily approves of, and is pleafed with, as he loves himfeif, and values the glory of his own nature.

Another part ofGod'sfulnefs which he communicates, is his happinefs. This happinefs confifts in enjoying and rejoicing in himfelf : And fo does alfo the creatures happinefs. 'Tis, as has been obfeived of the other, a participation of what is in God ; and God and his glory are the obje6live ground of it. The happinefs of the creature confifts in rejoicing in God ; by which alfo God is magnified and exalted : Joy,or the exulting of the heart inGod's glory, is one thing that belongs to praife. So that God is

all in all, with refpedl to each part of that communication of the divine fulnefs which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or fomething of God : And each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conform'd to God, and united to him ; and that in proportion as the communication is greater or lefs. And the communicatiori jtfeif, is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praife of God confifts.

And 'tis farther to be confidered, that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that commun cation of himfelf, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumftances of this eternal e-manation of divine good, it will more clearly ftiew how in making this his end, God teftifies a' fupreme refpe<5l to himfelf, and makes himfelf his end. There are many reafons to think that what God has in view, in an increaiing communication of himfelf throughout eternity, is an increafing

knowledge

knowledge of God, love 10 him, and joy in him. And

'tis to be confider'd that the more thofc divine communications increafe in the creature, the more it becomes one with God : For fo much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and clofe: and at the fame time the creature becomes more and more conform*d to God. The image is more and more perfec5t, and fo the good thai is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore, of God, who has a comprehenfive profped of the inereafing union and conformitv through eternity, it muft be an infinitely iViCt and perfea nearnefs, conformity, and onencypJ* For it will for ever come nearer and nearer to that ftridtnefs and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son : So that in the eyes of God, who perfectly fees the whole of it, in its infinite progrefs and increafe, it muft come to an eminent fulfilment of Chrift's requeft, in Joh. xvii. 21, 23.—'' That they all may be one^ as thou father art in me,& 1 in thee,that they alfo may be one in us, 1 in them and thou in me,that they may be made perfe(5t in one*^ In this view, thofe eledt creatures which muft be looked upon as the end of all the reft of the creation, con-fidered with refpe^ to the whole of their eternal duration, and as fuch made God's end, muft be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were refpeded as brought home to him, united with him, centering moft perfectly in him, -and as it were fwallowed up in him : fo that his refpe6t to them finally coincides and becomes one and

the fame with refpe6l to himfelf The intereft of the

creature., is, as it were, God's own intereft, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the intereft of a man*s family is look'd upon as the fame with his own intereft ; becaufe of the relation they ftand in to him ; his propriety in them, and their ftri6t union with him. But confider God's elecfl creatures with refpedl to their eternal duration, fo they are infinitely dearer to

God, than a man's family is to him. What has been

faid, fhews that as all things are from God as their firft caufe and fountain ; fo all things tend to him, and in their progrcfs come rearer h nearer to him through all eternity : which argues that he who is tlieir firft caufe is their laft end.

Sect.

Sect. IV.

COme objedlions confidered which may be made againft *^ the realonablenefs of what has been faid of God's making himfelf his laft end.

ObjeSi. I. Some may objecl againft what has been faid, as inconfiftent with God's abfolute independence and im-mutabihty : particularly the reprefentatioh that has been made, as tho* God were inclined to a communication of his fulnefs and emanations of his own glory, as being his ofp mofi glorious and compleat ftall. It maytbe iho't that this don't well confift with God's being feU-exiftent from all eternity ; abfolutely pertecfl in himfelf, in the poffefTion of infinite and independent good. And that in genera], to fuppofe that God makes himfelf his end, in the creation of the world, feems to fuppofe that he aims at fome intereft or happinefs of his ownjnot eafily reconcileable with his being happy, perfedlly & infinitely happy in himfelf. If it could be fuppofed that God needed any thing; or that the goodnefs of his creatures could extend to him ; or that they could be profitable to him ; it might be fit,that God Ihould make himfelf, and his own intereft, his higheft and Jaft end in creating the world : and there would be fome reafon and ground for the prececding difcourfe. But feeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any refpe6t ; to what purpofe fhould God mske himfelf his end ; or feek to advance himfelf in any refpedl by any of his works ? How abfurd is it to fuppofe that God fhould do fuch great things with a view to obtain, what he is already moft perfe6tly pofiefTed of, and was fo from all eternity ; and therefore can't now pofi'ibly need, nor with any colour of reafon be fuppos'd to feek ?

Anfwer i. Many have wrong notions of God's happinefs, as refuiting from his abfolute felf-fufficience, independence, and immutability. Tho' h be true,that God's glory and happinefs are in and of himfelf, are infinite and can't be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature 5'

yet

yet it don't hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleafure or happinefs, in any of his a(5is or communications relative to the creature ; or efFe6>s he produces in them 5 or in any thing he fees in the creatures qualifications, difpofitions, adions and ftate. God may have a real and proper pleafure or happinefs in feeing the happy ftate of the creature : yet this may not be different from his delight in himfelf; being a delight in his own infinite goodnefs ; or the exercife of that glorious propenfity of his nature to diffuFe and communicate himfelf, and fo gratifying this inclination of his own heart. —-This delight which God has in his creature's happmefs, can't properly be faid to be what God receives from thp creature. For 'tis only the effecfl of his own work in, and communications 10 the creature ; in making it, and admit-jng it to a participation of his fulnefs. As the fun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and Ihmes pnly by a participation of its brightnefs.

With refpeft alfo to the creature's holinefs ; God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the crea-ture,as gratifying herebyjhis inclination,to communicate of his own excellent fulnefs. God may delight with true and great pleafure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expreflion and manifeftation of his own lovelinefs. And this is fo far from being ah inftance of his happinefs not being in and from himfelf, that 'tis an evidence that he is happy in himfelf, or delights and has pleafure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleafure in the expreffion of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he don't delight in his own beauty ; that he hath not his happinefs and enjoyment in his

own beauty and perfedion. So that if we fuppofc God

has real pleafure and happinefs in the holy love and praife of his faints, as the image and communication of his own holinefs, it is not properly any pleafure diftincSt from the pleafure he has in himfelf \ but is truly an inftance of it.

And with refpedl to God's bemg glorifiedin this refpcc?^, that thofe perfedlions wher^n his glory confifts, are exer-ciXed and exprefled in thtir^oper and corrcfponding efr«<5ls ^

F as

as his wlfoom In wife defigns and well-contrived works,-— ' his power in great efFe^^sr—his juftice in ads ot righteouf-•nefs —- his goodnefs in cummuaicating happin^fs ; and fo his (hewing forth the glory of. his own nature, in its being exercifed, exhibited, communicated, known, and eftcemcd : his having delight herein does not argue that his pleafure or happinefs is not in himfejf, and his own glory ; but the contrary. This is the neceflary confequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.

Nor do any of thefe things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happinefs. Tho' h.e has real pieafure in the creature's holinefs and happinefs ; yet this is nor properly any pleafure which he receives from the creature. For thefe things are what he gives the creature. Th«y are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they arc nothing that they give to Gcd by which thev add to him. His rejoycing therein,is rather a rejoicing in his own a>51s, and his own glory exprefled in thofe a<^s, than a jcy tierived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing befides his own adl, which he exerts with an abfo-jute and independent power. And yet, in fome fenfe it can be truly faid that God has the more delight and pleafure for th« holinefs and happinefs of his creatures. Becaufe God would be lefs happy, if he was lefs good : or if he had not that perfedlion of nature which confifts i» a pro-penfuy ot nature to diffufe of his own fulnefs. And he would be lefs happy, if it were poiTible for him to be hin-der'd in the exercife of his eoodnefs, and his other perfections in their proper efFedls. But he has complear happinefs, becaufe he has thefe perfedlions, and can't be hin-dred in exercifing and difphying them tn thei.r proper eftedts. And this furely is not thus, becaufe he is dependent ; but becaufe he is independent on any other that fncuUl hinder him.

From this view it appears, that nothing that has been faid is in the leaft inconfiftent with thofe exprefficns in the Scripture that fignify that man can't be profitable to God ; ihat he receives nothing of us by any of our wifdom and ti^hteoufnefs, f pr thefe cxprefUon? p(ainly mgan no triore-

than

A

than that God is abfplutely independent of us j that ,we have nothing ot our 6wn, no ftock. from whence we can give to God i and that no part of his happinefs originates frpm man.

From what has been faid it appears, that the pleafure that God hath m thofe things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleafure in difFufmg and communicating to the creature, than in receivi g trom the creature. Surely, 'tis no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate ot his infinite fulnefs. Tis no argument of the emptinefs or deficiency of a fountain, that it is in-chned to overflow.— Another thing fignified by thefe ex-prefTions of Icripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's happinefs, as tho' it were changeable either by encreafe or diminution. Nor does any thing that has been advanced in the leaft iuppofe or infer that it does, oris it in the leaH: inconfirtent wiflitiie eternity, and moft abfolute immutability of God's pleafure *

and happinefs. For tho' thefe communications of God,

thefe exercifes, operations, efFe(5fs and expreflions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoyces in, are in time ; yet his joy in them is wiihcut beginning or change, l^hey were always equally preftmt in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearnefs certainty and fulnefs in every refpt6t,as he doth now. They were always equally prefent ; as with him there is no variablenefs or fucctflion. He ever beheld arid enjoyed them perte<5lly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, abfoiutely perfedl unchangeable ^.an4 independent. It can't be added to or diminifhtd by the power or will of any creature : nor is in the leafl depeti'* dent on any thing mutable or contingent.

2. If any are not fatisfyed with the preceeding anfwer, but fiill infill on the objecf^ion : kt them confider whether they can devife any other fcheme of God's laft end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnr x-ious to this obje(5tion in its fuil force, it there be any force in it. For if God had any lad: end in creating the v^orld, then there was fomerhing, in fome refpecl future that h? aimed at, and defign'd to bring to pafs by creat-

?^ 2 ing

ing the world : fomething that was agreeable to his inclination or will : let that be his own ^ory, or the happi-nefs of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be fomething that God feeks as agreeable, or grateful to hiin^ then in the accompli(hnnent of it he is gratifyed. If the laft end which he feeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the objedl of his will) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleafure in. But then according to the argument ot the objedion, how he can have any thing future to defire or feek, who is already perfeaiy, eternally and immutably fatisfied in himfelf? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratifyed by, whofe eternal and unchangeable delight is in himfelf as his own compleat obje<5l of enjoyment. Thus the obje6tor will be prefTed with his own obje<5lion ; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to anfwer but that which has been taken ^bove.

It m^y therefore be proper Here to obferve, that let what will be God*s laft end, that, he muft have a real and proper pleafure in : Whatever be the proper object of his will, h« IS gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him iii itfeif ; or for fomething elfe for which he wills it : And fo is his further end. But whatever isGod's laft end,that he wills/^r it*s own Jake \ as grateful to him in it felf : or which is the fame thing-; it is that which he truly delights in j or in which he has fome degree of true and proper pleafure. Otherwife v/e muft deny any fuch thing as will in God with refpec^ to any thing brought to pafs in time j and fo muft deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reafon to fuppofe that God's works in creating and governing the v^orid, are properly the fruits of his will, as of his underftanding. And if there be any fuch thing at all, as what ve mean by aSis of will in God ; then he is not indifferent whether his will be fultiiled or not. And if h^ is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleafed in the fulfilment of his will : or which is the fame thing, he has a pleafure in it. And if he has a real pleafure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his

happinefs.

happinefs. That in which God's delight or pleafure in any meafure confift%^hi& happinefs in fome meafure con-filh. To fuppofe that God has pleafure in things, that are brought to pafs in time, only figuratively and metar-phoricaliy ; is to fuppofe that he exercifes will about thefc things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.

3. The doarine "that makes God's creatures and not himfelf, to be his laft end, is a doarine the fartheft fron| having a favourable afpedl: on God's abfolute felf-fufficience and independence. It far lefs agrees therewith than the doctrine againft which this is objeaed. For we muft conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He de-^ jpends on this end, in his defires, aims,aaions and purfuits ; fo that he fails in all his defires aaions and purfuits, if he fails of his end.—— Now if God himfelf be his laft end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends oa nothing but himfelf. If all things be of him, and to him» and he the firft and the laft, this ihews him to be all in all: He is all to himfelf. He goes not out of himfelf in what he feeks ; but hisdefires and purfuits as they originate from, fothey terminate in himfelf ; and he is dependent on none but himfelf in the beginning or end of any of his exercifes or operations. But if not himfelf,but ihe creature, be his laft end, then as he depends on his laft end, he is in fome fort dependent on the creature*.

Objea. 2. Some may objea, that to fuppofe that God iri.akes himfelf his higheft and laft end, is dilhonourable to him J as it in ejfFea fuppofes, that God does every thing from a felfifti fpirit. Selliftinels is looked upon as mean and fordid in the creature ! unbecoming and even hateful ii^ fuch a worm of tne duft as man. We Ihould look upon a man as of a bafe and contemptible charaaer, that ftiould in every thing he did, be governed by felfifti principles ; fhou'd make his private intereft his governing aim in alt his condua in life. How far then (hould we be from attributing any fuch thing to the fupream Being, the blefled and only potentate! Does it not become us to afcribe to him, the moft noble and generous difpofitions ; and thofe qualities that are the moft remote from every thing that is private, narrow and fordid .?

.M

-S kjuus la/i l:.7ja Sect.IV,

j^nf. I. Such an obje<5lion muft arlfe from a very ignorant or inconfiderate notion of the vi||Jpf felfifhnels, and the virtue of generofity. It by feltilhnefs be meant, a cjif-pofiiion in any being to regard himleif; this is no otherwifa^, vicious or unbecoming, than as one is lefs than a multitude ; and fo the public weal is4Df greater value than his particular interefl:. Among created beings one fingl^ per-foh muft be looked upon as inconfiderable in comparifon of the generality -, and fo his intereft as of little importance compared with the interefl: of the whole fyftem ; Therefore in them, a difpofuion to preter felf, as if it were more thiSn. all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other accoun^ than as it is a difpofition that don'r agree with the nature ct things ; and that which is indeed the greateft good. And a difpofition in any one to forego his own in-tereft tor the fake ot others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generofity than it is a treating things according to their true value ; a profecuting fome-thing moft worthy to be profecuted ; an exprefTion of a difpofnic»n to prefer fomething to felf-inrereil, that is indeed preferabk m it felt.—But if God be indeed fo great, and fo excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and lefs than nothing,' and vanity in comparifon of his ; and God be omnifcient and infallible and perfedly knows that he is infinitely the iTioft valuable being j then it is fit that his heart fliould be agreable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreable to this infallible and all-comprehending underifanding which he h^s of them, and ' that perfectly dear light in which he views them : and fo *tis fit and fuitab'e that he fhould value himlelf infinitely more than his creatures.

2.ItT created beings, a regard to felf-intereft may properly be fet in oppofition to the public welfare; becaufe ' «he private intereit ot one pcrfon may be inconfi^ent with the public good : at leaft it may be fo in the apprehenfion of that perfon. That, which this perfon looks upon as his interefl may interfere with,^ or oppofc the general good-^ Hence his private intereft may be regarded and purfued in oppofition to the public—But this can't be with rcfpe6t to the fupream Bein?, the author Si head of the whole fyftem 5

on whom all abfolutely depend ; who is the fountain of being; and good to tli,e whole.. It is more abfurd.to fuppofe that his inierel\ (hould be oppofire to the intereft ot the uni-verfal fyftcm, than that the welfare of the head, heart and vitals of the natural body, (hcu d be oppofite to the welfare of the body. And it is impoflible that God who is omni-fcient (hould apprehend the matter thus ; viz. his intereft-j as being inccnfiftent with the good and intereii of the whole.

3. GOD's feeking himfelf In the creation of tlie world, in the manner which has been fuppofed, is fo far from being inconfiftent with the good of his creatures, or any poifibility of bevng {o ; that it is a kind of regard to himfelf. that inclines him to feek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himfelf that dilpofes him to diftule and communicate himlelf. It is fuch a delight in his own internal fulnefs and glory, that difpofes him to an abundant efFjfioii and emanation of that glory. The fame difpofition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, caufes him to delight in the exhibitions, exprefllons and communications of it. This is a natural conclufi n —If there were anyperfon of fuch a talie and difpoHtionot mind, that the brightnefs and light of the fun feem'd unlovely to him, he would be willing that the fun's brightnefs and light Ihould be retaiaM within it felf: Bur thev, that delight in it, to v;hom it appears lovely and glorious, will efteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffufed and communicated through the v/orld.

Here by the way It may be properly confidered,whether fome writers are nor chargeable with inconfiftence in ths rerpe6\, viz. that whereas they fpeak againfi the dT)c51rines of God's makmg himfelf his own highe(> and laft end, as tho* this were an ignoble felnlbnefs in God : when indeed heon^y is tit to be made the higheft end, by himfelf and all other beings ; in as much as he is the highefV Bein^, and infinitely greater and more-worihy than all other;?.-It "Yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely lefs worthy of fupreme and uhim'nte regard, they (in effefl ar leaf^j fuppofe that they necefiarily ?t all times fee.k their own feappiuefsj aad mak« it their ultimate end inal', even their ' " moit

'J

moft virtuous a<5lions : And that this principle, regulated by wifdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and higheft happinefs is thegfoundation of ail virtue and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.

Obje<5t. 3. To what has been has been fuppofedjthaiGod makes himfelF his end in this way, viz. in feeking that his glory & excellent perte(5lion Ihouldbe known,efttemed,loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objtded, that this feems unworthy of God. It is confidered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his condu6V, by a defire of popular applaufe. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be erteemed but a low endj^ to be aimed at by a prince or philofopher, iii sny great and noble enterprize. Hovv^ much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g. the creation of the vaft univerfe, out ©f regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the duft : That the difplays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by ihofe who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meaneft rabble are beneath the greateft prince or philolopher.

This obje<5tion is fpecious. It hath a fhew of argument ; but it will appear to b$ nothing but a (hew^ if we confider,

I. Whether or no it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itfeif j and fpt to take pleafure in its exiftence.

It feems not liable to any doubt, that there could be nothing future, or no future exiftence worthy to be defired or fought by God, and fo worthy to be made his end, if no future exifience was valuable and worthy to be brought to €ffe<5l. If when the world was not, there was any poflible future thing fit and valuable in itfeif, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the efteem and love of it muft be fo. Underftanding and will are the higheft kind of created exiftence. And if they be valuable. It muft be in their ex-crcife. But the higheft and moft excellent kind of their cxercife, is in fome actual knowledge and exercife of wilL And certainly the moft excellent actual knowledge and

* win?

v/ill, that can be in the ^^creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the moft true excellent knov^ledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence .• and the moft excellent exercife of the will confifts in efteenji and love and a delight in his glory. If any created ex« iftence is in itfelf worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of exiftence, fuch a communication of divine fulnefs, fuch an emanation and expreflion of the olivine glory is worthy of exiftence. But if nothing that ever was future v/as worthy to exift, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creatiorij then nothing was worthy to be God's end \n creation.

If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be high» iy valued and delighted in by him, then the value and efteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him : for this is a necefTary confequence. To make this plain, let it be confidered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do fo» we fhall approve of and like others efteem of them ^ and fhall difapprove and diflike the contempt of them, li thefe virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that wc fhould thus approve others efteem, and difapprove their contempt of them.— And the cafe is the fame with refpc($t to any Being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly ef-teems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and neceftarily love to fee efteem of them in others, & difliks their difefteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly efteem'd by the Being w^ho hath them, fo is the efteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved, and regarded* I defire it may be confidered,

whether it be unfit that God fhould be difpleas'd with contempt of himfelf ? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and fuitable that he ftiould be difpleafed with this, there is the fame reafon that he Ihould be pleafed v/ith the proper love efteem and honor of himfelf.

The matter may be alfo cleared, by confidering what it would become us to approve of and value with rcfpe6V to any public fociety wc belong to, e. r. our nation or oouptry.

G ii

.*l

It becomes us to love our Country ; ahd therefore it becomes us to value the juft honor of our country. But the fame that it becomes us to value and defire for a friend, and the fame that it becomes us to defire and feck for the community, the fame does it become God to value and feck for. himfelf 5 that is on fuppofition it becomes God to love himfeU as well as it does men to love a friend or the public i which 1 think has been before proved.

Here arc two things that ought particularly to be ad-%rerted to—i. That in God the love of himfelf, and the love of the public are not to be diftinguifhedj as in man. Becaufe God's Being as it were comprehends alh His ex-ifience, being infinite, muft be equivalent to univerfal cxifl-cnce. And for the fame reafon that public affedion in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himfelf mufl be fo likewife.—^ 2. In God, the love of vsrhat is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, can't be a dif^in(5l thing from the love of himfelf. Becaufe the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holinefs does primarily and cheifly confift, and God's own holinefs muft primarily confift in the love of himfelf; as was before obferved. And if God's holinefs confifls in love to himfelf, then it will imply an approbation of and pleafednefs with the efteem and loveli-nefs of him in others. Tor a Being that loves himfelf, ne-ceflfarily loves Love to himfelf. If holinefs in God confift chiefly in love to himfelf, holinefs in the creature muft chiefly confift in love to him. And if God loves holinefs in himfelf, he muft love it in the creature.

> Virtue by fuch of the late philofophers as feem to be in fchief repute, is placed in public affe(5lion or general benevolence. And if the efTence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue it feif is virtuous, no otherwife, than as it is implied in or arifes from this public affe6>ion, or extcnllve benevolence of mind. Becaufe if a man truly loves the public, he nccefTarily loves Love to the public.

Now therefore, for the fame reafon, if univerfal benevolence in the higheft fenfe, be the fame thing with benevolence to the divine Being, who is in efTe6l univerfal Be-3ng, it will follow, that love to virtue itfelf is no otherwife virtuous, than as it is implied in or anfes from I«ve to the

divin©

divine Being. Confequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himfelf : and is virtuous no otherwif« than as it arifes from love to himfelf. So that God's virtuous difpofition, appearing in l©ve to holinefs in the creature, is to be refolve4 into the fame thing v/ith love to himfelf. And confequently v^^hereinfoever he makes virtue his end he makes himfelf his end.——-In fine, God being as it were an all comprehending being, all his moral pcrfe(5lions, as his holinefs, juftice, grace and benevolence are fome way or other to be refolved into a fu-pream and infinite regard to himfelf : and it fo it will be eafy to fuppofe that it becomes him to make himfelf his fupream and iaft end in his works,

I WOULD here obferve by the way, that if any infift that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own fake, in fuch a manner as not to love it from regard to himfelt ; and fhat it fuppofeth too much felfidincis to fuppofe that all God's delight in virtue is to be refolv'd into delight in himfelf: This will contradi6t a former objedion againft God's taking pleafure in communications of himfelf ; viz. that inafmuch as God is perfevStly independent and felf-fufiicient therefore all his happinefs and pleafure confifts in the in-"joyment of himfelf. For in the prcfent objedion it is infiftcd that it becomes God to have fome pleafure, love or delight in virtue difiind from his delight in himfelf. So that If the fame perfons make both objedlions they muft be inconfiftent with themfelves.

2. iN-anfwer to the objc6lion we are upon ; as to God's creatures whofe cfteem and love he feeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity.— I would obferve that it is not unworthy of God to take pleafure in that which in itfelf is fit and amiable, ^even in thofe that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and con-defcention in it, yet thefc are not unworthy of God ; but infinitely to his honour and glory.

They who Infift that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world ; but that al! that he h^d any ultimate regard to was th? happinefs

'44 GOD'S lafl End s,,^if;_

of his creatures ; and fuppofe that he made his creatures, 4nd not himfeJf his Jaft end ; do it under a colour of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence ^nd love to his

creatures. But if his love to them be fo great, and he fo

highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they fuppofe ; they are not confiftent with themfelves, in fuppofmg that God has ib little value for their love and efleem. For as the nature of love, efpecially great love caufes him that loves to value the efteem of the perfon beloved : fo that God fhould take pleafure in the creatures juft love and efteem wfjl follow both from .God*s love to himfelf and his love to his creatures. If he efteem and love himfeJf, he muft approve of efteem and bve to himfelf; and difapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he muft value and take delight in their mutual love and efteem : becaufe he loves not becaufe he needs them.

3. As to what is alledged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their condud and atchievements by a regard to the applaufe of the populace : I would obferve, Vv'hat makes their applaufe to be worthy of fo little regard, is their ignorance^ giddinefs and injuftice. The applaufe of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any jufl: view and underftanding of things, but on humour, miflake^ folly and unrcafonable aife<5tions. Such applaufe is truly V'Orthy to be difregarded —But 'tis not beneath a man C)f the greateft dignity and wifdom, to value the wife and juft efteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, inftead of being an exprelTion of greatnefs of mind, would ftiew an haughty and mean fpirit. 'Tis fuch an efteem in his creatures only,* that God hath nny regard to : for 'tis fuch ah efteem only that is fit and amiable in itielf.

Ol'jcSi. 4. To fuppofe that God makes himfelf his ulti-

ir.are end in the creation of the world derogates from the

trecriefs of his goodnefsjn his beneficence to his creatures i

nd from their obligations to gratitude for the good commu-

licatcd, ,Fcr if God, in communicating his tulnefs,makes

;;:mrelf, and not the creatures, his end ; then what good

he does, he does for himfelf, and not for them ^ for his

wn fakc; and not theirs, ^^/^

Anf, God and the creature in this affair of the emanation of the divine fulnefs^ are not properly fet in oppofition 5 or made the oppofite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creatures good, to be fpoken of as if they were properly and entirely diftincfl, as they are in the objedlion. This fupporeth5thatGod's having refpecSl to his glory and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different : that God's communicating his fulnefs for himfelf, and his doing it for them, are things

landing in a proper disjundtion and oppofition. Wheoe-

as if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are fo much above us, 'tis probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwife : and thatthefe things, inftcad of appearing entirely diliincSt, are implied one in the other. That God in feeking his glory, therein feeks the good of his creatures. Becaufe the emanation of his glory (which he feeks and delights in, as he delights in himfelf & his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happinefs of his creature. And that in communicating his fulnefs for them, he does it for himfelf. Becaufe their good, which he feeks, is fo much in union and communion with himfelf. God is their good. Their excellency and happinefs is nothing, but the emanation and expreffion of God's glory : God in feeking their glory and happinefs, feeks himfelf: and in feeking himfelf, i. e. himielf diffufed and ex-preffed, fwhch he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty amd fulnefs) he leeks their glory and happinefs.

This wIH the better appear, if we confider the degree and manner.in which he aimed at the creatures excellency aiici happinefs in his creating the world ; viz. the degree and . manner of the creatures glory and happinefs during the whole of the defign'd eternal duration ot the world, he was about to create : which is in greater and greater nearnefs and ftridnefs of union with himfelf, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happinefs, in conflant progreffion, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, viz. v/ith refpedl to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally pro-greffi^'e union and communion v;ith him j fo the creature

mufl

muft be viewed as in infinite ftri6J: union with himfelf. In this view it appears that God*s refpe<5l to the creature, in the whole, unites with his refpc6l to himfelf. Both regards are like two lines which feem at the beginning to be ^parate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the fame center. And as to the good of the creature itfelf, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite pro-greflion, it muft be viewed as infinite ; and fonot only being fome communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the fame thing in its infinite fulnefs. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it cJomes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it can't be viewed as a diftindl thing frorn God*s own infinite glory.

The apoftle's difcourfe of the great love of Chrift to men, Eph. 5. 25. to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Chrift to his church ; as coinciding with his love to himfelf, by virtue of the ftri<5t union of the church with liim. Thus '* hufbands love your wives, as Chrift alfo loved the church, and gave himfelf for it—that he might prefent it ^o himfelf a glorious church. So ought men to love their v^ives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his Wife loveth himfelf—even as the Lord the church ; for we are members of his body, of his flefli, and of his bones."

Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's feeking the good of the creatures, or in his difpo-fuion to communicate of his own fulnefs to them, that at all derogates from theexcellence of it jor the creature's obligation.

God's difpofition to communicate good, or to'caufe his own infinite fulnefs to flow forth, is not the lefs properly called God's goodnefs, becaule the good that he communicates, is fomething of himfelf; a communication of his own glory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no lefs benefit by it ; neither has fuch a difpcfition lefs of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit ; or the lefs of a tendency to love to the creature, w hen the creature comes to exiO". Nor \$ this difpofition in God to communicate of and diffufe his ov/n good, the lefs

excellent

JBxeeilent, becaufe it is implied in his love and fegafd to himfeif. For his love to hlmfelf don't imply it any other-wire, but as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and ex ' cellent. -The emanation of God's glory, is in itfelf worthy and excellent, and fo God delights in it : and his delight in this excellent thing, is implied in his Jove to himfelf, or his own fulnefs ; becaufe that is the fountain, and fo the fum and comprehenfion of every thing that is excellent. And the matter ftanding thus,'tis evident, that thefe things cannot derogate from the excellency of this difpofition in God, to an emanation of his own fulnefs, or communication of good to the creature.

Nor does God*s inclination to communicate good in this manner, i. e. from regard to himfelf, or delight in his own glory, at all diminilh the freenefs of his beneficence in this communication. This will appear, if we confidcr particularly, in what ways, doing good to others from felf-love, may be inconfiftent with the freenefs of beneficcncCt And 1 conceive there are only thefe two ways,

T. When any does good to another from confined {t\U love, that is oppolite to a general benevolence. This kind of felflove is properly cdXVd felfijhnefs. In fome fenfe, the moft benevolent generous perfon in the world, feeks his own happinefs in doing good to others ; becaufe he places his happinefs in their good. His mind is fo enlarged as to take them, as it were, into himfelf. Thus when they are happy he feels it, he partakes with them, and is happy in their happinefs. This is fo far from beinginconfifteat with the freenefs of beneficence, that on the contrary, free benevolence arid kindnefs confifts in it. The moll free beneficence that can be in men, is doing good, not from a confined felf-iflincfs, but frjm a difpofition to general benevolence, or Jove 10 beings in general.

But now, with refpad to the divine being, there Is no fucii thing as fuch confin'd felfiihnefs in him, or a love to himfelf, oppofite to general benevolence. It is impoffi-blc, becaufe he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own efTence. The tirft Being, the eternal and infinite ^eing, is in cf3;t<5f> B$ing in general j and ccmprehends

univsrfal

univerfal exigence, as was obferved before. God in his "benevolence to his creatures, can't have his hesrt enlarged in fuch a manner as to take in beings that he finds,who are originally out of himfelf, diftincSt and independent. This can't be in an infinite being, v9ho exifls alcne from eternity. But he, from his goodnefs, as it were enlarges him-felt in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and diffuling himfelf; and fo inPttad of finding, making objecSts of his ^nevolence : not by taking into himfejf what he finds diftTn(5t from himfelf, and fo partaking of their good, and being happy in them ; but by flowing forth, and exprefTing himfelf in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in himfelit cxprefTed in them, and communicated to them.

2. Another thing, in doing good to others from felf-love, that derogates from the freenefs of the goodnefs ; is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need, or defire : which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not felf-moved, but as it were, conflrained by fomething without burfelves. But it has been particularly fhewn already, that God's making himfelf his end, in the manner that has been fpoken ofg 'argues no dependence ; but is ccnfiflent with abfolute in-dependence_and felf-fufficience.

And I would here obferve, that there is fomething in that difpofition in God to communicate goodnefs, which fhews him to be independent and felf-rnoved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the moft: gracious of them, are not fo independent and felf-moved in their goodnefs ^ but that in all the exercifes of it, they are excited by fome objed that they find : fomething appearing good,or in feme rcfpefl worthy of regard, prefents itfcif, arid moves their kindncfs. But God being all and alone is abfolutely felf-moved. The exercifes ot his communicative difpofition are abfolutely from within himfelf, not finding any thing, or any objed to excite them or draw them forth : but all that is good and worthy in the ob-jedl, and the very being of the 'obje(^, proceeding from the ever flowing of his fulnsfs, " . ■

' ' ■ ' ' -. Thesh

These things (hew that the fuppofition of God's makr jng himfelf his laft end, in the manner fpoken of, don''t at all diminifh the creature's obligation to gratitude, for communications of good it receives. For if it JefTen it's obligation, it muft be on one of the following account. Either, that the creature has not fo much benefit by it 5 or, that the difpofition it*flows from is not proper good-nefs, not having fo direcSt a tendency to the creatures benefit; or that the difpofition is not fo virtuous and excellent in it's kind ; or that the beneficence is not fo free. But it has been obferved, that none of thefe things take place, with regard to that difpofition, which ha^ htta fuppofed to have excited God to create the world,

I CONFESS there is a degree of indiflincStnefs and ob-fcurity in the clofe confideration of fuch fubjeds, and a great imperfe(5tion in the expreflions we ufe concerning them ; arifing unavoidably from the infinite fublimity of the fubje<^, and the incomprehenfiblenefs of thofe things that arc divine. Hence revelation is the fureft guide in thefe matters ; and what that teaches (hall in the next place be confidered. Neverthelefs, the endeavours ufed to difcover what the voice of reafon is, fo far as it can go, may ferve to prepare the way, by obviating cayils infifted on by many ; and to fatisfy us, that what the word of God fays of the matter, is not unreafonable ; and thus prepare our minds for a more full acquiefcence in the inftrudions it gives, according to the more natural and genuine fenfe of words and exprefiions, we find often ufed there con-cerning .this fubjecSt.

H C H A P^

^o QODf bjt End SectX

C H A P. II.

Wherein it is enquired, what is to be learned ** from holy fcripiures^ concerning God's laji end in the creation of the world.

SECT. L

The fcriptures reprefent God as making hmfelf\h% own lajl end in the creatloa of the world.

IT is manifeft, that the fcriptures fpeak, on all occafions, as tho' God made himfelf his end.in all his works : and as tho' the fame being, who is the firft caufe of all things, were the fupream and laft end of all things. Thus in ifai. 44. 6. " Thus faith the Lord, the king of Ifrael, and his redeemer the Lord of hofts, 1 am the firft, I alfo am the ]aft> and befides me there is no God'\ Cap. 48. 12. *' I am the tirft,and I am the laft". Rev. i. 8. I am alpha and omega,the beginning arid the ending,faith the Lord, which is, and was, and which is to come, the almighty, ver. ir. 1 am a^pha and omega, the firft and the laft. ver. 17.1 am the firft and the laft^ Cap. 21. 6. " And he faid unto me, it is done, I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end". Cap. 22. 13. "I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the fifft and the laft".

And when God is fo often fpoken of as the laft as well a» the iirft, and the end as welf as the beginning, what is meant (or at leaft implied j is, that as he is the firft efficient caufe and fountain from whence all things originate ; fo he is the laft final caufe for which they are made ; the final term to which they all tend in their ultimate iiTue. OThis feems to be the moft natural import of thefe exprefTi-ons; and is confirmed by other parallel paf&ges ; as Rom. J I. 36, " For of him and thro' and to him are all things". CoL I. 16, " For by him were all things created, that are

in heaven, and that are in earth, vlfible and invifible, whether they be thrones or dominions, principalities and powers, all things were created by him, and for him". Heb. 2. 10. " For it became him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things". In Prov. 16. 4. 'tis faid e^ prefly, " The Lord hath made all things for himfelf".

And the manner is obfervable, in which God is faid to be the laft, to whom, and for whom are all things. 'Tis evidently fpoken of as a meet and fuitable thing, a branch of his glory ; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite and eternal being ; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other beings ; from whom all things are, and by v;hom they confifl, and in comparifon witji whom, all other things are as nothing.

Sect. H.

TlCTHereln feme pofitions are advanced concerning ajuft ^^ method of arguing in this affair, from what we find in holy fcriptures.

We have feen that the fcriptures fpeak of the creation of the world as being for God, as its end. What remains therefore to be enquired into, is, which way do ihefcripturss reprefent God as making himfelf his end ?

It is evident that God don't make his exiftence or being the end of the creation ; nor can he be fuppofed to do fo without great abfurdity. His being and exillence can't be conceived of but as prior to any of God's acls or defigns : tliey muft be prefuppofed'as the ground of them. .Therefore it can't be in this way that God makes himfelf the end of his creating the world. He can't create the world to the end that he may have exiftence; or may have fuch attributes and perteclions, and fuch an effence. Nor do the fcriptures give the leaft intimation of any fuch thing. Therefore, what divine efFea, or what is it in relation to God^ that is the thing which the fcripture teacheth us to be the end he aimed at in his works of creaucn, in d^figning of 'vvhich;, h§ makes /;/>?A'/his end I

y.

>2 GOD'S hji End s,„. II.

In order to a right underftanding of the fcrlpture doc« trine, and drawing juft inferences from what we find faid in the word of God relative to this matter ; fo to open the ■way to a true and definitive anfwer to the above enquiry, I Mould lay down the following pofitions,

Pofition, I. That which appears to be fpoken of as God's ultimate end in his worlcs of providence in general, we may juftly fuppofe to be his laft end in the^work of creation This appears from what was obferved before (under the fifth particular of the introduction) which I need not now repeat,

Pof. 2. When any thing appears by the fctlpture to be the laft end of feme of the v/orks of God, which thing appears in fa6f, to be the refult, not only of this work, but of God's works in general. And altbo' it be not mentioned as tne end of thofe works, but only of fome of them,yet being adlually the refult of other works as well as that, & nothing appears peculiar, in the nature of the cafe, that renders it a fit, and beautiful and valuable refult of thofe particular works, more than of the reft ; but it appears with equal reafon deferable and valuable in the cafe of all works, of which it is fpoken of in. the word of God as (and feen infa6l to be) the effeCl ; we may juftly infer, that thing to be the laft end of thofe other works alfo. For we muft fuppofe it to be on account of the valuablenefs of the efteCV, that it is made the end of thofe works of which it is exprefly fpoken of as the end : and this efFe(5V, by the fuppofition, being e-qually, and in like manner the refult of the work, and of the fame value, 'tis but reafbnable to fuppofe, that it is the end of the work, of which it is naturally tlie confequence, m one cafe as well as in another.

Pof. 3. The ultimate end of God's creating the v/orld, beinj2 alfo (as was before obferved) the laft end of all God's works of providence, and that in the higheft fenfe, and being above all other things important, we may well prcfume that this end will be chiefly infifted on in the word of God, in the accoimt it gives of God's defigns and ends in his

works of providence- and therefore, if there be any par-

aku!ar thine, that we find more frequently mentioned in

fcripture

fcrlpture as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing elfe, this is a prefumption that this is the fupreme and ultimate end of God's works in general, arx^ fo the end of the work of creation.

Pof. 4. That which appears from the word of God to be his laft end with refpedt to the moral world, or God's laft end in the creation and difpofal of the intelligent part of the fyftem, and in the moral government of the world, that is God's laft end in the work of creation in general. Becaufe it is evident,,from the con-ftitution of the world itfelf, as well as from the word of God, that the moral part is. the end of all the reft of the creation. The inanimate unintelligent part is made for the rational as much as a houfe is prepared for the inhabitant. And it is evident alfo from reafon and the word of God, that it is with regard to what is moral in them, or for the fake of fome moral good in them, that moral agents are made Si the world made for them.—-But it is further evident that whatfoever is the laft end of that part of creation that is the end of all the reft, and for which all the reft of the world was made, muft be the laft end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch, to move that aright, and for a due and proper regulation of that, then it will follow, that the laft end of the hand, is the laft end of the whole machine.

Pof. 5. That, which appears from the fcrlpture to be God's laft end in the chief work or works of his providence,, we may well determine is God's laft end in creating the world. For as was obferved, we may juftiy infer the end of a thing from the ufe of it. We may juftly infer the end of a clock, a chariot, a fliip, or water-engine from the main ufe to which it is applied. But God's providence is his ufe of the world he has made. And if there be nr.y work or works of providence that are evidently God's main work or works, herein appears and confifts the main ufe that God makes of the creation.— From thefc two laft pofttions we tniy infer the next, viz.

Pof. 6.

.^4 GODVlaJiEnd SHCT.ir.

Pof. 6. Whatever appears by the fcrlptures to be God's laft end in his main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we juftly infer to be the laft end of the creation of the world. Becaufe as was juft now obferved, the moral world is the cheit part of the creation and the end of the reft ; and God's laft end in creating that part of the world, muft be his laft end in the creation of the whole. And it appears by the laft pbft-tion, that the end of God's main woik or works of providence towards them, or the main ufe he puts them to, (hews the laft end for which he has made them ; and confequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.

Pof. 7. That which divine revelation fhews to be God's laft end with refpccSl to that part of the moral world which are good, or which are according to his mind, or fuch as he would have them be; I fay that which is God's laft end with refped to ihefe (i. e. his laft end in their being, and in their being good) this we muft fup-pofe to be the laft end of God's creating the world. For it has been already fhev/n that God's laft end in the moral part of creation muft be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that are good, muft be the laft end for which he has made the moral world in general. For therein confifts the goodnefs of a thing, viz. in its fitnefs to anfwer its end : or at leaft this muft be goodnefs in the eyes of the author of that thing. For goodnefs in his eyes is its agreablenefs to his mind. But an agreablenefs to his mind in what he makes for fome end or ufe, muft be an agreablenefs or fitnefs to that end. For his end in this cafe is his mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with refpe^t to that thing. And therefore they arc good moral agents, who are fitted for the end for which God has made moral agents ; as they are good machines, in-ftruments and utenfils that are fitted to- the end they are defigned for. And confequently that which is the chief end to which in being good they are fitted that is the ch.iefend of utenfils. So that which is the chief end to which good created moral agents in being good are fitted, this is the chief end of moral agents, or the moral part

of the creation ; and confequently of the creation in gerkeral.

Pof. 8. That, which the word of God requires the intelligent and moral part of the worjd to feek as their main end, or to have refped to in that they do, and regulate all their condudl by, as their ultimate & higheft end, that we have reafon to fuppofe is the laft end for which God has made them ; and confequently by pofition fourth, the laft end for which he has made the whole world. A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the reft of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their creator, and the end for which he made them, and capable of adively complying whh his defignin their creation and promotmg it ; while other creatures can't promote the defign of their creation, only palTively and e-ventually. And feeing they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made ihem, 'tis doubtlefs their duty to fall in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the will of the creator in this refpedl, in mainly feek-ing the fame as their laft end which God mainly feeks as their laft end. This muft be the law of nature and reafon with refpcdt to them. And we muft fuppofe that God's reveal'd law, and the law of nature agree; and that his will, as a lawgiver, mufl agree with his v/ill as a creator. Therefore we juftly infer, that the fame thing which God's revealed law requires intelligent creatures to feek as their laft,and greateft end, that God their creator has ma'ie their laft end, snd fo the eiid of the creation of the world.

Pof. 9: We may well fuppofe that what feems m holy fcripture from time to time to be fpoken of as the main end of the goodnefs of the good part of the moral world, fo that the refped and relation their virtue or goodnefs has to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and defirable ; I fay, we may well fuppofe that to be the thing which is God's laft end in the creation of the moral world ; and fo by po-fition fourth,of the whole world. For the end of the goodnefs of a thing, is the end of the thing. Herein, it was ob-ferved before, muft confift the goodnefs or valuablenefs Qf any thing in th« eyes 9f him that made it for his

ufc,

ufe. viz. Its being good for that ufc, or good with refpedl to the end for which he made it.

Pof. 10. That which perfons who are defcribed in fcripture as approved faints, and fet forth as examples of piety, fought as their laft and higheft end in the things which they did, and which are mentioned as parts of their holy ccnverfation, or inftances of their good and approved behaviour ; that we mull fuppofe, was what they ought to feek as their laft end ; and confequently by the preceeding pofition, was the fame with God*s laft end in the creation of the world.

Pof. ir. That which appears by the word of God to be that end or event^in the defire of which, the fouls of the good parts of the moral world, efpecially of the beft, and in their beft frames, do moft naturally, and dire(5ily exercife their goodnefs in, and in expreffing of their defire of this event or end, they do moft properly and dire<5\ly exprefs their refpe6t to God ; we may, I fay, well fuppole, that e-vent or end to be the chief and ultimate end of a fpirit of piety and goodnefs, and God's chief end in making the moral world, and fo the whole world. For doubtlefs the moft dire<5t and natural defire and tendency of a fpirit of true goodnefs in the good and beft part of the moral world is to the chief end of goodnefs, and fo the chief end of the creation of the moral world. And in what elfe can the fpirit of true refpcdt and friendfhip to God be exprefs'd by way of deftre, than defircs of the fame end, which God himfelf chiefly and ultimately defires and feeks in making them and . all other things,

Pof' 12. Since the holy fcriptures teach us that Jefus Chrift is the head of the moral world, and efpecially of all the good part of it ; the chief ot God's fervants. appointed to be the head of his faints and angels, and fet forth as the chief and moft perfect pattern and example of goodnefs ; we may well fuppofe by the foregoing politions, that what he fought as his laft end, was God's laft end in the creation of the world.

SECT.

them exceeding Jiappy ; ami then the end of all, or the fum of God's defign in all, is declared to be God's owa^ glory. *'I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy" name, thou art mine.— I will be with thee.—When thou walked thro' the fire, thou fhalt not be burnt, nor the flame kindle upon thee,— thou art precious and honorable in my fight. 1 will give men for thee, and people for thy life. Fear not, I am with thee.—I will biing my Tons from far, and m.y daughters from the ends of the earth ; every one that is called by my name : for 1 have created him for my ghry^*

So It plainly Is chap. 60. vcr. 21. the whole chapter Is made up of nothing but promifcs of future, exceeding happinefs to God's church. But for brevity's fake, let us take only the two preceeding verfes. "The fun fhall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightnefs fhall the moon give light unto thee : but the Lord fhall be unto thee an everlafting light, and thy God thy glory. Thy fun fhall no more go down, neither fhall thy moon withdraw itfelf: for the Lord fhall be thine everlafting light, and the days of thy mourning fhall be ended. Thy people alfo fhall be all righteous ; they fhall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands," and then the end of all is added, " that 1 ?night he gkrifiedy All the preceeding promifes are plainly mentioned as fo many parts or conftituents of the great and exceeding happinefs of God's people ; and God's glory is mentioned rather as God's end, or the fum of his defign in this happinefs, than this happir efs as the end of this glory. Juft in like manner is the promife in the third verle of the next chapter. To appoint to them that mourn in Zion, to give to ihem beauty for adies, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praife for the fpirit of heavinefs, that they might be called trees of righteoufnefs, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified''. The work of God promifed to be effe<5ted, is plainly an accomplifhment of the joy, gladnefs and happinefs of God's people, inf^ead of their mourning and forrow ; and the end in which the work ifTues, or that in which God's defign in this work is obtained and fummed up, is his glory. This proves by the feventh pofition, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

I 2 Ths

The fame thing maybe argued from Jcr. 13, n. "For as a girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, fo have I caufed to cleave unto me the whole houfe of Ifrael, and the whole houfe of Judah, faith the Lord : that they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praife, 2SiA for a glory : but they woukl not hear". That is, God fought to make them to be his own holy people ; or, as the apoftle cxpreiTes it, his peculiar people, zealous of good works ; that fo they might be a glory to him, as girdles were ufed in thofe days for ornament and beauty, and as badges of dignity and honor.* Which is agreeable to the places ob-ferved before, that fpeak of the church as the glory of thrift.

Now when God fpeaks of himfelf, as feeking a peculiar and holy people for himfelf, to be for his glory and honor, as a man that feeks an ornament and badge of honor for his glory, 'tis not natural to underftand it meerly of a fub-ordinate end, as tho* God had no refpedl to himfelf in it ; but only the good of others. If fo, the comparifon would not be natural ^ for men are commonly wont to feek their cwn glory and'honor in adorning themfelves,and dignifying themfelvcs with badges of honor, out of refpedt to theni-lelves.

The fame do<5^rlne feems to be taught, Eph. 44: 23* *' Having predeftinated us to the adoption ot children, by Jefus Chrift, unto himfelf, according to the good pleafure of his will, to the praife of the glory of his grace".

The fame may be argued from Ifai. 44. 23. " For the Lord haih redeemed Jacob, he hath glorifted himfelf in Ifrael". And chap. 49. 3. " Thou art my fervant Jacob, in whom I will be glorified". Joh. 17. 10. " And all mine arc thine, and thine are mine, and I am gl^itied in them". 2 Thef. i. 10. " When he (hail come to be glorified in his faints", ver. 11. 12. <« Wherefore alfo we pray always for you, that our God would count you wor-

* ^S'ee vr. 9, and alfo Ifai. 3. 24. and zz, 2i> And ^3. ic, 2 Sain. iB. XI, Excd. 28. 8,

thy of his calling, and fulfill all the good pleafurc of his goodnefs, and the work of faith with power: that the name of our Lord Jefus may be glorified in you, and ye in him, according to the grace of God and our Lord Jefus ChrilV*.

3. The fcripture fpeaks from time to timcjof God's glory, as tho' it were his ultimate end ot the goodnefs of the moral part of the creation ; and that end, in a refpedl and relation to which chiefly it is, that the value or worth of their virtue coniifts. As in Phil. i. 10. 11. "That ye may approve things that are excellent, that ye may be fin-cere, and without offence till the day of Chrift : being filled with the,fruits of righteoufnefs, which are by Jefus Chrift, unto the glory and praife of God." Here the apolle (hews how the fruits of righteoufnefs in them are valuable and how they anfwer their end. viz. in being *' by Jefus Chrift to the praife and glory of God." Joh. 15. 8. '^-Herein is my .father glorified, that ye bear much fruit." Signifying that by this means it is, that the great end of religion is to be anfwered. And in i P^t. 4, ii. the apofile directs the chriftians to regulate all their religious performances, with reference to that one end. *'If any man fpeak, let him fpeak as the oracles of God : if any man minifter, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth, that God in all things may beglorified ; to whom be praife and dominion forever and ever, amen.*' And, from time to time, embracing and pfadlifing true religion, and repenting of fin, and turning to holinefs, is ex-prefled by' glorifying God, as tho' that were the fum and end of the whole matter. Rev. 11. 13. "And in the earthquake were flain ot men {<iVQn flioufand ; and the remnant were affrighted, and gave glory to the God of heaven." So, Rev. 14. 6, 7. " And I faw another angel fiy in the midft of heaven, having the everlafiing gofpel to preach

to them that dwell on the earth j faying with a lend

voice. Fear God, and give glory to him." As tho* this were the fum and end of that virtue and religion, which was the grand defign of preaching the gofpel every where thro' the world. Rev. 16. 9. —" And repented not, to give him glory.'* Which is as much as to fay, mey did not forfake their fins and turn to true religion, that God might receive that which is the great &nd he feeks, in tho

reJigJoa

religion he requires of men. See to the fame purpofc, Pfal. 22. 2l.r--—23. JJai. 66. 19. 24. 15. 25. 3. Jer, 13. 15, i6. Dan, 5. 23. ^i'w. 15. 5,6.

And as the cxerclfe of true religion and virtue in chrifti-ans is fimimarily exprefled by their glorifying God ; fo v/hen the good influence of this on others, as bringing them by the example to turn to the ways and practice of true goodnefs, is fpoken of, it is exprefled in the fame manner, Adatt. 5. i5. *' Let your light lo ihine before men, that o-thers feeing your good works, may glorify your father which is in heaven." i Pet, 2. 12. "• Having your conver-fation honeft among the geniiles, that whereas they fpeak evil againft you as evil-doers, they may by your good works which they behold, glorify God m the day of vifitation.'*

That the ultimate end of mora] goodnefs, or" righte-oufnefs is anfwer'd in God's glory beiog attain'd, is fuppo-fed in the objedion which the apoftle makes, or fuppofes fome will make, in Rorn. 3. 7. *' For if the truth of God hath mere abounded thro' my lie unto his glory, why am 1 judged as a fmner ?" i. e. feeing the great end of righte-oufnefs is anfwer'd by my fin, in God's being glorified, why is my fm condemned and punifhed : and why is not • my vice equivalent to virtue ?

And the glory of God Is fpcken of as that wherein confiih the value and end of particular graces. As of faith. Rem. 4. 20. *' He daggered not at the promile of God thro' unbelief J but was ftrong in faith, giving glory to God.'* FhiL 2. If, «' Th5t every tfiPhgue fliould confefs that Jefus JS the Lord, to the glory of God the father." Of repentance. Jo/h. 6. 19 «' Give ! pray theeglciy, to the Lord God ot iirae), and make confcITiop unto him.'* Of charity. 2 Ccr. 8. 19. —'* With this grace, which is admi-rilired by us, to the glory of the fame Lord, and declaration of your ready mind." Thankfeiving and praife. Luk, 7. 18. ••* There are not found that returned to give glory to God, fave this Granger." Plai 50. 23. ** Whofo cffer-€th praW; glorifieth me, ard to him that ordfrelh his con-"V';;ria\>cn arigh^, will I fhew the falvarion of God." Concerning which ivU place may be obferv'd j ■— God here

feems

feems to fay this to fuch as abounded in their facrltices and outward ceremonies of religion, as taking it for granted, and as what they knew already, and fuppofed in their religious performances, that th« end of all religion was to glorify God. They fuppofed they did this -in the bed manner, in offering a multitude of facrifices (fee the pre-cceding part of the pfalm.) But here God corre6ts this mlftake, and informs that this grand end of religion is not attained this way, but in offering the rriore fpiri:ual facrifices of praife and a holy canverfation,

In fine, the words of the apoflle in 1 Cor. 6. 20. are worthy of particular notice. " Ye are not your own 5 tor ye are bought with a price : therefore glorify God in your body and in your fpirit, which are his." Here not only is glorifying God fpoken of, as what fummarily comprehends the end of that religion and fervice of God, which is the end of Chrift's redeeming us: but here I would further remark this. — That the apoftle in this place urges, that inasmuch as Vv^e are not our own, but bought for God, . that we might be his 5 therefore we ought not to aft as if we were our own, but as God's; and Ihould not ufe the members ot our bodies, or faculties of our fouls for our-felves, as making ourfelves our end, but for God, as making him our end. And he exprefTes the way in which we are to make God our end, viz. in making his glory our end. " Therefore glorify God in your body and in your fpirit, which are his." Here it can't be pretended, that though chriftians are indeed required to make God's glory their end ; yet it is but as a fubordinate end, as fubfervi-ent to their gwn happinefs, as a higher end ; for then in ading chiefly and ultimately for their ov/nfelves, they would \\{^ themfeives more as their ov/n, than as God's» which is direc5lly contrary to the defign of the apoille's ex-hortation, and the argument he is upon ; which is, that we fliould give ourfelves, as it were, away froin-ourfelves to God, and ufe ourfelves as his, and not our own, acting for his fake, and not our own fakes. Thus it is evident by pof. 9. that the glory of God 15 the laft ^vi^ for w|j|jch he created the world,

4» There

4. There are feme things in the word of God, that lead us to fuppofe that it requires o\ men, that they (liouJd dffire and feck God's glory, as their higheft and laft end in wliat they do. As part^ularly the paffage Jaft mentioned. This appears from what has been juft now obferv'd upon it. The fame may be argued from 1 Ccr. 10. 30. ** Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatfoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." And i Pet. 4. 11. —^" That God in all things may be glorified.'* Which was mentioned before. And it may be argued that Chrift requires his followers (hould defire and feek God's glory in the firft place, and above all things elie, from that prayer which he gave his difciples, as the pattern and tule for the di-re<5lion of his follcwers in their prayers. The firft petition of which rs, " Hallowed be thy name." Which in fcrip-ture language is the (ame with, glorified be thy name ; as is m.anifeft from Lev. 10. 3. Exik 28. 22. and many other places. Now our laft and highcft, end is doubtlefs what ihould be firft in our defires, and confequently firft in our prayers : and therefore we may argue, that fince Chrift di-redsthatGod'sglory fliould be firft in our prayers,that therefore this is our laft end. This is further confirmed by the conclufion of the Lord's prayer, " For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory." Which, as it ftands in con-necSlion with tl>e reft ot the prayer, implies that we defire and ask all thefe (things, which are mentionedin each petition, with a fubordination, and in fubfervience to the dominion and glory of God 3 in which all our defires ultimately terminate, as their laft end. God's glory and dominion are the two firft things mentioned in the prayer, and are the fubje6t of the firft half of the prayer ; and they are the two hf\ things mentioned in the fame prayer, in it's conclufion : and God's glory is the alpha and omega in the prayer. From thefe things we may argue, according to pof. 8. that God's glory is the laft end of the creation.

5. The glory of God appears, by the account given in ihe word ot God, to be that end ©r event, in the earneft defires of\\hich, and in their delight in which, the beft: part of^he moral world,and when in their beft frames, do moft naturally exprefs the dired tendency of the fpirit of true gocdaels, and give vent to the virtuous and pious

afFedlions

CHAP.ir. ^^^ ^^^^ Creation of the World, 6^

affections of their heart, and do moft properly and dire<5lly tertify I heir fupream refpedt to their creator. This is the way in which the holy apoftles, from time to time, gave vent to the ardent exercifes of their piety, and exprefled and breathed forth their regard to the fupream being, Rom. II. 36. " To whom be glory forever and ever, amen". Chap. 16. 27. " To God only wife, be glory, thro' Jefus Chrift, forever, amen". Gal. 1.4, 5. " Who gave himfelf for our fms, that he might deliver us from this prefent evil world, according to the will of God and our father, to whom be glory forever and ever, amen". 2 Tim. 4. 18. " And the Lord (hall deliver me from every evil work, and will preferve me to his heavenly kingdom : to whom be glory forever and ever, amen". Eph. 3. 21. " Unto him be glory in the church, by Chrift Jefus throughout all ages, world without end". Heb.

13. 21. "Through Jefus Chrifl, to whom be glory

forever and ever, anrien". Phil 4. 20. *' Now unto God and our father, be glory forever and ever, amen". 2 Pet. 3. 18. " To him be glory both now and forever, amen", Jude 25. " To the only wife God our faviour, be glory and majefty, dominion and power, both now and ever, amen". Rev. i. 5, 6. '-Unto him that loved us &c—• to him be glory and dominion forever and ever, amen". It was in this v/ay that holy David, the fweet pfalmift of Ifrael, vented the ardent tendencies and defires of his pious heart, i Chron. 16. 28, 29. *' Give unto the Lord •ye kindreds of the people, give unto the Lord glory and ftrength : give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name". We have much the fame expreffions again, PfaL 29. I, 2. and. 69. 7, 8. See alfo, Pfal. 57. 5. 72. 18, 19. 115.. I. So the whole church of God, thro' all parts of the earth. Ifai. 42. 10, 11, 12. In like manner the faints and angels in heaven cxprefs the piety of their hearts. Rev. 4. 9, 11, and 5. i r, 12, 13, 14. and 7. 12. This is the €vent that the hearts of the feraphim efpecially exult in, as appears by Ifai. 6. 2, 3. " Above it ftood the feraphim.— And one cried unto another and faid, Holy, holy, holy is the LORD of hofts, the whole earth is full of his gjory". So at the birth of Chrift, Luk. 2. 14* *' Glory to God m the higheft^ Scq,

It is manlfeft that thcfe holy pcrfons In earth anclhea-ven, in thus exprefling their defires of the glory of God, have refpedt to it, not meerly as a fubordinatejend, or meerly for the fake of fomething clfe ; but as that which they look upon in itfelf valuable, and in the high-eft degree fo. It would be abfurd to fay, that in thefe ardent exclamations, they are only giving vent to their vehement benevolence to their fellow-creatures, and exprefling their earneft defires that God might be glorified, that fo his fubje<51s may be made happy by the means. It is evident 'tis not fo much love, either to themfelves, or fellow-creatures, which they exprefs, as their exalted and fupream regard to the moft high and infinitely glorious Being. When the church fays, " Not unto us, not unto us, O Jehovah, but to thy name give glory", it would be abfurd to fay, that (he only defires that God may have glory, as a neceflary or convenient means .of their own advancement and felicity. From thefe things it appears, by the eleventh pofition, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

6. The fcripture leads us to fuppofe, that Chrift fought God's glory, as his higheft and iaft end. Joh. 7. iS. *' He that fpeaketh of himfelf, feekcth his own glory : but he that feeketh his glory that fent him, the fame is true, and no unrighteoufnels is in him". When Chrifl fays, he did not feek his own glory, we cannot reafonably un-dcrftand him, that he had no regard to his own glory, e-vcn the glory of the human nature ; for the glory of that nature was part of the reward promifed him, and of the joy fet before him. But we muft underfiand him, that this was not his*ultimate aim -, it was not the end that chiefly governed his condud : and therefore when, in oppofition to this, in the latter part of the fentence, he fays, " But he that feeketh his glory that fent him, the fame i« true, Ijc." 'tis natural from the antithefis to underfiand him, that this was his ultimate aim, his fupream governing end. Job. 12. 27, 28. *' Now is my foul troubled, and what fliall I fay ? Father, fave me from this hour : But for this caufe came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name". Chrift was now going to Jerufalem, and ex-P-aed in a few days ther? to be crucified : and the ^' profpe(^

profpbd of his laft fufferings, in this near approach, was very lerrible to him. Under this diftrefs of mind, in fo terrible a view, he fupports himlelf with a profpecfl of what would be the confequence of his fufferings, viz. God's glory. Now, 'tis the end that fupports the agent in any difficult work that he undertakes, and above all others, his ultimate and fupream end. For this is above all others valuable in his eyes ; and fo, fufficient to countervail the difficulty of the means. That is the end, wl.ich is in itfelf agreable and fweet to him, which ultimately termi* nates his defires, is the center of reft and fupport ; and fo muft be the fountain and fum of all the delight and comfort he has in his profpe6\s, with refped to his work. Now Chrift has his foul ftraitned and diftrefled with a view of that which was infinitely the moft difficult part of his work, which was juft at hand. Now certainly if his mind feeks fupport in the conflicfl from a view ot his end : it muft moft naturally repair to the higheft end, which is the proper fountain of all fupport in this cafe. We may well fuppofe, thst when his foul confli6ls with the appearance of the moft extream difficulties, it would refort for fupport to the idea of his fupream and ultimate end, the fountain of all the fupport and comfort he has in the means, or the work. The fame thing, viz. Chrift's feeking the glory of God as his ultimate end, is manifeft by what Chrift fays, when he comes yet nearer to the hour of his iaft fufferings, in that remarkable prayer, the Iaft he ever made with his difciples, on the evening before his crucifixion 5 wherein he exprefles the fum of his aims and defires. His firft words are, " Father, the hour is come, glorify thy fon, that thy fon alfo may glorify thee". As this is his firft requeft, we may fuppofe it to be his fupream re-queft and delire, and what he ultimately aimed at in all. If we confider what follows to the end, all the reft that is faid in the prayer, feems to be but an amplification of this great requeft.

On the whole, I think ij^is pretty manifeft, that Jefus Chrift fought the glory of God as his higheft and Iaft end ; and that therefore, by pofition twelfth, this was God's Iaft end in the creation of the world.

K % 7. 'Tn^

uipiij 111

6S GOD'S lajl End sbctJII,

7. 'Tis manifeft from fcripture, that God's glory is the laft end of that great work ©t providence, the work of redemption by Jefus Chrift. This is manifeft from what is jurt now obferved, of its being the end ultimately fought by Jefus Chrift the redeemer. And if we further confider the texts mentioned in the proof of that, and take notice of the context, it will be very evident, that it was what Chriii ^ fought as his laft end, in that great work which he came 5nto the world upon, viz. to procure redemption for his people. It is manifeft that Chrift profeffes in Joh. 7. 18, that he did not feek his own glory in what he did, but the glory of him that fent him. He means that he did not feek his own glory, but the glory of him that fent him, in the v;ork of his miniftry ; the work he performed, and which he came into the world to perform, and which his father fent him to work out, which is the work of redemption. And with refpedl to that text, Joh. 12. 27, 28. it has been already obferved, that Chrift comtorted hrmfelf in the view of the extreme difficulty of his work, which was the work of redemption, in the profpe6t of that which he had refpedl to, and rejoiced in, as the higheft, ultimate and moft valuable excellent end of that work, which he fet his heart moft upon, and delighted moft in. And in the an-fwer that the father made him from heaven at that time, jn the latter part of the fame vcrfe, " I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again", the meaning plainly is, that God had glorified his name in what Chrift had done, in the work he fent him upon, and would glorify it again, and to a greater degree, in what he ftiould furtlier do, and jn thefuccefs thereof. Chrift fhews that he underftood it thus, in what he fays upon it, when the people look no-rice of it, wondering at the voice ; fonie faying, that it thundered, others, that an angel fpake to him. Chrift fays, ♦< This voice came not becaufe of me, but for your fakes". And then he fays (exulting in the profpedt of this glorious end and fuccefs) ''Now is the judgment of ihis world ; now is the prince of this world caft out. & I, if 1 be lift up Jrom tlie earth,will draw al! men unto me". Jn the fuccefs , nt the fame work of redemption, he places his own glory, :>9 was oV^ferved before, in thefe w^ords in the 23, and 24, -rfcs of the fame chapter. " The hour is come, that the f.M of man fnould be glQr.ified. Verily, verily J fay unto

you.

Chap. I. tH.the Creation of the World. 6f

you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, it abideth albne ; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit'*.

So it is manlfeft that when he feeks his own and his father's glory, in that prayer, Joh. 17* (which, it has been obferved, he then fecks as his lad end) he feeks it as the end of that great W3rk he came into the world upon, which. he is now about to tiaifli in his death. What roilovvs thro' the whole prayer, plainly ihews this : and pirticularly the 4th. and 5^h. verfes. *' I hive glorified thee on earth : I have fill filed the work which thou gaveft me to do. And •now, O fzthQT^ glorify thou me with thine own (c]V\ Here 'tis pretty plain that declaring to his father, that he had gloritied him on earth, and finifhcd the work God gave him to do, mnnt tiiat he had tinidied the work which God gave him to do for this end, viz. that he might be glorified, ile had now iinifned that foundation that he came into the worid to lay for his glory. He had laid a foundation for his father's obtaining his will, and the ut-mofl that he defigned. By which it is manifeft, that God's glory was the utmoft of his d.efign, or his ultimate end in this great work.

And 'tis manifeft by Joh. 13. 31, 32. that the glory of the father, and his own glory, are what Chrift exulted in, in the profpe6t of his approaching futferings, when Judas Vv-as gone out to betray him, as the end his heart was mainly fet upon, and fupreamly delighted in. ** Therefore when he was gone our, Jefus faid, Now is tjie fon of mm glorified, and God is glorijfied in him. If God be glorihed in him, God rtiall aJfo glorify him in himfelf, and fhall ftraitway glorify *him".

That the glory of God Is the hlgheft and laft end of the work of redemption, is confirmed bv the fong of the angels at Chrift's birth. Luk. 2. 14. " Glory to God in the highcft, and on earth, peace and good-will towards men". It muft be fuppofed that they knew w^liat was God's laft end in fending Chrift into the world : and that in their rejoicing on the occafion of his incarnation, their minds would be raoO: taken up with, and would moll: rejoice in tha'c which wss moll valuable and glorious in it ; which

muft

muft confift in its relation to that which was its chief and ultimate end. And we may further fuppofe, that the thing which chiefly engaged their minds, as what was moft glorious and joyful in the affair, is what would be firft exprefled in that fbng which was to exprefs the fentiments of their minds, and exultation of their hearts.

The glory of the father and the fon is fpoken of as the

end ot the work of redemption, in Phil. 2. 6, 11. very

much in the fame manner as in Joh» 12. 23, 28. and 13.^ 31, 32. and 17. I, 4, 5. "Who being in the form of

God, made himfelf of no reputation, and took upon

him the form of a fervant, and was made in the likenefs of men : and being found in fafhion as a man, he humbled himfelf, and became obedienrunto death, even the death of the crofs : wherefore God alfo hath highly exalted him,

and given him a name, &c. that at the name of Jefus

every knee (hould bow, and every tongue confefs, that

Jefus is the Lord, To the glory of God the father". So God's glory, or the praife of his glory, is fpoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Eph. 1.3, &c. ^' BlefTed be the God and father of our Lord Jefus Chrif^, who hath blcfTed us with all fpiritual bleffings in heavenly places in Chrift : according as he hath chofen us in him. Having predeftinated us to the adoption of children,—TO the praise of the glory of his grace'*. And in the continuance of the fame difcourfe concerning the redemption of Chrift, in follows in what the fame chapter^ God's glory is Once and agam mentioned as the great end of all. Several things belonging to that great redemption are mentioned in the following verfes : fuch as God's great wifdom in it, ver 8. The clearnefs of light granted thro' Chrift, ver. 9. God's gathering together in one, ail things in heaven and earth in Chrift, ver. 10. God's giving the chriftiansthat were firft converted to the cnrifti-an faith from among the jews, an intereft in this great redemption, ver. I f. Then the great end is added, ver. 12. *' That we ftiould be to the praise of his glory^ who arft trufted in Chrift". And then is mentioned thebeftow-ng of the fame great falvation en the gentiles, in its bc-^ nning or firft fruits in the world, and in the compleating

it

Chap.II. ^^ ^^ Creation of the World. yi

it in another world, in the two next verfes. And then the fame great end is added again. " In whom ye alfo trufled, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gofpel of your falvation : In whom alfo, after that ye believed, ye were fealed with the holy fpirit of promife,which is the earneft of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchafed pof-feflion, UNTO the praise of his glor\". The fame thing is exprefs'd much in the fame manner, in 2 Cor. 4. 14,15. —" He which raifed up iheLordJefuSjfhall raife up us alfo by Jefus, and (hall prefent us with you. For all things are for your fakes, that the abundance of grace might thro' the thankfgiving of many, redound to the glory of God".

The fame is fpoken of as the end of the v^ork of redemption in the old-teftament. Pfal. 79. 9. " Help us, O God of our falvation, for the glory of thy name; deliver us and purge away our fins, for thy name's fake". So in the prophecies of the redemption of Jefus Chrift. Ifai. 44. 23. " Sing, O ye heavens ; for the Lord hath done it : fhout, ye lower parts of the earth : break forth into finging, ye mountains, O foreft, and every tree therein : for the Lord liath redeemed Jacob, and glorified HIMSELF in Ifrael." Thus the v/orks of creation are called upon to rejoice at the attaining of the fame end, by the redemption of God's people, that the angels rejoiced at, whenChrift was born. See alfo chap. 48.10, 11. and 49. 3,

Thus' 'tis evident that the glory of God is the ultimate

end of the work of redemption. Which is the chief

work cf providence towards the moral world, as is abundantly manifefl from fcripture : the whole univerfe being put in fubjed^ion to Jefus Chrift j alV heaven and earth, angels and men being fubjedl to him, as executing this office : and put under him to that end, that all things may be order'd by him, in fubfervience to the great defigns of his redemption : ail power, as he fays, being given to him, in heaven and in earth, that he may give eternal life to as many as the father has given him : and he being exalted far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and made head over all things to the church. The angels being put in fubje<5lion to him, that he may employ

them

them all as miniftring fpirits, for the good of them that fhaJl be the heirs of his falvation : snd all things being fo govern'd by their redeemer for them, that all things are iheirs, whether things prefent or things to come : and all God's works of providence in the irioral government of the world, which we have an account of in icripture hiflory, or that are foretold in fcripture prophecy, being evidently fub-crdinate to the great puipofes and ends of this great work. And befides, the work of redemption is that work, by v^iich good men are, as it were, created, or brovght into being, as gccd men, or as reflored to hclinefs snd happi-iiefs. The wojk of redemption is a new creation, according to fcripture reprefentation, whereby men are brought into a new exifltnce. or are m.ade new creatures.

From thefe things it follows, according to the 5th, 6tb, and 7th pofiticns, that the glory of God is the laft end of the creation of the world,

8. The fcripture leads us to fuppofe, that God's glory is his iaft end in his moral government of the world in general. This has been already (hewn concerning feveral things that belong to God's moral government of the world. As particularly, in tlie work of redemption, the chief of ail his difpei^fations, in his moral government of the world. And I have alfo obferved it, with refpe(5l to the duty which God requires of the fubjcfls of his moral government, in requiring them to feek his glory as their iafl: t\\^. And this is aclualiy the laft end of the moral goodnefs requiied of them ; the end which gives their nioral goodnefs its chief value. And alfo, that it is what that perfon which God has fet at the head of the moral world, as its chief governor, even Jefus Chrift, feeks as his chief end. And it has been fhewn, that it is the chief end . for which that part of the moral world which are good^ are made, or have their exiftence as good. I now further ob-{f:,\\i^^ that this is the end of the eflablifliment of the pub-lick worlhip and ordinances of God among mankind. Hag. I. 8. " Go up to the m.ountain, and bring wood, and build tlie hcufe ; and I will take pleafure in it, and 1 will EE GLORIFIED, faith the Lord." This is fpcken of 2& the end cf God's pr^-mifes of revv^rd?^ and bf their

fulfilmentt

Ckap.il ^^ ^'^^ Creation of the World, :y"^

fulfilment. 2 Gor. i. 20. " For all the promifes of God in hiitt are yea, and in him amen, to the glory of Goo by us." And this is fpoken of as the end of the execution of God's threatnings, in the punifhment of fin. Num. 14. 20, 21, 22, 23. *' And the Lord faid, I have pardoned according to thy word. But as truly as I live, all the earth (hall be filled with th£'"^lory of Jehovah. Becaufe all thefe men, &£- '^' '-^^^ely they (hall not fee the land.'" The glory of Jehovah is evidently here fpoken of, as that which he had regard to, as his higheft and ultimate end ; which therefore he could not fail of; but mufi take place every where, and in every cafe, through all parts of his dominion, whatever became of men. And whatever a-batements might be made, as to judgments deferved ; and whatever changes might be made in the courfs of God's proceedings, from compafTion to finners 5 yet the attaining of God's glory was an end, which being ultimate and fu-pream, muft in no cafe whatfoever give place. This is fpoken of as the end of God's executing judgments on his: enemies in this world. Exod. 14. 17, 18 '' And I wiU get me honour {Ikhahhedha^ I will be glorified) upon Pha-roah, and upon all his hoft, &c." iLzek. 28. 22 **Thus faith the Lord God, Behold 1 am againft thee O Zion, and I WILL BE GLORIFIED in the midft of thee : And they fnall know that I am the Lord, when I (hall have executed judgments in her,and fhall bz fanofijisd in her." So Ezek, 39. 13. '^Yea, all the people of the land (hall bury them j and it dial] b« to them a renown, the day thai 1 Jhall he glorified^ faith the Lord God." And this is fpoken of as she end, both of the executions of wrath, and in the glorious exercifes'of mercy, in the mifery and happinefs of another w»orld. Rom. 9. 22, 23. *' What it God willing to (hew his wrath, and make his power known, endu-red with much long fufFering, the vefTels of wrath fitted to deftru(ftion : and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vefTels of mercy, w hich he had afore prepared unto glory". And this is fpoken of as the end of the day of judgment, which is the time appointed for the higheft exercifes of God's authority as moral governor of the v/orld ; and is as it were, the day of the confumma-tion of God's moral government, with refpedt to all hij fubi^(5ls. in hcaven.e^fth and heilv 2 Thef* r. 9,iG, *' Who

Jhall be punilhed with everlafling deftru<5lion from the pre-v'fence of the Lord, and from the glory Qf his power ; when

he (hall come io be glorified in his faints, and to be admired In.

all ihem that believe". Then his glory fnall be obtained,

with refpe<Sl both to faints and finners.

From thefe things it is mi^i^ei^ by the fourth pofition, that God's glory is the uJtimat^LJ^Hii^ithiejc,reation of the

world. ■'-"■:•■:'] A 70 V'.

9. It appears from what has been already obferved, that the glory of God is fpokcn of in fcripture as the laft end of many of God*s works ; and it is plain that this thing is in fa^t the ifTue and refult of the works of God's common providence, and of the creation of the world. Let us tike God's glory in what fenfe fo ever, confift^nt with its being fomething brought to pafs, or a good attained by any work of God, certainly it is the confequeiice of thefe works : and befides it is exprefsly fo fpoken of in fcripture. This. ;is implied in the ift. ver. of the 8th. pfalm, wherein are celebrated the v/orks of creation ; the heavens being the work of God's fingers ; the moon and the ftars'beir.g ordained by God ; and God's making man a little lower than the angels, &c. The firfl verfe is, *' O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth ! who haft fet thy glory above the heavens", or iipon the heavens. By name 2ind glory^ very much the fame thing is intended here, as in many other places, as fnall be particularly fhewn afterwards. So the pfalm concludes as it began. " O Lord our Lord, how excellent is thy name in ail the earth" I So in the 148th. pfalm, after a particular inention of moft Qf the works of creation,enumerating them in order,vh€ pfal-mifl fays, ver. 13. " Let them praife the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellenr, his glory is above the earth and th€ heaven*'. And in in the iC4th pfalm, after a very particular, orderly and magnificent reprefentation qf God's works of creation and common providence,'tis faid in the -21 ft ver. *' The glory of the Lor4 ihall endure forever : the Lord fliall rejoice in his works", l^cre God's glory is fpoken of, as the grand refult, and bleffed ccnfequence of ;all thefe works, which God values, and on account of which l;e reioic€§ in thcfc wofk$. And thi$ i^gtic thing dooibt-

DEU

Chap. IL ^^ ^^^ Crtation of the World ' Js

lefs implied in'the fong of the feraphim, Ifai. 6. 3. ** H0I7, holy, holy is the Lord of hofts, the whole earth is full of his glory".

The glory of God, in being the refult and confequenc^ of thofe works of providence that have been menlion'd, is in fadl the confequence of the creation. The good attained in the ufe of a thing, made for ufe, is the refult of the making of that thing, as the fignifying the timeof day,wheti adtually attained by the ufe of a watch, is the confequence of the making of the watch. So that 'tis apparent that the glory of God is a thing that is a6lually the refult and con* lequence of the creatioi-j of the world. And from what has been already obferved, it appears* that 'tis w.hat God feeks as good, valuable and excellent in itfelf. And 1 pjefume, none will pretend, that there is any thing peculiar in the nature of the cale, rendering it a thing valuable in fome of the inftances wherein it takes place, and not in others : or that the glory of God, tho' indeed an efFedl of all God's works, is an exceeding defirable eiFe6t of fome of them ; but of others, a worthlefs and infignificant efFedt, God's glory therefore, muft be a defirable, valuable confequence ot the work ot creation. Yea 'tis exprefsly fpoken of in PfaL 104. 3, (as was obferved) as an effe6t, on account of which, God rejoices and takes pleafure in the works of creation.

Therefore it is manlfeU by poiition third, that tlie glory of God is an ultimate end in the creation of th-e world.

Sect. \Y ^

LACES of fcripture that lead us to fuppofe, that God created the world for his Name^ to make i^is Perfections KNov/N 'y and that he made it for his Praise.

Here I (hall firft take notice of fome paiTagcs of fcrlp-fare,. that fpeak of God's «^?;;7^ as being made God's end, m the obje^^ of his regard, and the reg.^rd of his v'ltuo.us

L 2 ara4

and holy intelligent creatures, much in tlie fame manner is has been obferved of God's glory.

As particularly, God's name is in Fike manner fpoken ©f, as the end of his adts of goodnefs towards the good ]part of the moral worlds and of his works of mercy and Salvation towards his people. A$ i Sam. 12. 2-2. *' The Lord will not forfakc his people, for his great nomis fake.** Pfal. 23. 3. ** FJe rertoreih my foul, he leadeth me in th« paths p[ righteovifnefs, for his name's jake'^ Pfal. 31. 3. *' For ihy name's fake lead me, and guide me." Pfal. T09.

21. " But do thou for me, --for thy name's fake'' The

forgivenefs of fin in particular, is often fpoken of as being for God's name'*s fake. \ Joh. 2. 12. *' 1 write unto you, Jittle children, becaufe your fins are forgiven you for Ms name's JakeJ** Pfal. 25*. 11. " For thy name's fake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is gteat." Pfal. 79. 9. '* Help us, O God of our falvation, for the glory of thy na?ve^ and deliver us, and purge away our fins, for thy name's fake,*' Jer. 14- 7. *' O Lord, though our iniquities telhfy againil us, do thou \k for thy name's fake,**

The^e tilings feern to fliew, that the falvation of Chriil js for God's name's fjike. Leading and guiding in the way of fafety and happinefs, reftoring the foul, the forgivenefs of fin, and that iielp, deliverance and falvation, that is confequen*- tliereon, is for God's name. And here 'tis ob-fervablc, that thole two great temporal falvations of God's people, the redemption from Egypt, and that from Baby^ ion, that are olten reprefented as. figures and fimilitudes of the redernp.tion of Chrift, are frequently fpoken of as being wrought y^r God's name's fake. So is i hat great work of God, iu delivering hi^ people from Egypt, carrying them throijgh the wiidernef? to their rell in Canar'n. 2 Sam. 7. 23. '* And what- one nafion m t!ie earih is like tliy people, even like ifraei, v^hom God wenr to redeem for -a people to h]mfeir,and \o male him a name." Pfal. ic6. 8. *' Never-tbriefs he faved rht-m for his name's fakt.'^ Ifai. 63. la. " That ]^i\ them by the riglu hand of Mofcs, with his p'oTJcus arm, dividing the wa'ers before th.em, tc incke him-felf an evt'>]Jiing nuy)ie*' -in the 20th cinp. of Enek. God f^ihearfing rht various parts cf \\\\i wGiidciful vscil:, adds

fioni

Chap.il '^ ^^^ Creation of the World, 'JJ

from time to time, *' I wrought for my name*s fahe^ that It fliould not be polluted before the heathen,*' as in vecr. 9, 14, 22. See alfo Jofh. 7. 8, 9. Dan. 9 15. So is th« redemption from the Bibylonifh captivity. Ifai. 48. 9, 10.

** For my names fake will I defer mine anger.' -For mine

own fake, even for mine own fake will I do it, for how-llnould my name bt polluted ?" In Ezek. 36. 2r, 22, 2> the reafon is given for God's mercy in reftoring Ilraelo " Bat I had pity for my holy name. — Thus faith the Lord, I do not this for your fakes, O houfe of Ifrael^ but for my haly. name s fake ; — And I will fanSi'ify my-great name^ which was profan'd among the heathen." And chap. 39. 25. ^« Therefore thus faith the Lord God, now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob, and have mercy upon the whole houfe of- Ifrael, and will be jealous for my holy name.'* Daniel prays that God would forgive his people, 8nd fhew theni mercy for his own fake. Dan. 9. 19.

When God from time to time fpeaks of fliewlng mercy, and exercifing goodnefs, and promoting his people** happinefs tor his name's fake^ we can't underhand it as of a. meerly fubordinate end. How abfurd would it be to Tay, that he promotes their happinefs for his name's fake, in fabordination to their good ; and that his name may be exalted only for their fakes, as a means of promoting their happinefs ! efpecially when fuch expreflions as thefe are iifed, *^ For mine own fake, even for mine own fake will I do it, for bow Ihould my name be polluted ?" and <« Not for your fakes do 1 this, but for my holy name's fake".

Again, Ms* reprefented as tho' God's people had their exirtcnce', at lead as God's people, for God's name's fake. God's redeeming or purchaiing them, that they mrght be his people, for his name, implies this. As in that paifage mentioned before, 2 Sam. 7. 23=——^'Thy people Ifrael, whom God went to redeem for a people to him-ielf, and to m^ke h'nn a name'\ So God's making them.a people for his name, is implied in Jer. 13. i r, '' For as Che girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, fo have I cauferi

to cleave unto me the whole houfe of Ifrael &c. • that

they may be unto me for a people, a^id for a name,'' AO.

15. 14. '* Simeon hath declared how God at the firft did Vilit the gentiles, to take out of them a people for his name"

This alfo Is fpoken of as the t;nd of the virtue and religion, and holy behaviour of the faints. Rom. i. 5. *' By whom we have received grace and appoftlefhip, for obedience to the faith smong all miions for his name." Matte 19. 29. '' Every one that forfaketh houfesor brethren 5fc. "—for my names fahe^ (hall receive an hundred fold, and Ihall inherit evcrlafting life." 3 Joh. 7. " Becaufe that for his name's fake they went forth, taking nothing of the gentiles." Rev. 2. 3. "And haft born, and haft patience, and/<?r my name's Jake haft laboured, and haft not fainted."

And wc find that holy perfons exprefs their defire of this, and their joy m it, in the fame manner as in the glory of God. 2 Sam. 7. 26. '* Let thy name be magnified forever." Pfal. 76. i. ''In Judah is God known, his name is great in Ifrael." Pfal. 148. 13. "Let them praife the name of the Lord ; for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth, and heaven." Pfal. J35. 13. '* Thy name O Lord, endureth forever, and thy memorial throughout all generations." Ifai, iz. 4. " De« clare his doings among the people, make mention that his name is exalted."

The judgments God executes on the wickedjSrc fpoken of as bemg/or //;^^/^i? of his name^ in like manner as for his glory. Exod. 9. 16. " And in very deed for this caufe have 1 raifed thee up, for to fhew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth"* Neh. 9. 10. " And fhewedft figns and wondevs upon Pharaoh, & on all his fervants,and on all the people of his land ; for tliou knewedft that they dealt proudly againft them .: fo didft thou get thee a name as at this day".

And this is fpoken of as a confequence of the works of creation, in JiktMnanner as God's glory. Pfal. 8. i. "O Lord, hoiv exifiUrtt is thy name in all the caith I who haft fet thy glory abo r ifje tienvens". And then at the con-

cluficu

clufion of the obfervations on the works of creation, ths pfaim ends thus ( ver. 9. ) *' O Lord, our Lord, how excels /^»//i//^y w^w^ in all the earth". So Pfal. 148. 13. after a particular mention of the various works of creation, " Let them praife the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent in all the earth, his glory is above the earth and file heaven".

So we tind manifeftation, or making known God's per-feSlions^ his greatnefi and excellency^ is fpoken of .very much in the fame manner as God's giory.

There are feveral fcriptures which would lead us to fuppofe this to be the great thing that God fought of the moral world, and the end aimed at in the moral agents, which he had created, wherein they are to be ac5live in anfwering their end. This feems implied in that argument God's people fometimes made ufe of, in deprecating a ftate of death and deflru6tion : that in fuch a ftate, they can't know or make known the glorious excellency of God. Pfal. 88. 18, 19. '' Shall thy loving kindnefs be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulnefs in deflrucStion I Shall thy vvonders be known in the dark, and thy righte-cufnefs in the land of forgetfulnefs" ? So Pfal. 30. 9. ]fai. 38. 18, 19. The argument feems to be this : Why fhould we perilh ? and how (hall thine end, (or which thou haft mad'^ us, be obtained in a ftate of deilrud^i-on, in v/hich thy glory cannot be kno7vn or declared ? V

This is fpoken of as the end of the good part of the jnoral world, or the end of God's people in the fame manner as the glory of God. Ifai. 43. 21. ** This people have 1 formed for myfelf, they fliall fnew forth my praife'\ i Pet. a. 9. '' But ye ^re a chofen generation, a royal priedhood, ?in holy nation, a peculiar people, thai ye JJmild/})eiv forth tke fraifei of him^ who hath called you out of darkntfs into marvellous light".

And this feems to be reprefented as the thing wherein the valui? and proper fruit and end of their virtue appears. JXai, 6p, 6-. Speaking s>f \\\x conyerlign of the gentile na-

"' ~ ^ tions

ions to true religion-^i—** They fhall come zn6 fitw forth

■ theprarjes oi \\\& Lord'*. Ifai. 66. 19. ''1 wiJl fenc-

unto the nations—*—*and to the ifles afsr off, that have not heard my fame^ neither have feen my glory -, and they fhall declare my glory among the gentiles.

And this fcetns by fciipture reprefentatlons tc "be !he end, in the defiies of vhich, and delight in wh'ch appears the proper tendency and reft of true virtue, andho^ydif-•pcfitions ; much in the fame manner as the glory of Gcd. I Chrorv 16. 8. " Make known his deeds among the people". Ver. 23j 24. " Shew forth from day to day thy falvation. Declare his glory among the heathen". Sec alfo, Pfal. 9. I, ir, 14. ai.d 19. 1. and 26. 7. and 71. 18. and 75. 9. and 76. i. and 79. 13. and 96. 2, 3. and loi. 1. and 107.22. and 118. 17. and 145. 6,11, 12. Ifai. 42. 12. and 64. i, 2, Jer. 50. jo.

This feems to to be fpcken of as a great end of the 26\s of God's moral government. Particularly, the great •judgments he executes for fin. Exod, 9. 16. "And in very deed for this caufe have I raifed thee up, to (hew in thee my power, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth". Dan. 4. 17. ''This matter is

by the decree of the watchers, &C. To the intent that

ihe living may know that the moft high ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomfoever he will ; and ietteth up orer it the bafeft of men'\ But places to thiS purpofe are too numerous to be pariiculaily recited. See them in the margin.*

This

Exod. 14. 17, 18. I Sam. 17. 46. Pfal. 83. iS. Ifai. 45. 3. Ezek. 6, 7, 10, 13, 14. ai.d 7. 4, 9,

27. and II. 10, II, 12. and 12. 15, 16, 20. and 13. 9, 14, 21, 23. and 14. 8. and 15. 7. and 21. 5. and 22. 16. and 25. 7, 11, 17. and 26. 6. and

28. 22, 23, 24. and 29, 9, 16. and 30. 8, 19, 25, 26. and 32. 15. and 33. 29. and 35. 4, 12, 15. an4 38, 23. and 39, t), 7, 2X, 22»

CHAP.ir. ^^ ^"^ Creation of the World. 8i

This is alfo fpoken of as a great end of God's works of favor and mercy to his people. 2 King, 19. 19, "Now therefore, O Lord our God, I befeech thee, fave thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art theLordGod^^v^n thou only*', i King. 8. 59,,

60. ■*' That he maintain the caufe of his fervant, & the

caufe of his people Ifrael at all times as the matter (hall require, that ail the people of the earth may know that the Lord is God, and thai there is none e/fe*'. See other pafTages to the fame purpofe refer'd to in the margin, f

This is fpoken of as the end of the eternal damnation of the wicked,and alfo the eternal happinefs of the righteous, Rom. 9, 22, 23. "• What if God, wiilincj; to fhev/ his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long fufFering, the veflels of wrath fitted to deliruclion : and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the veflels of mercy, which he hath afore prepared unto glory" ?

This is fpoken of from time to time, as a great end of tl^e miracles which God wrought. See Exod. 7. 17. and 8-10. and. I®, 2. Deut. 29. 5, 6. Ezek. 24. 27.

This is fpoken of as a great end of ordinances. KxQd» 29. 44, 45, 46, '* And I will fandlify the tabernacle of the congregation ; I will fandtify alfo both Aaron and his fons, to minil^er to me in the priells ofSce. And I will dwell armong the children of Ifrael, and will be theic God. And they (hall know that I am rhe Lord their God, &C." Chap. 31. 13. " Verily my fabbaths (liall ye keep ; for it is a. lign between me and you, throughout your generations ; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth fandtify you'*. We have again almod the fame v/ords, Ezek. 20. 12, and ver, 20.

M This

t Exod. 6. 7. and 8. 22. and 16. 12. i King. g. 43. and. 20. 28, Pfal. 102. 21. Ezek. 23. 49. and 24, 24, and 25. 5, and 35, 9. and 39. 21,

This is fpoken of as a great end of the redemption out ot Egypt. Pfal. ix)6. 8. *' Neverthelefs he faved them for his name's fake that he might make his mighty power to be known'* See alfo Exod. 7. 5. and Deut. 4. 34, 35. And alfo of the redemption from the Babylonifti captivity,

Ezek. 20. 34, 38. " And I will bring you out from

the people^ and will gather you out of the countries whither ye are Scattered. And I wi 1 bring you into

the wildernefs of the people ; and there 1 will plead with you, as 1 pleaded with your fathers in the wildernefs of the land of Egypt. —— And I will bring you into the bond of the covenant. And I will purge out the rebels— And ye Jhall knew that I am the Lord," Ver. 42. ** Jlnd ye Jhall know that 1 am the Lord, when I (hall brings you into the land of Ifrael."— Ver. 44. " And ye fhall Jimw that 1 am the Lord, when 1 have wrought witn you for my name's fake:* See alfo, chap. 28. 25, 2^. and 36. ai. and 37,

This is alfo fpoken of as a great end of the work of Redemption of Jefus Chrift : both of the purchafe of redemption by Chrift, and the application of redemption, Rom. 3. 25, 26. *' Whom God hath fet forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righiecuf-

fjgjs, 7"<7 declare I Jay, at this time his righteoulnefs : that

he might be juft, and the juftifier of him that believcth in Jefus.*' Eph. 2. 4,- 7. " But God who is rich in mercy &c. ■ That he might Jhew the exceeding riches of his grace, in his kindnefs towards us through Jefus Chrift." chap. 3. 8, 9, 10. " To preach amortg the gentiles the unfearchable riches of Chrift, and to make all men fee, what is the feilowftiip of that myftery which, from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jefus Chrift : To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by tbs church the manifold ivi/dom of God.** Pfal. 22. 21, 22. «* Save me from the lion's mouth. 7 will declare thy name unt9 wy brethren : in the midft of the congregation will 1 praife thee," compared with Heb. 2 i^ and Joh. 17. 26, ifai. 64. 4. " O tHat thou wouldeft rent the heavens— 40 make thy name known to thine adverjarifs^--'-^**

An©

And it is fpokea of as the end of that great aaual fa!v4-tion, which Ihould follow Chrift's purchafe of falvation, both among Jews and gentiles. Ifai. 49. 22, 23. " I will lift up my hand to the gentiles,——and they (hall bring

thy fons in their arms and kings (hall be thy nurfing

fathers — and thou Jhalt know that I am the Lord'' *

This is fpoken of as the end of God*s common providence. Job 37 6, 7. *'«For he faith to the fnow, B« thou on the earth. Like wife to the fmall rain, and to the great ram* of his ftrength. He fealeth up the hand ot every man, that all men may kno^ his work'%

It is fpoken of as thci end of the day of judgment, tlmfc grand confumjnation ot God's moral government of the world, and the day for the bringing all things to their de-figned ultimate iffue. It is called *' The day of the revela-tioa of the rightecijs judgmeat of God", Roni. 2. 5.

And the declaration, or openly manifefting God*s excellency is fpoken of as the adtual, happy confequence and effect of the work of creation. Pfal. 19. at thie beginning. *' The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament fheweth his handy work. Day unto day uttcreth fpeech, night unto night (heweth forth knowledge.——In them hath he placed a tabernacle for the fun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a ftrong man to run his race, &c.'^

In like manner, there are many fc/rptures thatfpeak.cf God's PRAISE, in many of the forcmentioned refpeas, jufl in the fame manner as of his name and glory.

This is fpoken of as the end of the being of God's peop e, in the fame manner. Jcr. 13. 11. '* For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, {o have I caufed to cleave unto nie the whole houfe of Ifrael, and the

M 2 whole

* See alfo, Ezek, 16. 62. and 29. 21. and 34, 27, and 36, 38, and 39, 28, 29, Josl^ 3, ij.^

§4 GOD'S iajl End sect.1V.

whole houfc of Judah, faith the Lord ; that they might be unto mc for a name, and for a praife^ and for a glory."

It is fpoken of as the end of the moral world. Matt. 21. 16. '* Out of the mouth of babes and fucklings ha/i thou pirfeSied praife.^* That is, fo haft thou in thy fove-reigniy and wffdom orf^ered it, that thou fhouldeft obtain the great end for which intelligent creatures are made^ more tfpecially from feme o^ them that are in them-felves weak, or interior and more infufficient. . Compare Pfal. 8. 1,2.

And the fame thing that was obferved before coa^ cerning the making known God*s excellency, may alfo be obferved concerning God's praije. That it is made ufe of as an argurpent in deprecating a ftate of deftrudlion, that in fuch a ftate this end can't be anfwered ; in fuch a manner as feems to imply its being ah ultimate end, that God had made man for. Pfal. 88. 10. *' Shall the dead arife and praife thee f fhall thy lovmgkindnefs be declared in

the grave ? ftiall thy v\onders be known in the dark r"

Pfal 30. 9. *' What profit is there in my blood i when I ^o down to the pit, Jhall the dufl praife the'e ? fhall it de-'<!lare thy truth r" Pfal. 115. 17, 18. "The dead praife not the Lord^ neither any that go down into filence : but we will hlef the Lord, from this time forth and forevermore. Traife ye the Lord.'' Ifai. 38 18, 19. *^ For the grave Cannot praife ihee^ death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he Jhall praije thee."

It is fpoken of as the end of the virtue of^od's people, in like manner as is God*s glory. Phil. i. 11. " fieing fi\M with the fruits of righteoufnefs, which are by Jefus Chrift to the praije ojid glory of God''

It is fpoken of as the end of the work of redemption. In the firft chsp. of Eph. where th^t work in the various parts of it is particularly infifted on, arm fet forth in its exceeding glory, this is mentioned from time to time as the great end of all, that it fhould be " to the praife of Ms glory," (Pis in vcr. 6, 12, 14.) By which we may

doubtkfs

doubtlefs underftand much the fame thing, with that which in Phil. I. II. is exprefTed, " h'n praife and glory** Agre-ahle to this, Jacob's tourth fon, from whom the Melfiah the great Redeemer was to proceed, by the fpirit of prophecy, or the fpecial dire(5tion of God's providence, was called Praise, with reference to this happy confequence, and glorious end of that great redemption, this Mefllah, one of his pofterity, was to work out.

This in the old teftament is fpoken of as the end of the forgivenefs of the (in of God's people, and their falva-tion, in the fame manner as is God's name and glory. Ifai. 48. 9, 10, 11. *' For my name's fake will I defer mine anger, and for my praife v?ill I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not ofF. Behold I have refined thee ■ for mine own fake, even for mine own fake will I do it; for how fhould my name be polluted ? and my glory will I not give to another." Jer. 33. 8, 9. " And I will cleanfe them from all their iniquity,——^ and I will pardon all their iniquities . And it (hall be to me a name of joy, a

praife^ and an honor."

And that the holy part of the moral world, do exprefs defires of this, and delight in it, as the end v/hich holy principles in them tend to,reach after, and reft in, in their higheft exercifes, juft in the fame manner as the glory of God, is abundantly man\feft. it would be endlefs to enumerate particular places wherein this appears ; wherein the faints declare this,, by exprefiing their earned defires of God's praife ; calling on all nations, and all beings inhea-ven and earth-to praife him ; in a rapturous manner calling on one 'another, crying Hallelujah, praife ye the Lord, praife him forever". Expreffing their refolutions to praife him as long as they live through all generations, and forever ; declaring how good, how pleafant and comely the praife of God is, 5cc.

And 'tis manifeft that God's praife is the defirable a»nd glorious confdquence and effec^l of all the works of

creation, by fuch places as thefe. Pfal. 145. 5,— lo,

and 14.8. throughout, and 10^. 19,— -~12,

Sect,

"^ TmrwETd ;;;;7;:

S B C T. V.

pLACES of fcripture from whence it may be argued^ '•' that ccmmunicftion of good to the creaturey was one thing which God had in view> as an ultimate end oi the crea-on of the world.

I. According to the fcripture, communicating good to. the creatures, is what is in itfelf pleafing to God : and that" this is not meerly fubordinately agreabie^ and efteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in executing juftice in punifliing the fins ot men ; which God-is inclined to as fit and neceflafy in certain caies, and on the account of good ends attained by it : but what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in fimply and ultimately. For tho' God is fometimes in fcripture fpcken of as taking pleafure mpuni(hing men's fins, Deut. 28. 63. " The Lord will rejoice over you, to deflroy you". Ezek. 5. 13. *'Then (hall mine anger be accom-plifhed, and 1 will caufe my fury to reft upon them, and I will be comforted*'. Yet God is often fpoken of as exer-cifing goodnefs and (hewing mercy, with delight, in a manner quite different, and oppofite to that of his executing wrath. For the latter is fpoken of as what God proceeds to with backwardnefs and relu6iance ; the mifery of the creature being not agreable to.him on its own account. Neh. 9. 17. *' That thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, flow to anger, and of great loving kindnefs'*. Pfal. 103. 8. " The Lord is mercifu; & gracious, flow to anger, and plenteous in mercy". Plal. 145. 8. *' The Lord is gracious and full of compaflion, flow to anger, and of great mercv**. We have again almoit the fame words, Jonah 4. 2. Mic. 7. 10. ** Who is a God like thee, that pardonetb iniquity, &c.——Heretaineth not his anger forever, becaufe he delighteth in mercy". Ezek. 18. 32. " I have no pleafure in the death of him that dieth, faith the Lord God ; wherefore turn yourfelves, and live -^e". Lam. 3. 33. " He doth not afflia willingly, nor grieve the childien of tnen". Ezek. 33. 11. " As I live, faith the Lord God> 1 have no pleafure in the death ot the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live ;

turn

turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye die, O houfe of Ifrael". 2 Pet. 3. 9. <' Not willing that any fhould periQi, but that all (hould come to repentance".

2. The work of|redemption wrought out by Jefus Chrift, is fpoken of in fuch a manner as being from the grace and love of God to men, that does not well confift with his feeking a communication of good to them, only fubordi-nately, i. e. not at airfrom any inclination to their good di-Tecftly, or delight in giving happinefs to them, (imply and ^ultimately confider'd ; but only indirectly, and wholly from a regard to fooiethi ig entirely diverfe, which it is a means •of. Such expreilions as that in Joh. 3. 16. carry another -idea. " God fo loved the world, that he gave his only begotten fon, that whofoever believeth in him, (hould not perifh, but have everla(\ing life". And i Joli. 4. 9. 10. ** In this was manifelted the love of God towards us, be-caufe that God fent his only begotten fon into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love ; not that we loved God but that he loved us, and fent his fon to be a propitiation for our fins". So Eph. 2. 4. *' But God, who is rich in mercy,for his great love wherewith he loved us, &c'*. But if indeed this was only from love to fome--thing elfe, and a regard to a further end, entfrely diverfe from our good ; then all the love is truly teirminated in that, its ultimate obje<5t ! and God's love confi(\s in regard towards that : and therein is God*s love, and therein is hi& love mar{ife(led, ftri(5lly and properly fpeaking, and not in that he loved us, or exercifed fuch high regard towards us. For if our good be not at all regarded ultimately, but -only fubordinately, then our good or intereft is in itfelf con-fidered, nothing in GodVregard or love: God's refpedl is ^11 terminated upon, and fwaliowed up in fomething diverfe, which is the end, and not in the means.

So the fcrlpture every where reprefents concerningCh#ift', as tho' the great things that he did and fufFercd, were in the moft dire(5t and proper fenfe, from exceeding love to us ; and not as one may (hew kindnefs to a perfon, to whofe intereft, (imply and in itfelf confidered, he is iniirely indifferent, only as it may be a meins of promoting the in-

tered

"38 ^ GOD's la/i End sLt. V.

tereft of another (that is indeed diredly regarded) which is conncded with it. Thus the apoftie Paul reprefents the xnatter. Gal. 2. 20. *' Who loved me, and gave himfelf for me'*. Eph. 5. 25. *' Husbands love your wives, even as Chrift loved the church, and gave himfelf for it". And •Chrift himfelf, Joh. 17. 19, "For iheir fakes I fan^ify myfelf". And the fcripture reprefents Chrift as refting in the falvttion and glory of his people, when obtained, as in what he ultimately fought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of his race ; obtained the prize he aim.ed at ; enjoying the travail of his foul, in which he is fatirfird^ as the recompence of his labours and extreme agonies. Ifai. 53. 10, II. ** When thou (halt mske his foul an offering tor fin, he (hall fee his feed, he (hall prolong his days, and the pleafure of the Lord (hall prcfper m his hand. He (hall fee of the travail of his foul, and (hall be fatisfkd : by his knowledge (hall my righteous fervant juftify many, for he (hall bear their iniquities". He fees the travail of his foul, in feeing his feed, the children brought forth in the iflue of his travail. This implies that Chrift has Jiis delight, mcft truly and properly, in obtaining the lalvation of his church, not meerly as a means conducing to tl e thing which terminates his delight and joy ; but as what he rejoices and is fatisfied in, moft directly and properly : as do thofe fcriptures, which reprefent him as rejoicing in his obtaining this fruit of his labour and purchafe, as the bridegroom, when be obtains his bride. Ifai. 62. 5. *' As the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, fo fhall tny God rejoice over thee". And how emphatical and ftrong to the purpofe, are the exprefTions in Zeph. 3. 17. *' The Lord thy God in the midft of thee is mighty ; he will fave, he will rejoice over thee with joy : he will reft in his love, he will rejoice over thee with fingiag". The fame h rg may be argued from Prov. 8. 30, 31. " Then was 1 by him, as one brought up with him : and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him : rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth, and my delights were with the fons of men". And from thofe places that fpeak of the faints as God*s portion, his jewels and peculiar treafure. Thele things are abundantly confirmed by what is related, Joh. J2, 23>*——32, But the particular confideralion of what

may

rpay be obfervtd fQ the prefect purpofe, in that paflage p^ (cripture, ms'y be rcfer'd to the next feCiion,

3. The communications of divine goodnefs, particularly fprgivenels of tu>, ^nti faiyatioi), are fpol^en of froni time to time, as beiag tor God's goodoefs fakp, and for hi$ mercies laks, juft la the lame manner as they are fpokea of, as being for Gpd's name's fake, in places obferved before. Pfal, 25. 7. " Rerrsember not jh^ nps of my youth, por niy tranfgreffions ; according tQ thy mercy remembe*? thou m^y for thy gQodnefs fakey Q Lord", In the nth. ver. tlie pfaimill fays, V' For thy ngme's fake, O Lord pardon, mine iniquity". Neh, 9. 31. 'f Never,thel.efs for thy great purcies fake, thou ha(l not utterly confum^^d them, nor for-U^<ia them j for thou art a gracious and a merciful God", Pfal.6. 4. '' Return O Lordjdeliver my foul ; O fave me for thy mercies fak.e"o Pf^I. 31. 16. '• Make thy face to (hine upon thy fervant : fave ipe for fhy merciesfpke.*' Pfal. 44. 26« ^^ Arijfe for oitr help | Redeem \^sfor thy mercm fake** An4 iiere it may be obferved, ^fter what a remarkable mgnne.r God fpea.ks of hi^ love to ;he children of Ifrael in the wil-dernefs, ^s th^' his Jove were for lo\\e's fake, and his good-nels were its own end and motive, Deut. 7. 7, 8. ** The Lord did not fet his love upon you, nor choofe you, besauHs ve were more in number than any people, tor ye were the lev^eft of all people j but hecauje the horctjrvfd you*''

4. That the goyeinn:)ent of th? world In ai.l parts of if. Is tor the good of fjch as a^e to be the eternal fubje^is of God's goodiicfs, is implied in y/hat the f^rjpture teaches uf; of Chri,l\'s beii)| fet at (jod's right }ian,d? made king of an-» gels and -fnen s fet at the head pf the unjverfe, haying all jjjwer given hiiii in heaven an4 earthy to ihat^nd .ihat he may proonpte their happinefs ; being rpac)^ h§3.^ oyer all jthingg tp the phijrch, and having the gpy€r;:>i^.ept oMh^ whols creation for their gopJ.* ChriH: men^io.ns it (Mar. 2i$* '$.Q.) a$ the reafaa why th^ fon of rp^n is spadf hi'^^ of tJf«

f^ fabbath^

n II W ' I » !

Eph. J. 2to, :?r, ^^, ^^ Job. 17. 51. lAu, i|. g.^. fii4. .j^, i^^ j^, Jol>, ^. ||, ' ' ' '^

^^ UUVs lap Unci — ,Sect.v;

fabbath, that " the fabbath was made for man". And if fo, we may in like manner argue, that a!/ things were-hiade for man, that the fon of man is made Lord ot all things,

5. That God ufes the whole creation, in his whole government of it, for the good of his people, is moft elegantly reprefcnted in Deut. 35. 26. " There is none like the God of Jelhurun, who rideth on the heavens in thine help, and in his excellency on the fky". '1 he whole univerfe is a machine, which God hath made for his own ufe, to be his chariot for him to ride in j as is reprefcnted in Ezekiels vifion. In this chariot God's feat, or throne is heaven, where he fits, who ufes and governs and rides in this chariot (Ezek. i. 22, 26, 27, 28.J The inferior part of the creation, this vifible univerfe, fubjc^l to fuch continual changes and revolutions, are the wheels of the chariot, under the place of the feat of him who rides in this chariot. <jod*s providence in the conflant revolutions and alterations and fuccefTive events, is reprefented by the motion of the wheels of the chariot, by the fpirit of him who fits in liis throne on the hea\ens, or above the firmament. Mofes tells us for whofe fake it is tliat Gcd moves the wheels of this chariot, or rides in it fitting in his heavenly feat j ai^d to.what end he is making iiis progrefs, "or goes his appointed journey in it, viz. the falvation of hiS people,

6. God's judgments on the wicked in this world, and alfo their tternal damnation in the world to come, are fpo-ken of as being for the happinefs of God's people. So are his judgments on tliem in thisVVorld. llai. 43. 3, 4. '* For I am the Lord thy God, the holy one of Jfrael, thy favicur. I gave Egypt for thy ranfcm, Ethiopia and Seba for thee. Since thou hafl been precious in my fight, thou haf\ been honorable, and 1 hav-e loved thee ; therefore will I give roen tor thee, and people for thy life''. So the works of Ood's vindi(5live jurtice and 'wrath, are fpoken of as works of mercy to his people, Pfal. 136. 10. 15, 17, 18, 19. 20. And fo is their eternal damnation in another world. Rom* 9. 22. 23. " What if God, willing to fhew his wrath and jnake his power known^ endured with mw^h JongfufFering^

«»*w

the veiTels of wrath fitted to deftrucSlion : and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vefTels of mercy, v/hich he had afore prepared unto glory*'. Here it i$ evident the lail verfe comes in, in connection with the foregoing, as giving another reafon of the deftrudtion of the wicked, vi:^. the (hewingthe riches of his glory on tlie veflels of mercy ; in higher degrees of their glory and happinefs, in an advancement of their relifh of their own enjoyments, and greater fenfe of their value^ and of God's free grace ir> the beftowmen^.

7. It feems to argue that God's goodnefs to them who sre to be the eternal fubjeds of his goodnefs, is the end of the creation, that the whole creation, in all parts of it^ and all God's difpofals of it, is fpoken of as their's. i Cor. 3. 22, 23. *' All things are yours. Whether Paul, cr A-poilos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things prefent, or things to come, all are yours". The terms arc very univerfal ; and both works of creation and providence are mentioned : and'tis manifeftlv the defign of the apoftle to be underftood of every work of God whatfoever. Now, how can we underftand this any otherwife, than that all things are for their benefit 5 and that God made and ufcs all for their good ? =

8. All God's works, both his works of creation and providence^ are reprefented as works of goodnefs or mercy to his people in the r36th. pfalm. His wonderful works in general, ver. 4. *' To him who alone doth great wonders ; for his-mercy endureth forever". The works of creation in all parts of it. Ver. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. " To him that by wifdom made the heavens ; for his mercy endureth forever. To h^m that ftretched out the earth above the waters ; for his mercy endureth forever. To him that made great lights ; for his mercy endureth forever. The fun to rule by day ; for his m.ercy endureth forever. The moon and ftars to rule by night ; for his mercy endureth forever". And God's wprks of providence, in the follow* ing part of the pfalm,

1^ i g. TiihX

p GOD's lafi 2nd ittr.i.

9. That cxpreffion in the blcflcd fcfitencc pronounced 6n the righttous at the day of judgment, ** Inherit the Icingdotn prepiared for yoti from the toundation of xh€ "world**^ feems to hold forth as mnch, as thst the eternal fexpreflions and fruits of God's goodnefs to them, vias God'§ ^nd in creating the woild, and in his providential difpofai^ ever lince the creation : thdt God in all his wofks, in laying th(£ foundation of the world, and ever fincc the founda* tion of itj had been prepariog this kingdom and glory fof ihem*

io. AciiE ABLE, to ttiis, the good of rnen is fpoken.of ai In ultimate end of the virtue of the moral tvorld. Ro'm. 13. 8, 9, 10.. "He that loveth another hath fulfi'led thd law. For thi5J, lliou !hajt net commit aduitery, ThoU

llialt not kill, ore And If there be any rther command-

jrnenr, it is briefly comprcl.ended in this faying, l"'hou (halt love thy neighbour as thyfelf. Love wdrketh no ill to hii 'neighbour', therefore hvi h tin fulplUng of the ia'w''\ Gal. 5, J4. *' Ail the law is fultilled in one word,- even in this^ I'hou Ihalt love thy neighbour as thyfelf". Jam. 2. 8, ** If *ye fulfill the royal law, according to the fcripture, Thou (halt love thy neighbour as th}felf, thou Ihalt d»

If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things he does ; and Io be one end of all things that he Requires moral agents to do ; and an end they Ihruld have feipccSt to in all that they do, and which ilicy Ihould regulate all parts of their conduiff by \ thefe things tnay be eafiiy explained 1 but otherwife it feems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghol\ Ihould thUs eXptefs him-Jelt from time tb time. The fcr'pturc reprefents it to he the fpirit of ail true faints, to perfef the welfare of God's people to their ehirf joy. And this was the fpirit of JV1ok\v and the prophets of old : TinA the good of God'fe church was an tt^nd ilvey regulated all then condu(f> by. And fo ii was With the apollles. 2 Cor. 4. ^5. <« For all things are for >Dur fakes." 2 I'im. 2. 10. ** I Endure tall things for the ele6ts fake, that tlVey may aifo obtain the falvation which is in Chrift Jefus, with eternal glory.'* And ihe icuinuies reprefetii ii» ii>ou^h every chrifnan

rtiould in all things he does be employed for the good of God's church, as each particular member of the body, is in all things employed, for the g6">d of the body. Rom. 12. 4, 5, ^-Jc. Eph. 4. 15, 16. I Cor. 12. 12, 25, to the end ; together with the whole of the next chapter. To this end the kripture teaches lis the angels are continually einployed. Heb. i. 14.

Sect. VI.

%1ir7'HER£lM is confiderecJ what is meant by the g ^^ OF God, and the name of God in Icripture^

GLORY

^ whea spoken of as G6d's end in his works.

Having thus con^dcred what things are fpoken of ia the holy fcriptures, as the ends of God*s works ; and in fuch a manner as joiily to lead us to fuppofe, they were ■Yhe ends wliich God had ultimately in view, in the creation of the world : I now proceed particularly to enquire concerning fome of thefe things^ what they are, and how the terms are to be underftood.

I BEGii^ fiffr, v^ith tKe GLokY of C5od.

And here \ might o^ferve,. that the piirafe, ihe glory of Ood, is fonietimes manifertly ufed to fignify the fccond person in the IVir^ity. But it is hot neceffary at this time to Gonfider that matter, or ftand to prove it from particular paiTiges of fcripture. Omitting this therefore, 1 proceed \6 obferve concerning the hebrew word Cabhodh, which is the word moft commonly ufed in the old teftament where ^'G have the word glory in the englifh bible. The root which It comes from is either the verb Cabhadh, which dg' nifies to be heavy, or make heavy, or from the adjedlive Cabhedh, which fignifies he^jvy or weighty. Thefe, as Teems pretty msnifel^, are the primary fignifications of ihefe words, though they have alfo other meanings, which feetii to be derivative. i he noun Cobhedh fignifies gravity, heavinefs, greatnefs and abundance. Ofvery many places it v/ill be lufficient to name a few. Prov. ly. 3. 2 Saiii. J4. 26, 1 King. 12, ij, Ffal. 38. 4. Ifai. 30.

27. And

•/

J 94 GOD'j hji End Shct.VI.

27, And as the weight of bodies arlfcs from two things, viz. folidity or denfny, or fpecific gravity, as it is called, iand their magnitude j fo we find the word CrMedh \]{t(S to llgnify denfe, as in Exod. 19. 16. Gnamiz Cohhedh a dcnfe cloud. And it is very often ufed for great. Ifai. 32. 2. Gen, 5.9. I King. 10. i2. 2 King. 6. 14. and 18. 1^. Ifai. 36. 2. and other places.

The word Cahhodh^ which is commonly tranflatcd glcry, js ufed in fuch a manner as micht be cxpc6led from t])is fignification of tlie words from whence it comes. Sometimes it is ufed to fignify what is internal, what is within the being or perfrn inherent, in the fubjecfV, or what is iti the pofTcflion of the -perfon : and fomeiimes for emanation, exhibition or corrmuricaticn of this internal glory : and jfometimes for the knowledge or fenfe, or effect of ihefe, in thofe who behold it, 10 whom the exhibition or communication is made ; or an expreflion of this knowledge or fenfe or effec^h And here 1 would note, that agrcable to the ufe of the word Cahhcdh in the old teflament, is that of the word Db>:a in the new. For as the word Calhodh is generally tranflat^in by Dcxa in the feptu-2gint ; fo 'tis apparent, that this word is dcfigned to be y^zdi to fignify the fame thing in the new teOament, with CahhQdh in the old. This might be abundantly proved by comparing particular places of the old tcflament ^ btit probably it will not be denied.

I THEREFORE procccd particularly to confider thefe words, with regard to their ufe in fcripturc, in each of the forcmentioncd ways.

1. As to Internal glory. Vv^hen the word is ufed fo fignify what is within, inherent or in the pcflHllon of the fubjca,it very commonly fgnifies exccllency.or great valu-abicnefs, dignity, or worthinefs or regard. This? according to the hebrew idicrn, is as it were the wnght of a thing, as that by which it is heavy; as to ht lights is to be worth-kl's, without value, ccnteinptible. Num. 21. 5. ** This light bread.^' i Sam. 18. 23, '* Seemeih it a light thing." Judg. 9. 4. « I;^/;/ perfons," i. e. worthlefs, vain, vile ' peifous. So Zerh. 3. 4. To fet Ught n to defpife, 2 Sam.

19. 43. Bdihazzar's vilenefs in the fight of God, is re-

prefented by his being Tek^Jy weighed in the balances and found light, Dan. 5. 27. And as the weight of a thing arifes from thefe two things, its magnitude, and its fpecific gravity conjundly, fo the word gi^jry is very commoniy ufed to fignify the excellency of a perfon or thing, as confillino-either in greatnefs, or in beauty, or as it were precioufnefs, or in both conjun6tly ; as will abundantly appear by coa-iidering the places refered to in the margin. *

Sometimes that internal great and excellent good, which is called glory, is rather in pofTefnon than inherent. Any one may be called heavy, that poflefles an abundance ; and he that is empty and deftitute, may be called /Igbi. Thus we find riches is fometimes called ghry. Gen. 31. r. " And of that v/hich was our fathers, hath he gotten all this glory." Efth. 5. i[. " Haman, told "them of the glory of his riches." Pfal. 49. t6, 17. *< Be not a-fraid when one is made rich, when the glory of his houfe is increafed. For when he dieth, he (hall carry nothing away, his glory (hall not defcend after him." Nah. 2. q. " Take ye the fpoil of fiiver, take the fpoil of gold j for there is none end of the ftore and glory otjt of the plea-fant furniture.

And It is often put for a great height of happinefs and profperlty and fulnefs of good in general. Gen. 45. tj^ ♦•^ You Ih^ii tell my father gf aii m^ glory in -Egypt/'

Job

* £xod. 16, 7. and 28. 2, 40. and 3. 8. Ni]^pi» 1.6. iq Deut. 5. 24 and 28. 58. 2 Sam. 6. 20. i Chron. 16, 24 Eft. I. 4. Job. 29. 20. Pfal. 19. I. and 45. t^. and ^. 3. and 66. 3. and 67. 6. and S7. 3. and toi. 16. and 145. 5, 12, 13. Ifai. 4. 2. and 10. jg. and 16. 40. and 35. 21. and 40, 5. and 6a* 13, and 62. 2. Ezek. 31. 18. Hab. 2, 14. Hag. 2,

3, 9. Matt. 6. 29. and 16. 27. and 24. 30. Luk. t), 31, 32. Joh. I. 14. and 2. 11. and 11. 40. Rom» 6,

4. I Cor. 2. 8. and 15. 40. 2 Cor. 3. to. Eph. 3. ai% Col. I, If. 2 Their. I. g. Tit. ^, 13. jt Fet. i. ^4,

"7^5 ^^ ^iJUs fojt Una Sect.V!

Job, 19. 9. ** He hath ftnpt me of my gloiy." Ifai. jo. :5, *' Whtre will you leave yoyr glory. Ver 10. *^ Therefore ihall the Lord cf hofts fend ampng his fat ones jesn-neCs, ai^d under his glcry flvdlj he kindle a burning, like tlie huining of a fire.'* Ifai. 17. 3, 4.' ** Thc^kirgdcm fntli ccafe frcm Damafcus, and the icpinant of Syria j thty fhall be ss the glory of the children ©J IlVad. And in that day it ihall ccme to pafs, that the glory of Jacob (hall be made thin, and the lamefs ot his fKfnfhall be made lean/* Ifai. 21. 16. ** And all the glpry of Kedar (hall fail." Ifai. 6r. 6. " Yc (liall eat ti:e riches of the gentiles, and in their glory (hall ye boaft yourlblves." Chap. 66. n, J2. " That ye may milk out and be delighted with the

abundance of her glcry. ?- I will expend peace to her,

like a river, and the glcry cf the ^tntiles like a flowing dream." Hof. 9. 11. *< As for Ephraim, their glory (liaU fly away as a biid." Mstt. 4. 8. r^ ■ <* Sheweih him all the kingdoms of the world, ar.d the glcry of them."^ Luk. 24. 26. " Ought not Chri(^ to have luffered thefc things, and to enter into his glory ?"' Joh. 17. 27. " And the glory which thcu ga\eft mie, have I given them " Rem. 5. 2. ** And rtjoice in hope cf the glory of God." Chap. 8. J8. "The fufferings of this prefent time, are not worthy to be compared with the g'ory which (liall be revealed in us". See alfo-chap. 2. 7. 10. and 3- 23 and 9«23. iCor.2.7. "The hidden wifdom v.hichGcd ordained before

the world, unto our glcry." 2 Cor. 4. 17.— "Worketli

cut for us a far more exceeding snd eternal weight of glory.*' Eph. I. j8. ** j^.nd what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the faints." i Pet. 4. 13. " But rejoice inafmuch as ye are made partuktrs of Chrif^'s ftfferii gs j that when his glory (hall be revealed, ye may be glad alfq with exceeding joy." Chap. 1.8. "-^ Ye rejoice with joy Vpfpcskable and full of gldry." f

2. ThI

t|Sce alfo, Cplof. i. 27. and 3. 4. i Theif. 2. 12, 2 ThcC 2. 14. I Tim. 3. i1l>. 2 Tim. 2. JO. Heb, 2. 10. I Pet. r. li, 2f. and 5. i, lO. 2 Pet. I- 3. Rev. 2f. 24, a6o Pfah 73/h- ^^^^ ^49v|v '^^^*

Chap. II* ^'^ '^^ Creation of the World. ^y

1 The word glory, is ufed in fcripture often to exprefs the exhibition, emanation or communication of the internal glory. Hence it often fignifies a vifible exhibition of glory ; as in an effulgence or fhining brightnefs, by an emanation of beams of Tight. Thus the brightnefs of the fun and moon and ftars is called their glory in i Cor. 15. 41. But in particular, the word is very often thus ufed, when applied to God and Chrift. As in Ezek. i, 28. •' As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, fo was the appearance of the bnghtnefs round about." This was the appearance of the likenefs of the glory of the Lord." And chap. 10. 4. " Then the glory of the Lord went up from the cherub, and ftood over the threQiold of the houfe, and the houfe was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightnefs of the Lord's glory." Ifai. 6. i, 2, 3. " I faw the Lord fitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it flood the feraphim.-*?—- And one cried to another and faid, Ko!y,holy,holy is the Lord ot hofts,the whole earth is full of his glory." Compared with Joh. 12, 4. " Thefe things faid Efaias, when he faw his glory and fpake of him." Ezek. 43. 2. " And behold the glorv of the God of Ifrael came from the way of the eafl.—And the Q^rxh Jhined with his glory." Ifai. 24. 23. *' Then the moon (hall be confounded and the fun alhamed, when the Lord of hofts (hall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerufalem, and before his ancients gloriouJJy" ifai. 60. i, 2. *' Arife, fhine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is rifen upon thee. For behold the darknefs (hall cover the earth, and grofj darknefs the people ; but the Lord (hall arife upon thee, and his glory (hall be feen upon thee.'^ Together with ver. 19. ^' The fun fhall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightnefs (ball the moon give light unto thee : but the Lord (hall be unto thee an ever-Jading light, and thy God thy glory " Luk. 2. 9. «« The glory of the Lord (hone round about them." Ad. 22. ir-•* And v/hen I could not fee, for the glory of that light.'' In 2 Cor-3.7. '^^^ (hining of Mofes's face is called the glory of his countenance. And to this Chri(\'s glory is compared ver. 18. " But v/e all with open face, beholding as in a glals the glory of the Lord, are changed into the fame image, from glory to glory." And fo chap, 4, 4, " Left

the light of the glorjoys gofpel of Chrift, who is the image Oi God, (hould'diine urito them." Ver. 6. *< For God, who commanded the light to (hine out of darknefs, 'hath fhined in our hearts, to give the light of the know-'Jedge of the glory of God in the iace of Jefus Chrift." Heb. I 3. " Who is the bjightnefs of his glory." The apoOIe Peter, fpeaking of that emanation of exceeding brightncfs, from the bright cloud that over O-isdowed the difciples in the mount of transfiguration.; and of the fiiining of Chrifl's face st that time, fays, 2 Pet. i. 17. '^ For he received from God the father honor and glory, when there came fuch a voice to'him from the excellent glory, This •is my teloved fon, in^whom 1 am well pleafed." Rev. ' iS. I. " Another angel came down from heaven, having great power, arid the earth was I'rghtened with his glcryj*^ Rev. 2[. II, '* Having the glory of God, rnd her light was like unto a flor.e moft precious, like a jafper ftcne, clear as cryftal." Ver. 23. ** And the city had no need of the fun, nor of the moon to fhine in it ; for the glory of God did lighten it." So the word for a vifible effulgence or ema-r^ation of light in the places to be feen in the margin. *

The word ghry^ as applied to God or CliriO-, fometimes evidently fignifies the communicalions of God's fuluefs and ineans much the fame thing, with God's abundant and exceeding gcodnefs and grace. So Eph. 2. 16. " That he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be ftrengthncd with might, by his fpirit in the inner man''. The exprefiion, *' According to the riches of his glory", is apparently equivalent" to that in the fame epiftle, chap. I. 7. -^^ According to the riches of his grace". And chap. 2." 7.' '' The exceeding riches of his grace in his kindnefs towards us, thro' Chrift Jefus". in like manner IS the yjord glory ufed in Phil. 4. 19. " But my God (hall

fupply

* Exod. 16. 12. and 24. i5, 17, 23. and 40. 34, 25-Lev. 9. 6, 23. Num. 14. 10. and 16. 19. i King. 8. It. 2 Chron, 5. 14. and 7. i, 2, 3. Jfai. 58. I. Ezek. 3. 23. and 8. 4. and 9. 3. and 10. 18, 19. and II. 22, 23. and 43. 4, 5. and 44. 4, A<5>. 7. 55. Rev. 15. 8,

CHAP.il. ^^^ ^^^^ Creation of the World, ^^

fupply all your need, according to his riches in glory, by Chrift Jefus'*. And Ronn. 9. 23. *' And that he might make known the riches of his glory, on the veflels ot mercy". In this, and the foregoing verfe, the apoltle fpeaks of God's making known two things, his great wrath, and his rich grace. The former, on the velTeis of wrath, ver. 22. The latter, which he calls the riches of bn glory^ on the veffcls of mercy, ver. 23. So when Moles fays, *' 1 be-feech thee fhew me thy glory ;'* God granting his requeH-, makes anfwer, ••• 1 will make all my goadnefs to pafs before thee." Exod. 33. 18, 19. f

What we find in Joh, 12. 23, 32. is worthy of

particular notice in this place. The words and behaviour of ChrifV, which we have an account of here, argue two

tnmgs.

, I. That the happinefs and falvation of men, was an end that Chrift ultimately aimed at in the labours and fuiFerings he went through, for our redemption (and con-fequently, by what has been before obferved, an ultimate end of the work of creation.J The very fame things which were obferved before in this paffage (chap, fecond, feet, third) concerning God's glory, are equally, and in the fame manner obfervable, concerning the falvation of men. As it was there obferved, that Chrift in the great

O 2 conflict

•f Dr. Goodwin obferves (vol. I. of his works, part 2d, page 166) that riches of grace are called riches of glory m fcrip-ture. *' The fcripture," fays be, " fpeaks of riches of glory *'in Eph. 3. 16. That he ijoauld grant you according to *' the riches of his glory ; yet emiaeniiy mercy if there in-** tended ; for it is that which God be'.lo?^s, and which ** the apotlle there prayeth for. And he calls his mercy '• there his glory, as clfewhqrc he doth, as being the moll •' eminent excellency in God —— That in Rora. 9. 22, 23. " compared, is obfervable. In the 2zd ver. where tne a-*'poftle fpeaks of Gad's making known the power of his *' ivrathi faith he,.. G^i' ivilling to Jl:>e~w his n.vraihf and make " his piKJUip kr.O'XVft. . Biit in ver. 231/ when he com.es to ** fpeak of mercy, he faich, That h; might f^a^s-kmiiKia tbi V_ riches of hii ghry^ on th&_ 'U?J/}1> of tngrcj.]\

too GODs lafi End Sect.VL

confli(5t of his foul, in the view of the near approach of the molt extreme difficulties which attended his undertaking, comforts himfelf in a certain profpedl of obtaining the end he had chiefly in view. It was obferved that the glory of God is therefore mention'd and dwelt upon by him, as what his foul fupported itfelf and refted in, as this great end. And at the fame time, and exadly in the fame manner, is the falvation of men mentioned and infifted on, as the end of thefe great labours and fufFerings, which fatis-fied his foul, in the profpecfl of undergoing them. Compare the 2-^4 and 2\th verfes ; and alfo the 2%th and 2(^ih verfes ; ver. 31. and 32. And,

2. The glory of God, and the emanations and fruits of his grace in man's falvation, are fo fpoken of by Chrift on this occafion in juft the fame manner, that it would be quite unnatural, to underftahd hitn as fpeakmg of two difimdl things. Such is the connexion, that what he fays of the latter, muft moft naturally be underftood as ex-cgetical of the former. He firft fpeaks of his own glory and the glory of his father, as the great end that (hould be obtained by what he is about to fuffer ; and then explains and amplifies what he fays on this, in what he ex-prefles of the falvation. of men that fhall be obtained by it. Thus in the 23. ver. he lays, " The hour^s come that the fon of man fhould be glorified." And in what next follows, he evidently (liews how he was to be glorified, or wherein his glory confifted : " Verily, verily 1 fay unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." As much fruit is the glory of the feed,- fo is the multitude of redeemed ones, which fhould ipring from his death, his glory, * So concerning the glory of his father^ in the 27//?, and following veries. " Now is my foul troubled, and what Ihall 1 fay f Father, fave me from this hour ? But for this caufe came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice fiom

heaven,

Here may be remembered what was before obferved cf the church's being fo often fpoktn of as the glory and fulnefs Qi Chriih

hi the (Jreation^^fy^rorfa^^

heaven, faying, I have b©th glorified it, and will glorify it again." In an aflurance of this, which this voice declared, Chrift was greatly comforted, and his foul even exulted under the view of his approaching fufFerings. And what this glory was, in which Chrift's foul was fo comforted on this occaiion, his own words which he then fpake, plainly (hew. When the people faid it thundered ; and others faid, an angel fpake to him ; then Chrift explains the matter to them, and tells them what this voice meant. Ver. 30, 31, 32. " Jefus anfwered and faid, This voice came not becaufe of me, but for your fakes. Now is the judgment of this world ; now (hall the prince of this world be call: out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." By this behaviour, and thefe -fpeeches of our redeemer, it appears that the expredions of divine grace, in the fandification and happinefs of the redeemed, are efpecially that glory of his, and his father, which was the joy that was fet before him, for which he endured the crofs, and defpifed the (hame : and that this glory efpecially, was the end of the travail of his foul, in obtaining which end he was fatisfied, agreable to Ifai,

53' io> II'

This is agreable to what has been jufl: obferved, of God's glory being fo often reprefented by an effulgence, or emanation, or communication of light, from a luminary or fountain of Mght. What can be thought of, that fo naturally ami aptly reprefents the emanation of the internal glory of God ; or the flowing forth, and abundant communication 0/ that infinite fulnefs of good that is in God ? Light is. very often in fcripture put for comfort, joy, happinefs and for good in general, f

Again-,

f Ifai. 6. 3. — " Holy, holy, holy is ths Lord of hafis, the whole earth is full of his glory.'* In the original. His glory is the fulnefs of the nvhole earth : which fignifies much more than the words of the tranflation. God's glory, confiding efpecially in his holinsfs, is that, in the fight or communica-lions of which man's fulnefs, i. e. his holinefs and happinefs,

. confuls. By God's glory here, thsrs feems to bs rsfped to

that

Again, the word ghry^ as applied io God in fcripture,

implies the view or knowledge of God's excellency. The

exhibition of glory, is to the view of beholders. The ma-

nifeftation of glory, the emanation or effulgence of bright-

nefs, has relation to the eye. Light or brightnefs is a quality

that has relation to tlie fcnfe of feeing : we fee the luminary

by it's light. And knowledge is often expreiTed in fcripture

by light. The word glory very often in fcripture fignities or

implies honor^ as any one may foon fee by caf^ing his eye

on a concordance. ** But honor implies the knowledge of

the dignity and excellency of him v/ho hath the honor, .

And this is often more efpecially fignified by the word glo^

ry^ when applied to God. Num. 14. 21. *' But as truly

as 1 live, all the earth ihall be filled with the glory of the

Lord." i. e. All tlie earth fiiail fee the manifeOations I

will make of my perfed holinefs and hatred of fin, and fo

of my infinite excellence. This appears by the context.

So Ezek. 39. 21, 22, 23. ''• And 1 v;ill fet my glory among

the heathen, and all the heathen/W/y?^ my judgment that

I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them.

So the houfe of lfraelyZY7//iwaf that I am the Lord their

God. And the heathen 72?^// know^ that vhc houfe of Ifrael

went into captivity for their iniquity." And 'tis manitefl

in many places, where we read of God's glorifying himfelf,

or of his being glorified,'that one thing diredly intended,

is a manifefting or making known his divine greatnefs and

excellency.

Again, glory, 2s the word Is ufed \x\ fcripture, often fig-nifies or implies praife. This appears from what was ob-ferved before, that glory very often lignifics honor, which is much the fame thing with praife, viz. high ef^eem and re-ipc6t of heart, and the exprefT.on and tcftimeny of it in words and a(5fions.* And" 'tis Inanifefl that th.e words ^Z^-ry and praife^ are often ufed as equivalent cxprefTions in

fcripture.

that tra^n, or thofe effulgent beams that tiled the temple : thtfe beamji fjgnifying -God's glory ihiring forth,- and com-irunicated. ""i his effulgence or communication is the Yul-nefs of aU iriielligcht creatures, who have ftO fiilrLef« of their own.

* See particularly Heb. 3. 3.

Chap.II. ^« f^^s Creation cj the World, \a%

fcripture. Pfal. 50. 23. " Whofo offe-eth pralfe, glorifi-eth me". Pfal, 22. 23. " Ye that fear the'Lord, praife him; all ye feed of Ifrael, glorify him". Ifai. 42. 8, " My glory I will not give unto another, nor my praife to graven images". Ver. 12. " Let them give glory uato the Lord, and declare his praife in the. i-Hands". Ifai. 48, 9, ro, II. " For my name's fake will I defer mine anger ;

for my praife will I refrain for thee. — For mine own

fake will I do it ; for 1 will not give my glory unto another". Jer. 13. II. «« That they might be unto ms for a people, and for a name, and for a praife, and for a glory". Eph. I. 6. " To the praife of the glory of his grace''. Ver. 12. "To the praife of Ij^s glory". So ver. 14. The phrafe is apparently equivalent to that, Phil. i. ti. "^ Which are by Jefus Chrift unto the praife and glory of God". 2 Cor. 4. 15. " That the abundant grace might, thro' the thankf-giving of many, redound to the glory of God"

It is manifeft the praife of God^ as the phrafe Is ufcd In fcripture, implies the high efieem and love of the l.eart, exalting thoughts of God, and comphcence in his excellence and perfection. This is fo manifell to every one acquainted with the fcripture, that there feems to be but little or no need to ref<cr to particular places. However, if any need fa-tisfa6lion, th<^y m;\y, among enumerable other places which might be mentioned, turn to thofe in the margin, ||

It alfojmplies joy in God, or rejoicing in his pet fecflions, as is manifell by Pfal. 33. 2. " Rejoice in the bord, O ye righteous, {ok praife is comely for the upright". Other paf-fages to the fame purpofe, fee in the margin. § How often

do

' • • • - II - I I I I I ■HI mm III ■! Ill II I

jj Pfal. 145. I, 12. and 34. i, 2, 3. and 44. 8.

and 71. 14, 15. and 99. 2, 3. and 107. 31, 32. and 108^3, 4, 5. and 119. 164. and 14.8. 13 and 150. 2. Rev. 19. I, 2, 3,——-*

§ Pfal. 9. I, 2, 14. and 28. 7. and i^, 27, 28. and 42. 4. and 63. 5. and 67. 3, 4,5. and 71, 22,23. and 104. 33, 3|. and 106. 47. and 135. 3. and 147. I. and 149. I, 2, 5, 6. A(5t, 2, 46, 47. and 3', 8, R^y, 19, 6, 7,

>^04 GOD'S laft End Sect.VI.

do we read o^ftng'wg praife ? But finging is commonly an cxpreflion of joy. It js called, mskirg a joyful noife. f And as it is often ufed, it implies gratitude or love to God for his benefits to us.*

Having thus conCdered vhat Is Inrplied in the phrafe, THE GLORY OF GoD, as we find it \aitd in fcripture ; I proceed to enquire what is meant by the name ot God.

And I obferve that 'tis manifeft that God's name and his glory, at leaft very often, fignify the fame thing in fcripture. As it h?s been obferved concerning the glory of God, that it fometimes fignifies the fecond perfon in the rrinity j the fame might be fhewn of the name of God, if it were reedlul in this place. But that the name and glory of God are often equipollent expreflions, is manifeft by Excd. 33, 38, 19. When Mofes fays, " 1 befcech thee, (hew me thy glory" : and God grants his rtquefl, he fays, ** I wiil proclaim the name of the Lord before thee". Pfal. 8. i, *' O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth ! Who haft fet thy glory above the heavens". Pfal. 79. -9. ** Help us O God of our falvation, for the glory or thy name ; and deliver us, and purge away ovr fins, for thy name's fake". Pfal. J.02, 15. " So the heathen ihalJ feaf the name oi the Lord'; and all the kings of the earth, thy ghry", PfaK 148. 13. ** His ?7<7w^ alone is exceilenr, antl his glory is above the earth and heaven. Ifai. 48. 9. '' Fof my name's fake will I defer mine angers and ixix my fraife will I refjraVh for thee". Vef. 11. " For mine own fake, even For mine own fake will I do it : .for how fhould my name be polluted ? And I will not give my glory unKo another". Ifar. 49. 19. *'They At all fear the name o{ xhQ Lord from the weft, and his i^/i^ry from the rifing of the fun". Jer.. 13^ V* " '^^^^^ they might be unto me for a

name

if-^ I.,-i'gi

i Pfal._66. I, 2. and ^6.' 4,:;5. '

* Pial. 3©. -1-2* aRd^5. lS.-?^m^^Ji-^^1f.'"^r!t^^6. ^,

9. and 71. 6, 7, 8. and and. 79^ Oit^^P^ 9§?:i4j 5*

'and 106.- 4.. 'and • 167. 'li^%%^ ?^"z^^^! %:' ^■'^"^-

-inany-o'thcr phce5

name^ and for a praife^ and for a glory, As glory often im-pliei the manifcft^tion, publicarion and knowledge of excellency, and the honor that any one has in the world ; fp u is evident does name. Gen. 11. 4. "Let us make u? a name'\ Dcut. 26. 19. '* And to make thee high abovp all nations, in praife, \i\ nanae, and in honor".||

So 'tis evident that by name is fomstimes meant much the fame thing as praife, by feveral places which have been juft mentioned, as Ifai. 48. 9, Jer. 13. 11. Deut. 26,-19. And alfo by Jer. 33. 9. <' And it (hall be unto me for a name^ a praije and an horior^ before all the nations of the earth, which fhall hear of all the good I do unto them'*. Z^ph. 3. %q. '• I will iTiake you a name and ^prai/ezinon^ all people of the earth".

And it feems that the expreffion or cxhibhion of God'i goodnefs is efpecially called his name^ in Exod. 33. 19. *« I jvilj mak,e all ii)y goodncls pafs before thee, and 1 will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee". And chap. 34^. 5, 6, 7. '' And the Lord defccnded in the cloud, & ftood -^ith hirn there, ^nd proclaimed the name of the Lord^ jAnd the Lord pafTed by before him, and proclairped, the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, JongfufFering and abundant in goodnefs and trv^th j Keeping njcrcy fo^ |thoufands"j &c. ..

And thciame ilJuftnotJS brightnefs and leffulgencein the pillar of cloud, that appeared in the wilderncfs, and dwelt above the mercy feat in the tabernacle and temple (or rather the fplritual divfhe brightnefs andeffulgence reprefented by it) which is fo often called the ghry of the Lor.d^ is alfo ofteu called tjje name df the Lord. Becaufe God'* glory was tQ jdweil in the tabernacle, therefore he promifes, Exod. 29. ^3. ** TheVe wijl I meet with the children of Ifraef, atid the tabernacle fhall be fan^ified by my glory." And the jtemplc was called th^ jpouff of Gad's ghr)i, Ifai. 6p, 7. In like

' P aiannef^

I Secalfo, 2 Sam. 7. 9. and 8. 13. and 23. 18. Neh. 9- 10, Job 30. 8. Prov. 22, J. Many o^her pl;?f ei iAlport th^ im^ thij?g.

manner, the fiameoi God Is faid to dwell in the fan(5^uary. Thus we often read of the place that God chofc, to -[ui his 'twmethere', or (as it is in the hebrew) to caiile his nsme to '^inhabit there. So it is fometimes rendered by cur tranfla-tors. As Deut. I2. ii. "Then there fhajl be a pbce ^hich the Lord your God (hall chule to ccuje hh name to dwell there'. And the temple is often fpoken of as built for GocTs naine. And in Pfal. 74. 7. the tcinple is . called the dwelling place of God's name. The mercy feat in the temple was called the throne of God's name or glory> Jer. 14. 2 1. "Do not abhor us,for \hy name's fake,do not difgrace the throne of thy glory". Here Gud\name and his glory^ feem to be fpoken of as the fame.

Sect. VIL

SHEWING that the ukimate.end of the creatjci^ of the wcrldj is but one, and what that o^e jii\D is.

FpvOM what has been obferved in the laft fccSiion, it rp-pears, that however the lart end of-the creation is fpcktn ^f in fcripiure under various denominations ; yet if tl^e -^ho|e of what is faid relating to this siFair, be duly weighed, and one part compared with another, we flvali have leafon to think, that the defign of the fpirit of God don't feem to be to reprcfentGod's ultimate end as manifoljci, but ss one. For tho' it be fignified by various names, yet tliey appear not to be names of diflerent things, but various !iames involving each other in their meaning ; either different names of the fame thing, or names cf fevtral parts of one whole, or of the fame whole viewed in various lights, or in its different refpedls and relations. For it appears that all that is ever fpckenofin the fcripture as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phrafe, thegk-Ys cf Gcd \ which is the name by which the laft end of. God's works is moft commionly called in fcripture ; and feems to be the name which moft aptly %nifies tEe thing-Tag

€HAP.if. f^ ^^^ Creation of the World, tb)^

The thing fignified by that name, the glory of God, vvhsn fpttken of a^ t!ie fupream and ultimate end of k\\z v/ork of creation, and of all God's works, is the emanation and true externa! expreffun of Gjd's intTsrnal glory and fulnefs ; meaning by his fulnefs, what has already been explained. Of in o'her words, God's internal glory extant, in a true and juft exhibition, or external exiftence of it. It is con-feffed that there is a degree of obfcurity in thei"2 detinitions : but perhaps an obfcurity which is unavoidable, thro' the imperfection of language, and words being lefs fitted to ex-prefs things of fo fublime a nature. And therefere the thing rnay polfibly be better underfiood, by ufing many words ancj a variety of exprelfions, by a particular conlideration of it, as it were by parts, thaa by any Ihort defini-tioti.

There Is Inchided in this, the exercifc of God's perfections to produce a proper efFe6t, in oppofition to their lying; eternally dormant and inefFe(5tuaI: as his power being eternally without any a(5t or fruit or that power; his wifdom eternally inefFccStual in" any wife production, or prudent difpofai of any thing, &c. The manifeftation of his internal glory to created underOandings* The communication of the in-tinite fulnefs of God to the creature. The creature's higli efieein of God, love to God, and complacence and joy iti God 'y and the proper exercifes and expreflions of ihefe.

Tpiese at firfl view may appear to be entirely dlftintft things: but if we more clofely confider the matter, the/ wiil all appear fo be one thing, in a variety of vievvs and re^ lations. They are ail but ths emanation of God's glory ; or the excellent brightnefs and fulnefs of the divinity difFu-fcd» overflowing, and as it were enlarged ; or in one word, ex'ijling ad extra, God's exerrciiing his perfection to produce a proper efFjCt, Is not diftinc^ from the emanation or communication of his fulnets : for this is the efFeCt, vi-z. his fulnefs communicated, and theproducing this effect is tha communicationof his fulnefs ; and there is nothing in this effectual exerting of God's perfection, but t:he emanation of God's internal glory. The emanation or communication,'* of the iriternal glory or fulnefs of God,as it is. Now God's internii glory, as it is in God*, is either in his uud«rftand-

ing, or will. The glory or fulncfs of bis iinderftanding/is his knowledge. The internal glory and fulnefs of Godj V/hich we rbui! conceive of as having its fpecial feat in his wil[, is his honriefs arid happinefsa The whole of God's ihterrid good or glory, is in thefe three things, viz. his infinite knowledge ; his infinite vertiie or holinef?, and his infinite joy and happinefs^ Indeed there are a great many aPtributes in God, according to our way of conceiving or talking of them : but all niay be reduced to thefe ; oi* t6 the degree, circumftances and relations of thefe. We have; no conception of Gad*s powfer, different from the degree of thefe things^ ^Ith a; certain relation of them to efFe(51s, God's in^riity is hot To properly a diftind kind of good in tjod, but" only exprefles the .degree of the good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a diftin(5V good ; but is the duration of good. His immutability is ftill the fame good^ with a negation of change. So thar, as I faid, the fulnefs of the God-head is thclulriefs of his iihderftanding, con* fifting in his knowledge, and the fulnefs of his will, confiding in his veriiie and happinefs. And therefore the external glory of God confirts in the comrtiunication of thefe. The cornmuhicaiiori of his knowledge is chiefly in giving the knowledge of htnlfelf : for thi\ is the knbwledge in -which the fulnefs of God's undcrftahdihg chiefly confiftsi ■ And ihus we fee how the manifeftatioh of God's glory td created underftandings, arid their feeing and knowing it, is not diftind from an emanation or communication of God's •^fulnefs, but clearly implied in it. Again, the communica-'^tibn of God's vertue or holiriefs, is principally in commu-■nicating the love of himfelf (which appears by what has before.been obferved.) And thus we fee how, not only the cr>ature's feein-g and knowing God's c?cce]lfence, but alfo i"uprcamiy efteemihg and loving hirn, belongs to the com-, rhunication.ot God's fulntfs. And the ccmmuhication of God's joy U happinefs, cohfifts chiefly in communicating to the creature, that happinefs and joy, which confiflis in rejoic-ino-in God, and in his glorious excellency ; for in fuch joy God's own happinefs ddes principally cohlift And in thefe th'rigs, viz. in knowitig God's excellency, loviiig God for It, arid rejoicing in it ; and in the exercife ana expreiTion ot of thefe, confirts (lod's honor and praife : fo ♦hatthtie arc <:learly implied in that glory of God, which

confifts

cpnfiits ia th« emanation of his internal glory; AnJ tho' we fuppofe all thefe things, which feent to be fo yariousi are fignified by that ghry^ which the Jcrijpture fpeaks of as the laft end ot all God's works ; yet it is manifeft there is ho greater, and no other variety in it, than in the internal and e{r:ntial glory of God itfelf. God's internal glory is partly in his underftanding, and partly in his will. And this internil^lory, as feated in the will of God, implies both his holinefs and his happinefs : both are evidently God's glo-i-y, according to the ufe of the phrafe. So that as God*s external glory is only the emanation of his internal glory, 'this variety necefiarily follows. And again, it hence appears that here is no other variety or diftmclion, but what neceiTirlly arifes from the diltindi faculties of the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the Irriage of God ; even as having thefe two faculties of un-derftanding and will. God eomm»unicates himfelf to the underilanding of the creature, in giving him the knowledge of his glory , and to the will of the crea-ture, in giving him holinei-s, confifiing primarily in the love of God : and in giving tiie creature happinefs, chiefly confifting in joy in God. T riefe are the fum of that emana'tion of divine ful-hefs called in fcripture, the gbry of God. The firft part ol this 2;lory, is called truth, the latter, grace, Joh. r. 14. *' VVe belicld his ^hry^ the glory of the only begotten of Ihe Father, full oi grace Sind iruth'\

Thijs we fee that the great and laftehd of God's works which is fo varioully expreiTed in fcripture, is indeed but one^ and this ^«^ end is moft properly and comprehenfively called, THE GLORY OF GoD ; by which name it is moft commonly called in fcripture. And is fitly compared to an effulgence er emanation of light from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly reprefented in fcripture. Light is the external exprcfTion, exhibition and manifeftation of the excellency of the luminary, of the fun for inftance : It is the abundant, extenfive emanation and communication of the fulnefs of the fun to innumerable beings that partake of it. 'Tis by this that the fun itfelf is feen, and his glory beheld, a.nd all other things are difcovered : 'tis by a participation rof-this communication from the fun, that fur-rounding objeds receive all their luftre, beauty and bright-

nefs,-

rci5. *1ris by this that i?l nature is qu;c!tcn*d and receive iifr, ccfcfort and to -t and

; h y. Li^ht is abundant!y ufcd in kripturc ugn.iy ilicfc three things, kn!>\\!edge, i.o nappincis.

^^"HAT hss been faid may be fuiRcient to (hew how are fpc'ken ct in fcriptuie as ultimtitc

- - .. iho' tiuy msy kcm at tiril vitw to

be di.^iWl, are all pJainly to be reduced to this one thing, viz. Gcd's internal g'ory or fa'neis extant externally, or exUtmg m its cm:na:icn. Ani tho' God in fecking this end, ftcks the creature's good \ )et therein sppeirs hiS (upreaie regird to himJelr.

The emanation or communication of the divine fulnefs^ ccndilingin the kaowletfge ot Gcd, love to God, and ioy in Gc<J. h:LS rchtrrn indeed both 'o Gcd, and the crea-txire : bjt it hss relation to God as its fountain, 25 it is an emanir en rrcmGod ; and as the ccmmunicaticn itrelf, or ihing ccmrnunicated, is fomething divine, fcmething of G Of his internal fu^nefs ; as t!ie water in

.thx .ethin^of the fountain ; and as the bcuras

t>f the fun, are fomething ot the fun. And again, they b2\c rdation to God, as ihcy have refpevSt to him as their

object i

♦ '^ ' ' ' ' vvltcge, cr tba: osrifcfririca and

c --- -: :: : c-ge is received. Pul. 19 S. and

1:9. 105, 150 Pi€.T. 6 2;;. Ifai 8- 20. Sfid 9 2. ard 29. iS. Dan. 5. II. Ech -. 13. •* Bj: a'l things that are re-prcred, are Baaoe n>»n feil bj the iig-t : for whiilcev^r «i«ih Bi£ke raaniicft, » lig^t/' Acd in c^her places of the iisff :«dc£:.cc; icnuiserabl?.

"Tis uied :o LgiJfjr vertce cr sorsl good. Jrb. 25. 5. £ccK ^. I. Ifai. £, ::o and 2^. zx, ac-d 62. :. Ez:k zi. 7. 17. 1?L£. 2. -, 1. 1 »-L I. c. Aci s^zzv other r'i:c«

. jcb \t. •?. ird 22 :>; Si^ir^ 3. »rd

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i:"iL 42* ific- acd ^ 10. tc- - J -w. »- i6w L^ia 5-"*-*

i-^

w&:]

obje<a ; for the knowledge communicated is the knoFislcdge of God ; and fo God is the cbjccl of the knowledge : ar-d the love comir.unicate,d, is the io^e of God ; h Gad i&ih^ objeft ofthit love : and the ' - ^ '-efs conrimu- - -^^ - - r in God i and fo J\c is the c the joy c

in the creature's knowing, eneeming, Toving, rejo»c;na in, and praillr.g God, the g'cry of God is both '

acknowledged j his fuhiti's is received and re:_ ;. : ^

is both an cmanat'ton, 2nd r£manatiin. The refulgence (hinef dpon and into the cresture, and is rtBzcitd back to the luminary. The beams of glcry come t'ronc God, and are fomethifig of God,and are refunded back again to their original. So that the vrho'e is cf God, and in God.and /> God 5 and Gou is the beginning, middle and end in this aSalr.

' AvD tho' it be true that Gcd has refpect to the cresturf in thefe thing; ; yet his refpecl to him,reif, and to the crea-tiirc In this matter, are nor properly to be looked uponj as a double and divided rcfpecl cf Gcd's heart. What hag L?cn fa'rd in chap. I. feet, 3, 4, may bs faScicct to li>ew this. Nevcrihelefs, it may net b? z— ■'-. here ' ' ' to fay a few things ; tho' they are rr .piled .. t

has been faid already.

"VVh 2: God was abcQt to create the wcr ., ... had re-fpccl to that emanation of his glcrj-, which is sctualiy the confcqjence of the creation, juft as it is with regard to ai! that be'ongs to it, both with regard to its relation to h-n-;-felf, afv2 the creature. He had regard to it. as an e.;. :-nation from himfelf, and a ccmiauniCation of himfcif, sr. 1 as the thing communicated, in its naii:re returned to him-k](, as its final term. And he had regard to it aifo. as the emanation was to the creature, and as the thinz comtr'a r>icated was icthe creature, as its fubjea. And God regard to it inRiis manner, as he had a " -- —- -^--^ ,^ hirafelf, and value for his cyn infinite : It

was this value for himfelf that caufed biin to valuc-sr.c ieek that his internal g'ory fhou'd How .^ '

It was from his value for his e'orious p . _. ,,

dom and righteoufnefi, Ecz. — that he valaed :be proper 4jsercife and e^tf^ of thefe perfefticns. ir. wife and nshtc-^us zSii and eft-ifls. It wis f^cn his isSnite vslae *^-^- --:

XJZ LrUJJs lajt Lnd SpcT. VII

internal glory and fulnefs, that Jie valued the thing \xW\U which is cornmunicatedy which is fomeihing of the faine^ extant in the creature. Thus, becaufe he infinitely values his own glory, confifling in the knovyledge of him-felf, \oyQ to himfclf, and complacence and joy in himfelf j he therefore valued the innagc, communication or participation of thefe, in the creature. And *t;s becaufe he valpes himfelf, that he delights in the knowledge and love and joy of the creature ; as being hinifelf the objecSt of this knowledge, love and complacence. For it is the nf ccfTary con-fequence of the true efleern and love of any perfon or being (fuppofe a fon or friend) that we Ihould approve and value others efl^eem of the fame objt<5t, and dffapprove and dif-like the contrary. For the iame reafon is it the confe-quence of a being's eftetm and love of himfelf, that \^ lliould approve of others eAeepi and \sys^ of himfelf.

Thus 'tis eafy to conceive, how God (hould feek the good of the creature, confifling in the creature's knowledge and holinefs, and evtn his happinels, from a fupreme regard to himfelf; as his happii.pfs arifes from that which is ar^ image and participation of Gold's own beauty ; and confifts in the creature's excrcifing a fupreme regard to God and complacence in him ; it^ beholding God's glory, in erteeming and loving it, and rejoicing in ir, and in hi^ cxercifing and teftifying love and fupream refpe(5l to God ; which is the fame thing with the creature's exacting Gotj. as his chief good, ^nd making him his fupream end.

And though the emanation of God's fu'pefs which God intended in the creation, and which a6iuaily is the confe-qucnce of it, is to the creature as it's cbjc(5t, and the creature is the fubjciSt of the fulnefs ccmmunicated, and is the creature's good ; and was alfo regaidcdj!*^ f^P^h, whei^ God fought it as the end of his works : yetit don'c necef-farily follow, that even in fo doing, he did not make himfelf his end. It comes to the lame thing. God's refpc(5l to the creature's good, and his refpc<ft to himfelf, is not ^ divided refpedl ; but both are united in one, as the hap-pinefs of the creature aimed at, is happinefs in union with liimfelf. The creatui^e is no further happy with this happinefs which God makes his ultimate ^nd^tban he becomes

Chap.il ^^ ^^^ Creation of the World. Jiz

6

one with God. The more happinefs the greater_ union t w.h«;n the happinefs is peifedt, the ui:\io.h is perfe<!5t. And as the happinefs wiil.^e-increafing to cterni|y,tire union will

'become more ^ml more llridi and pei:re<5l ; Hearer 8c more like to- tJiat beiwe.en ,God the FatHer, and-the §pn '; who are fo luiited, that, the^r jntereft is pejfedlly 6^ the

happinefs of the creature be confidered as it will be> iiH the whole of the creature's eternal duration, w'ith iailttl^p infinity of its progrefs, and infinite increafe of nearnefs ^nd y-nion to God ; in this view, the creature muft_ be /looke<?

~ upon as united to God in an infinite ftndtnefs.

If God has refped to fomething in tl>c ere?^ure, which he views as ofeverlafting duration, and as rifir/g higher and higher thro* that infinite duration, and that/fioi with con° ftaatiy diminifhing(but perhaps an incteafino/) celerity : then he has refpedt to it,as,in the whole,of infinit/eheight; though there never will be any particular time wj/^en it can be faid already to have come to fuch an, height

Let the moft perfed union with G/od, be reprefdnted by fomething at an infinite heigh: above/us ; and the erernaliy increafmg union of the faints with ( fiod, by fciriethnz th^t is afcending conftantly towards that upwards with a given velocity; and to move to all eternity. God who eternally increafine; height, views it : And if he has refpec^ to it, and mak whole of it, he has refpecfl to it as ai the time will never coii.e when it ca <dy arrived at this infinite height.

infinite height. mGvr;;j; at is to continue ihUs

th

ews the whole ofjjii$ ts an infinite height, es it his end, as in the I infinite height, iho* n be laid it hss slrea^

God aims at that which the moti/on or progreflion whieh he cauArs, aims at, or tends to. l/f there be'many things fuppofed to be fo made and appc/inted, that by a conftant and eternal mqtipn, they all tend t/o a certain center ; th^n h appear^ £that; he who made/ ittem and is the caufe ©f their motion, aimed at that/center, that lermol thrfr motion^-to which they eternally/tend, and are erermlly, as ir.wer©v driving after. And iw God be this cemer •-then ^od ai«ied at himfelf. And Ikrem it appearSr^hai^as he Esth^&ft^uthor cf th«ir beinfeand mou<>n, io he is the

I

J

nr4

UUDs lajt tufid S£CT. vii,

laft end, the final term, tq which is their uhimate tendency and aim.

We may judge of the end that the creator aimed at, in the being, nature and tendency he gives the creaturejby th^ mark or term which they conftantly aim at in their tendency and eternal progrcfs ; though the time will never come, when it can be faid it is attained to, \\^ the moft ab-' foiurely perfe<5t manner.

Bui" if ftricSlnefs of union to God be viewed as thus inn finitely iTjcalted ; then the creature muft be regarded as infinitely, nearly and clofely united to God. And viewed thus, their intereft muft be viewed as one with God's in-terelt ; and So is not regarded properly with a disjunct and feparate, but an undivided refpe<5t. And as to any difficulty of reconciling God's not making the creature his ultimate end, \vith a refpedt properly diftind from a re-fpedl to himfelf ; vvith his benevolence and free grace, and the cieatures obligation to gratitude, the reader muft be refer'd to chap. I. fedt. 4. obj. 4. wher? this obje^ion has been confider\ V and anfwer'd at large.

Jf by reafon of ih c ftri<5\nefs of the union of a man apd his family, their intf :rcft may be looked upon as one, hqw much more one i?»the inteieft of Chrift and his church, /'whofe firft union in heaven is unfpcakably more perfect and exalted, than tl lat of an earthly father and his family j if they be confiderc d with regard to their eternal and in-creaiing union ? L>pubtlefs it may juftly be efteemed as fo much one, that*i: m«y ^e fuppofed to be aimed at and fought, not with a diftind and feparate, but an undivided refpect.

*Tis certain that w hat God aimed at in the creation pf the world, was the good that would be {he confe-quence of the creation^ in the whole continuance of t|ie ihing created.

'Tis no folid objedlion againft God's aiming at an infinitely perfect union of tiie creature with himiblf, that the '^arUcuUr time will pever fome when it can be faid, tjie

uaioi^

d hap.il ^'« '^^ Creation of the War J J. u^

union is now infinitely perfecfV. God aims at fatisfyin^ juftice in the eternal damnation of finners ; which will be fatisfied by their damnation, confidered no otherwife than with regard to its eternal duration. But yet there never will come that particular moment, *when it can be faid that now juftice is fatisfied. But if this don't fatisfy ouf modern free-thmkers, who don't like the talk about fatis-fying juftice with an infinite punilhment ; I fuppofe it will not be denied by any, that God, in glorifying the faints in heaven with eternal felicity, aims to fatisfy his infinite grace or benevolence, by the bert®wment of a good infinitely valuable, becaufe eternal : and yet there never will come the moment, when it can be faid, that now this itiiiw nitely valuable good has been actually beftowed.

^^ ^^ ^^

Q-* The

The Nature of true Virtue.

CHAP. I.

.^hewing wherein the eflTence of true virtus^

confilts.

*

WHATEVER controverfies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (ex^ cepting fome fceptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) Kiean by it Ibnrething beautiful^

or rather fome kind oi heau*y, or excelkncy 'Tis not

all beauty, that is caned virtue ; for inttance, not the beau« ty or a building, of a flower, or of the rainb v : but fome beauty belonging to Beings that have perception and will—^ 'Tis not all beauty o^-mankind^ that .is called virtue ; for hillance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or fhape, gracefulnefs of motion, or harmony ot voice : but it is a beauty that has its original feat in the mind But

yet perhaps not every thing that may be called a beauty of jmind, is properly called virtue. . There is a beauty ot un-fBerftfindirig and fpecula^ion. There is lomething in ttic ideas and conceptions of great philofophers ano ftaiefmen, that may be called beautiful ; which is a different thing Jtwvti what is moft commonly meant by virtue. But virtue "is the beauty of thple qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a mi>r^/nature, i. e. fuch as are attended with defert oc worthinefs oipraife, or bhtne. Things of this fort, it ist gCAerally-agreed,fo tar as I know,are not any thing belorvg-ing meerly to fpeculation ; but to the difpofition and w'llU or (to ufe a general word,! fuppofe commonly well underftoodj to the^^^rr. Therefore 1 fuppofe, i dial! not depart trom Che common opinion, whea 1 fav, that virtue is the beau-

Chap, I. '^^^ Nature of true Virttie. tiy

ty of the qualities and exercifes of the heart, or thofc actions whicli proceed from them, ^o that when it is enquired, what is the nature of true virtus ? This is the fame as to enquire, what that is which renders any habit, difpofition^ or exercifc of the he^rt truly beautiful f ■! ufe the

phrife trm virtue, and fpeak of thmgs truly beautiful, be-caufe I fuppofe it will generally be allowed, that there is a dillin6lIon to be made between fome things which are truljf virtuous, and others which only feeni to be virtuous, thro** a parcial and imperf-edt view of things : that fome a<^ioni and difpofuions appear beautiful, if confidered partially and fuperficialiy, or with regard to fome things belonging to them, and in fome of iheir circumftances and tendenctcf^ which would appear otherwife in a more extenfive & com* prehenfive view, wherein they are ieen clearly in their whole nature and the extent of their connexions in the u* niverfality of things. There is a general and a particular beauiyo By a particular beauty, I mean that by which ^ thing appears beautiful when confidered only with regard to its conaedtion v^^ith, & tendency to fome particular things Within a limited, and as it were, a private fphere. And a general beau.y is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed moft perfecStly, comprehenfively and univer*-/ally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with every thing it ftands related to, * The former majr be Without and againft the latter. As, a few notes in a tune, taken only by themfelves, and in their relation to one another,may be harmonious ; which, when confidered witfe refpecflto all the notes in the tune, or the entire feries of found:» they are connecHied with, may be very difcordtnt

and difagreable. (Of which more afterwards} -^Thai only

therefore, is what I mean by true virtue,which is ihat^ be** longing to the heart of an intelligent Being, that is beauti« i^i by a general beauty, or beautiful in a comprehenfive yicw as it is in itfelf, and as related to every thing that \t ftands in connection with. And therefore when we are inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, viz. where--ia this true and general beauty of the heart does moft cf-fentially confift, -this is my anfwer to the inquiry

True virtue moil efTentially confitls in benevoienee to' Being in general. Or perhaps to fpcak more accilratd>v

it is that confent) propcnfity and union of heart to Being m general, that is immediateiy exercifcd in a general good-will.

The things which were before obferved of the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to fuch a notion of it. If it has its feat in the heart, and is the general goodnefs and beauty of the difpofition and excrcife of that, in the moft comprehenfive view, coniidered with regard to its univer-fal tendency, and as related to every thing that it Hands int conne6lion with ; what can it conlilt in, but a confent and good-will to Being in general ?-—-Beauty does nocconlift in difcord and difTentj but in confent and agreement. And if every intelligent Baling is feme way related to Being in general, and is a part of the univerfal fyftem of exiflence 5 and fo ftands in connedtion with the whole j what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and confent with the great whole.

If any fuch thing can be fuppofed Ss an union of heart to fome particular Being, or number of Beings, difpofing it to benevolence to a private circle or fyftem of Beings, which are but a fmali part of the whole ; not implying a tendency to an union with the great fyftem, and not at all incon-fiftent with enmity towards Being in general; this I fup-pofe not to be of the nature of true virtue : altho* it may in fome refpe<5ts be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things.—^ But of this more afterwards.

It 5s abundantly plain by the holy fcriptures, and generally allowed, not only by chriftian divines, but by the more confiderable deif^s, that virtue moft effentially confifts in love. And 1 ^^pt^UK^ owned by the moft confiderable writers, to confiiVW^^eral love of benevolence, or kind* affection : tho', it feems to me, the meaning of fome in this affair is not fufSciently explained 5 which perhaps oc-cafiofls Ibmc error or conMon in difcourfes on this fub--

jea.

Wh5n I fay, true virtue confifts in love to Being irt general, i Ihall not be likely to be underftood, that no orte

9i^

Chap. I. ^^^ Nature of true Virtue. ii^

a(5t of the mind or excrcife of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has Heing in general, or the great fyftecn of univerfal exiftence, for its diredl and immediate objedl i (o that no exercife of love or kind afFe6lion to any one particular Being, that is but a (mail part of this whole, has

any thing of the nature ot true virtue. But, that the

nature of true virtue confifts in a difpofition to benevolence towards Being in general. Tho', from fuch a difpofuioa may arife exercifes of love to particular Beings, as obje6\s are prefented and occafions arife. No wonder, that he who U of a generally benevolent difpofitjon, (hould be moie difpofed than another to have his heart moved with bene-V(j4ent affedtion to particular Perfons, whom he is acquainted and converfant with, and from whom arife the grcateft and moft frequent occafions for exciting his benevolent temper.-—^Bur my msaning is, that no afFe<f\ions towards particular perfons, or Beings, are of the nature of true virtue, but fuch as anfc from a generally benevolent temper, or from thar habit or frame of mind, wherein fonfifts a difpofition to love ^eing in general.

And perhaps it is peedlefs for mc to give notice to my readers, that when 1 fpeak of an intelligent Being's having a heart united and benevolently difpofed to Being in gene^ ral, 1 thereby mean intelligent Being in general. Not ina^i, mate things, or Beings that have no perception qr wilj 5 which are not properly capable obje^s of ben^yqUnce,

LovjE is commonly diftinguifhed into Ipve of benevo*

*jence and love ot complacence. Love of befievokme i^

that affe(^ion or propeniity of the heart to qny Beinp-, which Caufes it to incline to its well-being, or difpofes it to dcfire 3nd take pleafure in its happinefs. And if 1 miftake nor^, 'tis agreable to the common opinion, that beauty in t^e object is not always the ground of this propenfity : but that there may be fuch a thing as benevolence, or a difpofitiori to the welfare of thofe that are not confidered as beautiful 5 Tunlefs mere exiftence be accounted a beauty. And bens'* volence or goodnefs in the divine Being is generally fuppo* fed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many gf its ob-ie(5ls, but to their exiftence : fo as to be the ground both *)f their «xift?nQe and iheir beauty, rather t^^an they th^

f9Vindati9!i

foundation of God's benevolence ; as 'tis fihppofed that it is God's gcodnefs which moved h.im to give them both Being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily confif^s in that affedion of heart to Being, which is, exercifi^ in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then Gcd*s ver-tuc is fo extended as to include a propenfity not on^y- to Being adually exifting, &adually beauiifu), but to poAibJe Being, fo as to incline him to give Being, beauty and hap-

pinefs. But not now to inlift particularly on this =-

What 1 would have obferved at prefent, is, that it muft b® allowed, benevolence doth not neceffarily prefuppofs beauty IB its obje(5l.

What is crmmonly called \o\tciccmplacefia^ prefuppc-fes beauty. -^ — For it is no other than delight in beauty 1 or complacence in the perfcn or Being beloved for his beauty.

If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent Beiftg, and tif-tue ccniifls in love, then it is a plain inconfif^encc, to fup« pofe that virtue'primarily ccr^fifis in any love to its object for its beauty ; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a Being fcr his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to fuppofe, that the beauty of intelligent Beings primarily confifts ira love to beauty ; or, that their virtue firft'of all confifls in their love to virtue^ Which is an inccnfiflence, and gcing in a circle. Be-caufe it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the fcundaticri or firft motive of that love wherein virtue originally con-fifts, or wherein the very firft virtue confifts ; or, ir (jiip-pofes the firft virtue to be the confcquence and effecfl of virtue. So tiiat virtue is originally the foundation and exciting caufe of the very begiFining or firft Being of virtue. Which makes the firft virtue, both the ground, an<f the confequence, both caufe and eiTe<5t of itfelf* DoubtJefs virtue primarily confifts in fomething cjfe be-ii6t^ any cfTecff or confequence of virtue. If virtue con-£fts primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: \o that virtue muft confiS in the love of the love of virtue. And if it be inquired,

Tfhat that virtue is^ which' virtue conili^s in the Iqvq of

-■ •• — . ..-. ^ ^^^

the love of, it muft be anfwered, 'tis the love of virtue. So that there muft be the Jove of the love of the love ol virtue, and lo on in infinitum. For there is ho end ofgo-vig back in a circle. We never come to any beginning-^ or foundation. For 'tis without beginning and hangs ojgi nothing. '

Therefore, if the efTc^nce of virtue or beauty of mind lies injo^e, or a dlfpoGtion to love, it muft primarily con-fift in fomething different both from complacence, which is a defight in beauty, and alfo fiom any benevolence that has ^he beauty of its object tor its foundation. Becaufe 'tis absurd, toTay that virtue is primarily and firft of all the con-fequence of iifelf. For this makes virtue primarily pri©r to itfelf.

Nor can virtue primarily coniift in gratitude ^ or orje Be-ng's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him, Becaufe this implies tiie fame incondftence. For it fuppo-fes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the caufe of gratitude. Therefore the firft benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, can't be gratitude.

Therefore there is roorxi left for no other conclufion than th?.t the primary obje(5l of virtuous love is Being, fim-ply confidered ; or, that true virtue primarily condfts, noc in love to any particular Beings, becaufe of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, becaufe they love us 5 but in a pro-penfity a»d union of h<jart to Being (imply confidered; exciting abjolute Benevolence (if 1 may fo call it) to Being in ge-jiera^——-=■'. fay, true virtue primarily conijfts in this. For I am far from ailerting, that there is no true virtue in any other love than this abfolute benevolence. But I would sxprefs what appears to me to be the truth, en this fubjc<5ij^ in the following partipulars. -■■>'.

The fi>yi cbje(5t of a virtuous benevolence is Beings (th^^r ply confidered : and if Being, /«?/)/k confidered, be rt$ ob-je^, then Being in general is its objedl ; and the thing it lias an ultimate propenfiiy to, is ihe highej} good of Being in general. And it will feek the yood of every individual ^?ing UAkfs it bf conceived as not gonBl^gat with the

S I:i£he^

T22 ^he plat are oj true Virtue. GhaeJ

higheft good of Being In general. In which cafe the good ci a particular Being, or ibme Beings, may be given up fpr the fake oF the higheft good of Being in general. And particularly if there be any Being that is looked upon :js iiatedly and irreclaimably oppofite and pn eneiny to Being in genera], then confent and adherence to Being in general will induce the truly virtuous Iieart to forfake that Being, snd to oppofe it.

And further, if Being, fimply confidered, be the fiffl GDJecSi: of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that Being •"•who has moji ot Being, or has the greatefl: fliare of exigence, other things being equal, fo far as fuch a Being is Cv^hibiied to cur fatuities or fet in cur view, will have the grcaiejl Qiare of the propenfuy and benevolent sfFedL'cn of

the heart. I h\\ cihr ibi'^gs bang equals efpecially be-

ciufs there is a feccriary oh]^^ of virtuous benevolence, that 1 ftial) take notice of prcfently. Which is one thing that mud be contldered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous ben.evole;3ce. Pure benevolence in its firll ex-e'rcife is nothing elfe but Being's uniting, ccnfent, or pro-peniity to Being ; appearing true and pure by its extending to Being in general, and inclining to the general higheft gaod, and to each Being, vvhofe welfare is confident with the iiigheft general good, in proportion to th-^ Degree pf ex.iflem& * underhand, \oJher things being equal. 4>

The feccnd objecl of a virtuous propenfity of heart is k^-nevoknt Bemg.—— \ —A fecondary ground of pure benevolence

* I fay, —in proportion to the degre.s of e^-ij}^rce, — becauCe •sne Being may have more i:<ijfevce than another, as he may \;z greater than another. That which \igreat,^2^^ more exigence, a'd is further from nothirg, than that which is little. Cne Bfinfy may have every thing pofitive belonging to ir, or ever)? th'ng which gees ro it's pofitive e;xifler-ce (in oppcfKicn to defe6l) in an higher degree than snother ; or a greater ^gpacity an) power, greater urderftard'ng, every fccuJty srd every pofuivc quality in an higher degree. P^Ti Arch-cr.gil mull be fuppcfed 'o have more ejtiOence, and to be every way further rcoricved from mn entitv^ \\v^ %/^Qrvt^ «;,: <<

feHAPil; ^^^ Nature of true Virtn^, tz^^

ience is virtuous benevolence itfelf in its object. Whea any one under the.influence of genera! benevolence, fees another Being poffers'd of the like general benevolence, thi^^ attaches liis heart to him, and draws forth greater love to iiim, than meerly his having exirience : becaule fo far as the Being beloved has love to Being in general, fo far his own Bein^is, as it were, enlarged ; extends to, and ia fome fort comprehends, Being in general : and therefore he that is governed by love to Be/ng, in general, muft of neceflity have complacence in him, and the greater degree ef benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to Iiirri for his love to general exigence, that his own heart is ex^" tended and united to, and fo looks on its intereft as its own. 'Tis becaufe his heart is thus united to Being ia general, that he looks on a benevolent propenfiry to Being in general, wherever he fees it, as the beauty of the Being in whom it is 3 ari excellency, that renders hini worthy of efteem, complacence, and the greater good-vv^ilJ,

V But feveral things liiay be noted more particularly cori-cerning this fecondary ground of a truly virtuous Iqy.e*

1. That loving a Being on this ground, neceflarily arilefc from pure benevolence to Being in general, and comes ta the fame thing. For he that has a limple and pure goodwill to general entity or exiftence, mufl: love that temper in others, that agrees and confpires with itfelf. A fpint of confent to Being itiuft agree vvithconfent to Being. That which tririy and fincerely feeks the good of others, mufl approve of, and love that which joins with him in feeking the good-of others,

2. This which has been now mentioned as a ftcondary: ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or fpiritual beauty primarily confifts. Yea, fpiritual beauty confifls wholly in this, and the various qualities and ex-ercifes ol mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from thele internal qualities ^nd ex-ercifes. And in thefe things confifts all true virtue^ vi2. in this love of Being, and the qualities and a<^ts which arife from it.

• 3. As all fpiritual beauty lies in thefe virtuous princi« ^!es and a6ls, fo *tis primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz. that they imply confent and union with Being in general. This is t)ie"primary and moft eflenrial beauty of every thing that can juftly be called by the name of virtue, cr is any irioral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfedl view of things. 1 fay,— the primary and moft ef-/eniial he^iuxy^-—becaufe there is a fecondary and inferior fort cf beauty 5 which 1 (hall take notice bi afterwards.

4. This fpiritual beauty, that is but ^ Jecondary grolind of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, biit complacence^ and is the primary ground of the latter; that is, when the cornplacence is truly virtuous* Love to us in particular, and kindnefs received, ma) be a feCondary ground : biit this is the primary objedlive foundaiibn of it.

5. It muft be noted, that the degree of the aimahlenef^ h^ va^uahienefs of true virtue, primarily confifting in confent and a benevolent propenfity of heart to Being in gene-ial, iii the eyes of one that is influenced by fuch a fpirit, is not in they?w/>/^ proportion of the .de;gree f benevolent affection feen, but in a proportion compounded of the greatnefs ot the benevolent Beingor the degree of Being znd the degree q\ benrjoience. One that loves Being in general, will iieceiTarily value good-will to Being in general, wherever lie fees it. But if he ffefes^the; fame benevolence in iwo Beings, he will value it w^r^ Ih two^ than m one only. Becaufe it is a greater thing, more favorable to Being in general, to have two Being^ to favor ^jt, than only one of them. For there is more Bein^, that favors Being : both together having mofe Being than one alone. So, if one Bemg be as great as two, has as much exigence as both together, and has \ht fame degree of gener'aJ benevolence, it IS more favorable to being in general, than if there were general benevolence in a Being that had but half'that Ihare of cxifte/ce. As a large quantity of gold, with th^ fame degree iof pif cioufnefs, i. e. with the fame excellent quality of Ihattera is inore valuable than a fmall quantity of the lame meul,

6. It

;. 6. It is impolTible that any one fhould truly relijh this beauty, coniifting in general benevolence, who has not that tetnper himlelf 1 have obferved, that if any Being is pof-lefs'ci ot fuch a ttmper, he will unavoidably bepieafed witfi the fame temper m another. And it may in like manner be demonftratc^d, that *tis fuch a fpirir, and nothing elfe, "woicli will relifh fuch a fpint. For if a Being, deftitute Oi benevolence, (h<i)u!d love benevolence to Being in general, it wouid prize arid feek that which it had no value for. Becaufe to love an iuclinatiori to the good of Being in general, would inipJy a laving and pricing the good of Being in general. For how fhould one love and value a difpoftti^ on to a thing, or -^^ tendency to promote a thing, and for that very reafon, beCaufe it tends to promote it, when the

thing itfelf is what he is regardlefs of^ and has no value for, nor delires to have promoted*

C H A P, IL

Shewing hov/that/ipi;f, wherein true virtue confilts, refpeds the divine Being and created 'BiQmgs.'^

I^ROiVi what has been fald, 'tis evident, that true virtue 4" mui\ chiefly confit^ iii love to God ; the Being of Beings, Infinitely the greateft and bed: of Beings. This appears^ whether we confider the primary or fecondary ground of virtuous love. /It was observed, that x\\q firji obje<Stive ground, of that love, wherein true virtue confifts, is Being, (imply confidered : and as a neceflary confequence ot this, that Being who has the mod of Being, or the greateft fhare of univerfal exiftence, has proportionably the greateft ihare of virtuous benevolence, fo far as fuch a Being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal* But God has mfinitely the greateft fhare of exiftence, or is infinitely the greateft Being. So that all other Being, even that of all created things whatfoever, throughout the whole ^hiverfe, is as nothing in comparifon of the divine Being.

And

'120 Ib^ JNafure of ir^e Virtue. Ck/ip.in

. And if we confuler xIvq fe^cndary ground of love, vi:^;' beauty,or moral excellency,the fame thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greateft Being, fo he is allowed to be infinitely the mod beautiful and excellent : and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the rt flexion ot the diffufed beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulnefs of brightnefs and glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuablcjthan that of all other Beings upon botii thofe accounts mentioned, viz. the degree oi his virtue, and the greatnefs of the Being poiTefied ot this virtue. And God has fufiiciently exhibited himfelf, in his-Being, h\s infinite greatnefs and excellency : and has given.. us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly difcoveringt immenfe fuperiority to all oiher Beings, in thefe refpects. ^J here fore he that has true virtue, confiding in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral beauty, and benevoleiice to virlucus Being, muft necefi'arily have a fupreiPiC love to Godj both of benevolence and complacence. And all true vertue mu?i radically and, eflentially, and as it were fummarily, confift in this. Becaufe God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other Being, but he is the bead oi the imiverfal fyBem of exifience j the foundation and fountain of all Bting and all beauty % from whom all IS perfectly derived, and on whom all is mofi: abfolutely and perfectly dependant ;" ofwhcm^ and through whom^ & to vjhom is ail Bring and all perfection ; and whofe Being and beauty is as it v>/ere the fum and ccmprehenfion of all ex-iftence snd excellence.: much more than the fun is the fountain and fummary comprehenfion of ail the li-ght and brightnefs of the day.

If it (liould be obiedled, that virtue confifls primarily in benevolence,., but that our fellow-creatures, and not God, feem to be the mod proper objects of our benevo-Jence ; inafmuch as our gcodnefs exiendeth not io Gcd^ and wt cannot he prcfiiahle io hinu^— — To this I anfwer,

T. A BFNEVOLENT propcnfity of heart is exerclfed, nat only in Jeehng io promote the happinefs of the Being, towards whom it is exerclfed, but alio in rejoicing In his happinefs. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not

•pnly fxcite endeavours to requite the kindnefs v;e receivef, .by equally benefiting our benefactor, but alfo if he be a^ hovQ any need of us, or we have noticing to befto//-, and are unable to repay his kindnefs, it wiU difpofe us to rejoice in his profperity. -uav:^

2 Though v^e are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independantly ; yet we may be the inflruraents of promoting /;/; glory^ in which he takes a true and proper delight. {As was fnewn at Urge in the fornfier treatife, on God's end in creating the world. Chap. 1. feci. 4. Whither I muH: refer the reader for a more full anfwer to this objeciion.]

Whatever influence fueh an objeciion may feeni to have on the minds of fome, yet is there any that owns the B^ing of a God, who v/ill deny that any love ar benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exercifed towards him ? If no bene'uoknce is to be exercifed towards *God,bec3ure we cannot protk him, thenfor the fame, rea-fon, nQMhzv n gratitude to be exercifed towards him for l?is benelirs to u? rb.ecnufe we cannot requit-e him. But whei^e js tile man, who believes a God and a providence, that

will fay this r '■■■'%

There feems to be an inconfi(^efyceWfoii;>3 writers on morality. In this refpecSV, lost they don't wholly exclude a .regard to the Deity out of there fchemes of rnorality, but yet meotion it fo llight'y, that they'jeave me rooilV and reafon to fufpe6l they efteem it a lefs important and a fub-ordinate part of true morality ; aad infift on benevolence io the created fy/^em in fuch a manner, as would naturaliy lead one to. fuppofe, they look upon' that as\ by far the mod important and effenrial thing in their rcHeS^i But . why ihould this be ? If true virtvie'connns partly In a re-.fpe6t to God, then doubtlefsit confffts >/>/>/■?;> in 1t. If true morality requires that v/e fnould have Toiti^e^iregar^VTome benevolent affection to our creator, as well z% to his creatures, then doubrlefs it requires the firO: res^atd to be paid to him ; and that he be every way the fupream objed of our benevolence If his beino; aboveour reach, and be« ^'ond all capacity of being profited bv us, don't hinder buc

that nevcrthelefs be is the proper object of our love, then it don't hinder that he (hould be loved according to his dignity^ oraccordingtotht degree in which hehastbofe things wherc^ in worthinefs ol regard conoids, fo tar as we are capable of it, But this worthinels none will deny, conlifts in thcfe two things, grealnefs and ir.oral gQodnejs', And thofe ihat own \ God, don't deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings in thefe. If the Deity is to be look'd upon as within tha?; fyflem of Beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the fyftem, and the chief part of it ; if it be proper to call him a parts who is iaifinitely more than all the reft, and in comparifon of Vvhcm and wi hout whom all the reft are nothing, either as to beauty or ex-iftence. And therefore certainly, unlefs we will be aihcifts, we miift allow that true virtue does primarily and moft ef-fentially copfift in a fupream love to God j and that wherg this is wanting, there can be pp trfte virtue.

But this being a matter of the higheft importance, I ihall fay fomething further to make it plain, that love to God is moft eftential to truie \irtue \ and that no bcnevo-ience v/hatfoever to other Beings can be of the n^tue of true virtue, without it.

And therefore Jet \% be fuppofed, that feme Beings, by natural inftin6^ or by fome other means, have a determination of mind to union and bencvoler.ee to a particular per/on^ ^r private fyfiefn^ * which is but a fmall part of the univef-fal fyftcm of Being: and that this difpofition or determina* vion of mind is indepcndant on, or not fubordinatc to be»

nevolenccc,

• It may bp here noted, t)iat when hereafter I ufe fuch a phrafe as pri<v'hte jyfiemoi Beings, or others fimilar, I there-by intend any fyftem or fociety of Beings that contains but a fmall part of the great fyfteni comprehending the univer-fality of e?iiftence. I think, that may well be called a fri^jate fyjliniy which is but an infinitely fmall part of this great whole we ftand lelated to. I therefore alfo call that afFe<ftion, fri^vate affeBion, which is limited to fo narrow a circle : and that gemral affeftion or benevolence, v'^X'Z^^ \i^% Bdn^ in gentr^l fer U's obJ9^9

Chap. II. "^^^^ Nature of trae Virtue. ii^

nevolence, to Being in general. Such a determination, dif-poiition, or aifedion of mind is not of the natuie ot true virtue.

This is allowed by all with regard to /elf lovg; In which, good-will is confined to one fingle perion.oniy. And there are the fame reafons, why any orher private affec5liOa or goodwill tho' extending to a fociety of perlons, independent of, and unfubordmate to, benevolence to the uni-verfality, (hould not be efteemed truly virtuous. For, not-withftanding it extends to a number of perfons, which taken together are more than a fmgie perfon, yet the whole falls infinitely {hort of the univerfality of exigence ; and if pur in the fcales with it, has no greater proportion to it ihaa a fingle perfon.

However, it may not be amifs more, particularly to confider the reafons why private aff'eSiions^ or good-wiil limited to a particular circle of Beings,falling infinitely fliort of the whole exiftence, and not dependent upon it, nor fub-ordinate to general benevolence, cannot beot the nature of. true virtue.

I. SuGH, a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on it, as the caft may be, will be again/i general benevolence, or ot a contrary tendency ; and will fet a perfon againji general exiiience, and make

him an enemy to it As it is sn\x\\ felfijlmefs^ or when a

man is governed by a regard to his own private infereft, independent of regard to the publick good, fuch a remper expofes a man to adl the part o an enemy to the onb ick. As, in every eafe wherein his private tnrereit ferris ro claHa with the publick ; or in ail ih;;it cafe? whertir. luch things are prefented to his view, that fuit his perf nal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconfillenf wuh the - >o 1 of the publick. On which a:.ount a leliiili, conrracfteo, narrow fpirit is generally abhor-cd, and is eikemed bafe and

fordid. But it a mar»' ^.ffcc^tion tgkes in Haifa dozea

more and his regards extend lo fa beyond his ovvn iingie perfon as to take in his children aiid family ; or if it reacies further ftiil,to a larger cirr^ie, but falis luiinitely (hort of (he univerfal fyftemj and is exclunve of Being in general ; his

130 The Nature of true Virtue. Chap.IL

private sfiecftion cxpofes him to the fame thing, viz. to pur-iue ihe ii.terelt of its particular objed in oppcjition to general cxifttnce , vvhich is certainly contrary to (he tendency of true virtue ; yea, dircdly contrary to the main and moft elTential thing in its^nature, the tlung on account ot vvhich chiefly its naiure and tendency is good. For the chiet and jrioft tfllniial good that is in virtue, is its favouring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited fyl^em had in itfelf the eiTential nature ot virtue, it would be impofTible, that it fhould in any circumftance whatfoe-ver ha^e a tendency and inclination diredly contrary to that therein the eiTence of virtne chiefly confiils.

2. Private ^fFccfVions, if not fubordinate to general af-fe^ion> is riot only hable, as the cafe may be, to iHue in enmity to Being in general, but has a tendency to it as the ^?.{t c&nainly h^ and muft neceflarily be. For he that is influenred by private afFedion, not luboidinate to regard to Beine in general, lets up its particular or limited cbjecf above Being in general ; and this moft naturally tends to enmity ajainft the latter, which is by right the great fupreme, ruling, 2nd abfolutely fovereign objed oi our regard. Even as the fetting up another prince as fupreme in any kingdc m, diftinfl from the lawful fovertign, naturally tends to enmity againf^ the lawful iovereign. Wherever it is ftfficiently publifh-cd, that the fupreme, infinite, and all-consprehending Being requires alupreme regard to hinifeif -y and infifts upon it that our refpe<5\ to him fliould universally rule in our hearts, and every other afFedticn be fubordinate to it, and this under the pain of his diipleafure (as we muft fuppofe it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world) tl.en a confcicufnefs of cur havini^i chofen and fet up another prince to rule over us, and fubiedfed our hearts to him, and continuing in fuch an a(5V, muit unavoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a ffated op-pofition, to the fupreme Being. This demonfliates, that

ffediion to a private focitty or f\nem, intiependent en general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

or this would be ablurd, that it has the natute and tfTence ■p true virtue, and yet ai the lame time hj^s a tendency oppc^

^t o true virtue.

■ ^, No5^

3. Not only would afFedion to a private fyflcm, unfiib-or<iinale to regard to Ben-g in gtneral, have a tendency to oppofition to the fuprfc-ais objedt ot virtuous affedtion, as its cffc6l and confequence, but would become kjej an oppofi-t'on to that obje<it. Confuiered by itfelf in us nature, de-tacliM from us tfFcds, it is an in^ance or great oppoiit-on to tile righrtui fuprenie object of our refpe<5t. For it exalts its private objedt above the other great and infinite object ; and lets that up as fuprenns, in oppofitiori to this. It puts down Being in general, which is infinitely fuperior in itfeif and infinitely more iinportant, in an interior place ; yea, fubjeds the lupreme genrral object to this private infinitely liifertor object : which is to (tear ir with grca coii empt and truly to adl iii oppofition to it, and to act in o; pofitioa to the true or«ier of things, and in i^ppofirion tothsf wiii'ch is infinitely the fupreme interctl; making this lu^jrcme and infinitely important inrerefi, as far as in us lies, to be iub-jecl to, and dependent on, an .nterefi infinitel) mftnor. This is to act againrt it, ^v\(\ to act the par*^ of ati tntmy to it. He that rakes a iuhjedt and exalts him ab ve his prince, fets him as fupreme mfiead of the prince, and tre^s his prince wholly as a fubjedf, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince.

From thefe things, I think, it is manifeft, that no affection limited to any private {yftem, not dependent on, nor fubordinate to Bemg in general, can be ot the natuie of true virtue ; and this, whatever the private fyfiem be, let it be more or leis extenfive, confilting of a greater or fmaJi-er number ot individuals, fo long as it contains an infinitely little part of univerfal exiftence, and lo bears no propor-, tion to the great all comprehend.niz fyikm. Anu confe-

quently, that no afiVdion whaih.ever to any creature, or any fyftem of created beings, which is not dependent on, nor fubordinate to a propenfity or union ot the heart to God, the fupreme and infinite Being, can he of the nature of true virtue.

From hence a]fo It Is evident, thav the dwlne virtue^ or the virtue or the divine mind, mufi confilf primarily \x\ Love to himfelf^ or in the mutual love ad frienulhip which fub-Ms eternally and neceflkrily between the feveral perlons

S 2 in

in the God-head, or that infinitely ftrong propenfity there is in thei'e divine perfons one to another. 'I here is no need ot multiplying word:^, to prove that it muft be thus, on A fuppoiiiion that virtue in its moft effential natue, con-fifts in benevolent afFecStion or propenfity of heart tov\ards Being in g' neral ; and fo flowing out to particular Beings, in a greater or leiTer degree, according to the mealure of

exittence and beauty which they are poflefied ot. ■— It

"Will alfo follow from the foregoing things, that God's good-nefs and love to created Beings, is derived from, and fub-ordinate to his love to himfelf. [Jn what manner it is fo, I have endeavoured in fome mealure to explain in the prc-ceeding difcourfe of God*s end in creating the world.]

With refped to the manner in which a virtuous love in created Btaigs, one to another^ is dependent on, and derived from love toGW, this will appear by a proper corifideration of vhat has been faid ; that it is fufficient to render love to any created Being virtuous, if it arife from the temper of mind wherein confifts a difpofition to love God fupremefy, Becaufe it appears from what has bf^en already obierved, all that love to particular Beings^ which is the fruit of a benevolent propenfity of heart to Being in general^ is virtuous love. But, as has been remark'd, a benevolent propenfity of heart to Bei'^g in general, and a temper or difpofition to love God fupremely, are in efTe6l the fame thing. Therefore, if love to a created Being comes from that temper or

propenfity of the heare, it is virtuous. However, every

particular exercife of love to a creature may v\q\ fenfihly arife from any exercife of love to God, or an explicit confidera-tion of any fimilitude, conformity, union or relation to God, in the creature beloved.

The mofl proper evidence of love to a created Being, its arifing from that temper of mind wherein confifts a fupreme propenfity of heart to God, feems to be the agreablenefs of the kind and degree of our love ioGod's end in our creation and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the ex« r. i es of our Jove, in their manner, order, an ! mea-fure, witli the manner in which God himleif exercilcs. love to the Cicaiure in the creation and governn^ent of the v^'jfid, and the way in which God as the firCi caufe and fupreme

preme difpofer of all things, has refpe^t to the creature's happinefs, in fubordination to hinilelf as his own fupreme end. For the true virtue of cceated Bengs is doubtlefs their higheft excellency, and their true goodnefs^ and that by which they are elpecially agreable to the mmd of their creator But the true goodnefs of a thing (as was observed before) mu(\ be its agreablenefs to its endy or its fit-nefs to anfwer the defign for which it was made. Or, at leaft, this mull be its goodnefs in the eyes of the workman. —Tnerefore they are good moral agents whofe temper of mind or propenfity of heart is agreable to the end for which God made moral agents. But, as has been fhewn, the lalt end tor which God has made moral agents, muft be the laft end for which God has made all things : it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the reft of the world ; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a houfe is prepared for the inhabitants.

By thefe things it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the fovereign dominion of/(?i;^ ;f(? God^ does above all things feek the glory of God, and makes ihii his fupreme, governing, and ultimate end : conlifling in the expreflTion ot God's perfeCtiona in their proper ef^edls, and in the muufertation of God*s glory to created uader-ftandings, and the communicnions of the infinite fulnefs of God to the creature ; in the creature's highefV efteem of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper ex-ercifes 2n\d exprefTions ot theie. And fo far as a virtuous mind exercifes true virtue in benevolence to created Beings, it chiefly feeks the good of the creature, confining in Its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its u-nion with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and

joy in him. And that temper or difpofition of heart,

that conlsnt, union, or propenfity of mind to Being in ge-naral, which appears chiefly in ifuch ex-rcifes, is virtue, tiuly fo caled ; or in other words, true grace and real ho-linefs. And no Other difpofition or affedion but this is bf the nature ot true virtue.

Corollary. Hence it appears, that tht(e fch^fnes of religion or moral philofophy^ which, however well in foms

rerpe<5fs

7J34 ^^^ Nature of true Virtue* Chap.III,

refpeds, they may treat of benevolence to mankind^ and o-ther virtues depending on it, yet have not a lupreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in \ht Jcundatiojiy and all other virtues handled in a connexion vj'iih. this, and in 2 fubordwati' en to this, ire noi true Ichemes ot philofophy, bu( are fun-damenuijy aiid efieniialiy deiective —And whatever other benevolence or generofuy towarcs mankind, and other virtues, or moral quaiihcauons which go by iliat name, any are pofitlTecJ or, that are not auencied w^ith a love to God V'h'ch is altogether above thtm, and to which they are fubordinate, and on which thvy are dependent, there is nothing of the nature ot true virtue or religion in them. ->-And it may be ?ileried in general, that nothing is 01 the nature of true virtue, in which God is not iht firji and the laji ',, or, which with regard to iheir exerciies in general^ have not thtii firfl foundation and fource in apprehenlions of God's fuprtme digniiy and glory, and in anfwerable efteem t nd love ol him, and have not reipcdt to God as the fupi erne end.

CHAP. IIL

Concerning the frconJary and inferior kind

ol" beauty.

'T*' H O U G rt this wh'ch has been fpokeh of, alone, is -■• juiliv eltetmed the true beauty or moral agents, or fpiritual Beings : thus alont being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a c.eui & comprehenfive view ot things : and therefore alone is the moral amiablenefs of Beings thai have underftanding and will, in the eyes of him that perft(!:tiy fees ail things as they are. Yet there are o-ther quahties, o'her fenfations, prcpenfities and affections of mind, am priricipUs or aifion, that often obtain the epithet ot vtr ucus^ and by many are fuppofed to have the nature of ^rue vi;rne : winch are inlireiy of a diflindt na-t turc from this, and have ncthingot that kind ; and there-I fore are erioneoufly conlounded vath real virtue ; ■ ' h as

as may particularly and fully appear from things] which will be obferved in this and the tolMwing chapters.

That confent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been fpoken of, viz. the union or propenfuy of minds to mental or fpiritual exigence, may be called the higheft, and firft, or primary beauty, that is to be found among things that exift : being the proper and peculiar beauty of fpiritual and moral Beings, which are the higheft and firft part of the univerfal fyftem, for whofe fake all the reft has exillence. Yet there is another, interior, fecondary beauty, which is fome image of this, and which is not peculiar to fpiritual Beings, but is found even in inanimate things : which confifls in a mutual confent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and vifihle end or defign ; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, fym-. metry, proportion, harmony, he. Such is the mutual agreement of the various fides of a fquare, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutaal confent or the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or furface of a fphere, and of the correfpond-ing parts of an ellipfis. Such is the agreement of the colours, figures, dimenfions, and diftances o<^the different fpots on a chefs board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chinrs, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of an human body, or countenance. And fuch is the fweet mutual confent and agreement of the Various notes of a melodious tune. This is the fame that Mr. Hutchfson, in his treatife on beauty, exprefTes by uniiormity m the midft of variety. Which is no othiir than the confent or a-greement of different Wings,in form,*quantity.&c He obferves, that the greater the variety is, in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to fay, »he more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the rea-fon of that is, becaufe 'tis more confider?»ble to have many Jhings confent gne with another, than a few only.

The beauty which confifts In the vifible fitnefs of a 4l;iing to its ufe, and unity of defign, is not a diftin£l fort of Jieauty frona tlL5, For it's to be obkx'i^d:^ tiaat one thing

which

iiitiiiiiiM

J

'/■I

336 The JSaiure of true vtrine. Chap. IIL

V/hich contributes to the beauty of the agreement h pro-portiaft-of various tilings, is their relation one to anotiier; which conne6ls them, and introduces ihem together into view and confideration, and whereby one fuggefis the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them and fo to expe6l and delire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that uniformity in fo many pillars in the correfponding parts of the fame building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The anfwerab!enefs of a thing to its ufe is only the proportion, fitnefs, and agreeing cf a caufe or means to a vifibly defigned efte6t, and fo an ^U fedl fuggefted to the mind by the idea of the means. This ,kind ot beauty is not intirely different from that beauty yy^hich there is in fitting a mortife to its tenon. Only when the beauty confifts in unity of defign, or the adapted-n^h of a variety of things to promote one intended effe<51, ]n wh'ch all confpire, as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. Firft, there js the agreement of the various parts to the defigned tniSi, Secondly, thro' this, viz. the defigned en^. or effecl, all the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union whereby they being u-nited in this third, they thereby are all united one to another.

The rcafon, or at leafl one reafon why God has made this kind of mutual confent and agreement ot things beautiful and grateful to thofe intelligent Beings that perceive if probably is, that there is in it fome image of the true, Spiritual original beauty, which has been fpoken of : confifling in Being's confent to Being, or the union of minds or fpirltual Beings in a mutual propenfity and affecStion of heart. The other is an image cf this, be-caufe by that uniformity diverfe things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleafes God to obferve analogy in his works, as is manifeft in fadl in innumerable infiances ; and ef^ecially to efiablifh inferior things in an analogy to fuperior. Hius, in how many inftances has he fcrmed brutes m analogy to

the

the nature of mankind ? and plants, in analogy to animals, v/ith refpe<St to the manner of iheir gefier«tion, nutrition, 5cc. And fo he has conftituted the external woild in aa analogy to things in the fpiritual world, in numberlefs in-fiances ; as might be (3"ie\vn, if it were nectfiary, and licre

were proper place and room for it.-^ Why fuch analogy

in God's works pleafes him, 'lis not needful now to inquire. It is fufHcient that he makes an agreement or confent of different things, in their form, manner, meafurc, &c, to appear beautiful, becaufe here is lome image of an higher kind of agreement and confent of ipirituai Beings. It has pleafed him to cftabliih a law of nature, by virtue of which the unitormity and mutual correfpondence of a bcaUtiful plant, and the refpedt which the various parts of a regular building feem to have one to another, and their agreement and union,& the confent or concord of the various note§ of a me'odious lune, fliouid appear beautiful j becaufe therein is fome lm.3ge of th? confent of mind, of the different inembers of a focieiy or fyftem of intelligent Beings, iweet-

ly united in a benevolent agreement of heart...i -And here

by ihe way, I would further obferve, probably "lis with regard to this imigeorrefemblance, which fecondary beauty has of true fpiritual beauty, that God has fo conl\iruted nature, that the prefenting of this inferior beauty, efpeci-aily in thpfe kinds of it wnich have the greateft refemr. blance.of the primary beauty, as the harmony of founds, and the beauties or nature, have a tendency to afnft thofe whole hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to difpofe them to the exercifesof divine love, an4 enliven in them a fenfe of fpirlcual beauty.

From what has been faid we may fee, that there ^e two forts of agreement or confent of one thing to another, [i.) There is a cordial agreement ; that confirts in concord and union of mind and heart : which, if not attended (viewing things in general j with more difcord than concord, is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty, which is the only -true moral beauty.-——- (2.) There is a natural union or agreement : which, tho' fome image of the other, isin-tirely a dillindt thing ; the will, difpofirion, or affedion of the heart having no concern in it, but confifting only ia vmiformity and confent of nature, form, q^uantity, &c. (as

T bef^rf

before defcribed) wherein lies an inferior fecondary fort of beauty, which ma^', in diftin6\ion from the other, be call'd

mtural beauty,-- This may be fufficient to let the reader

know how I fhall hereafter ufe the phrafes of cordial, and natural agreement ; and moral, fpiritua], divine, and primary original beauty, and fecondary, or natural beauty.

Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be obferved,.

I. The caufe why fecondary benuty is,grateful to IVlen, js only a law of nature^ wh ch God has fixed, or an infiin^ he has given to mankind ; and not their perception of the fame thing which God is pleafed to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has eftabliflied fuch a law of nature. This appears in two things.

(t.) That which God has refpc6t to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature he has given us, whereby things having a fecondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in meafure,form &c. But in many inftances perfons that are gratify'd, and have their minds afFe^ed, in prefenting this beauty, don't refled on that particular agreement and proportion, which according to the law of nature is the ground snd ru'e cf beauty in the cafe, yea^ are ignorant of it. Thus, a man jnay be pleai'^ed with the haimony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjufimcnt of the tiotes, which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note co-incide in time vi^iih two vibrations of its o6lave ; and that two vibrations of a note cp-jncide with three of its fifth, &C.'— Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the cafe, cr any cor-Tcfponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal fpirits. -^ So, a man may be rfftcfled and pleafed with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, cr what njeafures, cjuantities, and diti?nce§ it ccniifls iri.

' ■'"«

Chap. in. '^'^^^ Nature of true Virtue. ^39

' In this a renfation of fecondary beauty differs from a fenfation of primary ai)d fpiritual beauty, confining in a fpiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itfelf. *Tis the imujediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is plcafing to the virtuous mind.

(2.) As was obferv*d before, God in erlablirtiing fuch a law that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. (hould appear beautiful or grateful to men, feems to have had regard to the image and refembhnce there is in fuch ^ natural agreement, of that fpirituil cordial agreement, wherejn original beauty confii^s, as one reafon .\[\y he eftabli(hed fuch a law. But it is not any refledlion upon, or preception of, fuch a re-femblance of this to fpiritual beauty, that is the reafoa , why fuch a form or (\ate of objeds appear beautiful to men : but their fenfarion of pleafure, on a view of this fecondary beauty is immediately owing to the law God has ellablilhed, or the inftin6t he has given.

2. Another thing obfervable concerning-this kind of beauty, is, th.K it aiTec^s the mind more ('other things being e^ual) when taken notice ot in obje(ils which are of confiderable importance, than in litiie trivial matters. Thus, the fymmetry of ihe parts of a human body, 01: countenance, affeds the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the folar fyftem, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the fame proportions in fome little flight com-poiitions, ma'de to pleafe children.

3. It may be obferved (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of different things is requifite in order to this inferior beauty, but fome relation or connexion of the things thus agreeing one with a-nother. As, the uniformity or likenefs of a number of pillars, fcattered hither and thither, does-not conftitute beauty, or at feaff by no means in an equal degree as uniformity in pillars connected in the fame building, in parts that have relatioa one to another. So, if we fee things

T a unlike.

'j4^ The Nature of true Virtue. Cma?.!!!.

unlike, and very difproportlon'd, in diftant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no fuch idea of deformity, as difagreement and inequality or difproportion in things.related and connedied : 2nd the nearer the relation and the flri<5ler the conne^lion, fo much the greater and more difguftfui is the deformity^ confifting in their di{-agreement.

4. This fecfBndary kind of beauty, confining in unifor-thity aincl proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but alio in things immaterial j and is, in very many things, plain and fenfible in the latter, as well 3S the toimer ; and when it is fo, there is no reafon why h fhou!(^ not be grateful to them that behold it, in thefe, as well as the other, by virtue of the fame fenfe or the fame determination of mind to be gratify'd with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affe^V, and appear agreable to, this fenfe of beauty, then why fhould not uniformity and proportion affect the fame fenfe in immaterial thmgs, as well as material, if there be equal capncity of difcerning it in both ? and indeed fTicre in fpiritual things {ceterisparibus) as thefe are more important than things meerly external and material ?

This is noj only reafonable to be fuppofed, but is evident in fa61:, in numterlefs inftances. There is a beauty of order in fociety, befides what confifts in benevolence, or can be refer'd to it, which is of the fecondary kind. As, when the difierent members of fociety have all their appointed office, place and Oation, according to their feveral capacities and talents, 2nd every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper bufinefs. In this there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity- of a beautiful building, or piece ot (kilful architedure,- where the f^rong pillars are iet in thejr proper place, the pilafters in a place jht for them.the fquare pieces cf marble in the pavement in aplace fuitable foi- them, the pannels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the cornifhes in places proper for them. &c. As the agreement of a varieiy in one common defign, of the parts of a building, or com-plicared mschine, is one' irftance of that regularity, which belongs to the fecoi^dary kind of beauty, fo there is the

fame

Chap.III. ^^^ Nature of true Virtue* l^X

fame kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called w'lfdom, confining in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpofe : which is a diftinct thing from the goodnefs of tiut general purpofc, as bein^^ ufefui and benevolent.

So there is a beauty in the virtue called jujlke, which confiiU in the agreement of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and meafure : and therefore is the very fame fort of beauty with that uruforinity an-i proportion, which is obfervable in thofe external and marerial things that are elleemed beautiful. There is a na ura' agreement and adaptednefs of things that have relation one to another, and an harmonious cor-refponding ot- one thmg to another : that he which from his will does evil to others, (hould receive evil from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whofe bulinefs it is to take care of the injured, and to ac5t in their behalf: and that he Oiauld fufFer evil in proportion to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual a-? greemenfe, not in a metaphorical but literal itwiQ^ when he whofe heart oppofes the general fyftem, fhould have the hearts of that fyllem, or the heart of the head and ruler of the fyftem, againli him : and that in confequence,he fhould receive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the op-

pofition of his heart. • So, there is a like agreement

in nature and meafure, when he that loves, has the proper returns of love : when he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other ; as there is a kind of juftice in a becoming gratitude.

Indeed moft of the duties incumbent on us, If well con-fidered, will be found to partake of the nature of juftice. There s fome natural agreement of one thing to another; fome adaptednefs of the agent to the object; ibme anfwer-ablenels ot the a6l to the occafion ; fome equality and pro- j portion in things of 2 fimllar nature, and of a direct relati- S on one to another. So it is in relative duties ; duties of 1 children to parents, and of parents to children ; duties of ' hufoands and wives; duties of rulers and fubjeds ; duties of friendfhip and good neighbourhood : and all duties that ; we owe to.Godp our creator,preferver, and benefaclor; and

ail '

\

t^Z ihe JSaturs of true Virtue. CbavMV

all duties whatfoever, confidered as required by God, and as branches ot our duty to him, and alio confidered as what are to be peri'^^ormed with a regard to Chrift, as a6ls of obedience to his precepts, and as teftimonies of refpedt to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper or mind he has exercifed towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for therelrom.

It is this fecondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr. JfoUaflon feems to have had in his e}e, when he refolved all virtue into an agreement ot inclinations, volitions and actions with truth. He evidently has refpe(5t to \\\^ juji'ice there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one Being towards another j vshich conffts in one Being's exprefling fuch affections and ufing fuch a condu(5t towards another, as hath a natural sgeerment ?nd proportion to what is in them, and what we receive frcm them : which is as much a natural conformity of afTedlcn and adt^on with its ground, object and occallon, as that which is between a true pro-poiition and the thing fpoken of in it.

But there is another and higner beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous difpofitions and exercifes, than what confills in any unifoirnity or fimilarity of various things ; viz. the union vf heart to Being in general^ Or to God the Being of Beings, which appears in thofe vinues 5 and which thofe virtues, when true, are the various exprt (Tions or effe(5\s of. Ikiievolcnce to Being in general, or to Being f!mply confidered, is intirely a diftincf thing from uniformity in the midfl of variety, and is a fuperior kind ©f beauty,

'Tis true, that benevolence to Being in genera], when a perfon hath it, will naturally incline him to juflice, or proportion in the exercifes of it. He that loves Being, fimply confidered, will naturally (as was obferved before) other things being equal, love particular Beings, in a proportion compounded ot the degree of Being,& the degree ot virtue-or benevolence to Being, which they have. And that is to Jove Beings in propoilion to their dignity. For the digni-» sy of any Being confifts m thofe t\^o things*• Refpcdi to.

Being,

Being, in this proportion, is the firft and moft general kind -of jaitice i which will produce all the fubordinate kinds. \ jSo that, after benevolence to Being in genera! exiles, the proportion which is obferved in objeds, may be the canfe of the proportion of benevolence to thofe obje(5b : but no proportion is the caul'eor ground of theexiftence of fuch a thing as benevolence to Being. The tendency of obje<5ts to excite that degree of benevolence,which is proportionable to the degree of Being, &c. is the conjcquence of the ex-jftence of benevolence ; and not the ground of it. Eveti as a tendency ot bodies, one to another, by mutual attrnc^li-on, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the confe-quence of the Being of fuch a thing as mutual attraction 5 gnd not attraction the effed of proportion.

By this it appears, that jujl affedions and a^s have a heauty in them, diftin(5t from, and fuperior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them : for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, relifhes and delights in them. And that is the expreffion and rr.anife(lation there is in them of

benevolence to Being in general- ■ — * And befides this,

there is the agreement of jujlice to the wilj and command of God : and alfo fomething in the tendency and conf«-quences of juftice, that is agreable to general benevolence, viz. as in many rcfpe^s it tends to the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency alfo makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mirid. So that the tejidency of general benevolence to produce juftice, alfo the tendency of jufticc to produce efFeds agreable to general benevolence, both render juftice plealrng to a virtuous mind. And it is on thefe accounts chiefly^ that juftice is grateful to a virtuous tafte,or a truly benevolent heart. But, tho' it be true,there is that in the uniformity and proportion there is ia juftice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends io the general good ; yet that is no argument, that there is no other beauty in it bqt its agreeing with benevolence. For fo the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, AS- it is profitable, and tends to the general good 5 but that is no argument, that there is no other fort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its fuiting bene-yplence by tending to the general good, / ^

-. Fro.'v:

144 ^"^ JSaiure of true Virtue. Chap.IIL

5. From all that has been obferved concerning; this fe-condary kind of beauty, it appears that that difpontion or fenfe of tlie mind, which confiHs in dctcrminaticp or mind to approve and be pleafed with this beauty, confide red fim-ply and by itfelf, has nothing of the nature cf true virrue, and is intireJy a different thing from a truly virtuous tafle. For it has been Ihewn. that this kind of beauty is iniirely ■diverfe from the beauty cf true virtue> whether it tokej- place in materia! or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow, that a taftc of this kind of btauly is intiiely a different thing from a tafte of true virtue. Who will afHrm, that a difpofition to approve of the harmony of good mu-fick, or the beauty of a fquare, cr equilateral triargle, is the fame with true ho]inefs,or a tiu'y virtuous difpofiticn of mind ! 'Tis a relifh of uniformity and proportion, tliat determines the mind to approve thefe things. And if this be all, there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any refpe6l diverfe,to determine the mind to approve and be pleafed with equal uniformity and • proportion among fpiritual things \rhich are equally difcerned. 'Tis virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue, for the heart to be pleafed with that which is intirely di{\in(5l from it.

Tko' it be true, there is feme analogy in it to fpiritual and virtuous beauty ; as-much as m^aterial things can have analogy tc things fpiritual (of wh'ch they ca;- have no more than a fhadow) yet, as has been obferved, men do not approve it becauie of any Tnch anakgy peiceiyed.

And not only reafc; . vperierce plainly flicws, that

men's approbation of this . ; ■■^' beauty, does not fpring from any virtuous temper, and h^? re conre>:idn with vir^ tue. For,otherwife, men's del-rht in the^beauty ot fquares, and cubes, and regular pol)gcnv^ in the/%ularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece c^ embroidery, would encreafe in proportion to mcn'^-virtue 5 and would be raifed to a great height in feme emintiuly virrurus cr holy men ; but would be almoft wholly loft in frme others that are very vicious and lewd. 'Tis evident in facSt, that a reiifli of thefe things decs not depend on gen- ral bene-voknce, or any benevolence at -all to any Being whaifoever,

any

Phap. IV. ^^^ Nature of true Virtuel J^S

any more than a man's loving the tafte of honey, or hi$ being pteafed wit^i the fmell of a lofe. A tafte of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing whtch has been miftaken by fome morajifls, for a true virtuous priii^ ciple, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.

CHAP,

OS /elf love, and its various influence, tQ caufc love to oi/jers, or the contrary.

MANY a/Tert, that all love arises from felf-Iove. la order to determine this point, it fnould be clearJy d^^ termined what is meant by felf-love.

Self-love:, I .thin^, is generally defined—=—a man^f Jove of his-own happinefs. Which is ftiort, and may be thought very plain : but indeed is an ambiguous definition, as the pronoun, his own, is equivocal, and liable to be takeri in two very diiTsrent fenfes. For a man's owti happinefs may either be taken univerfally, for all the happinefs or pleafure which the mind is in any regard the fubjedt of, or whatever is grateful and pleailng to rnen ; or it rnay be taken for the pleafure a man takes in his own proper,private, andie-|3arate good* And {oy/eif-love may be taken two ways. '

T. Self-LOVE may be ta^en for the fame as his loving whatfoev^r is grateful or pleafing to him. Which comcj only to this, that felf-love is a man's liking, and being fuited and pleafed irj that which he likes, and which pleafes him • or, t4iat.'tis a man's loving what he jpves. For whatever 2 ^iian loves, that .thing is grateful and pleafing tohJ.m, whe-iher that be his own jpeculiar happinefs, qx the happinefs of others. And if this be all that ihey mea.n by felf-Jove, no wonder they fyppo.fe that alMove may be reiolvjed into felt-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a mam loves, hi? love ijiay be reiblved into his Joving what he

ioves, if that be proper fpcaking ~- If by fdf-Jove is

meant nothing elfe but a man's loving what is grateful or pleafing to him, and being averfe to what is difagrcahle.

14^ 7he Nature of true Virtue. Chap.IV,

this is calling that felf-love, which is only a general capar city of loving, or hating j or a capacity of being either pleafed or difpleafed : which is the fame thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleafing or difpleafing, agreable or difagreable to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But ^ he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, thei) what he inclines to, ^nd chufes, is grateful to him ; whatever that be, whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbours, or the glory of God. And fo far as it is grateful or pleafing to him, fo far it is a part of his pjea* /"ure, good, or happinefs.

But iTthis be what is m^ant by felf-love, there is aa impropriety and abfurdity even in the putting of the quef-tion, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular obje<51: of our love, don't arife from felf-love ? For that svo.uld be the fame as to enquire. Whether the reafon. why our Jove is fix'd on fuch and fu^h particular objedls, is not, that we have a capacity of loying fome things ? Tbis may be a general realon why men love or hate any thing at all j and therein differ from ftones and trees, vyhi.ch love nothing, and hate noihing. But it carpi pever be ,a reafon why A"*en'$ love is placed on fuch and i"uch objcift?. That a man^ ip general, loves and is pleafccj with happinefs, pr (whipb is the fame thing) has a capacity of enjoying hsppinefs, .canpot be the jeafcn why fucl;i and fuch things become his happinefs : as for inllance, >yhy the good of his aeighb.our, or-the happinefs and glpry of God, is grateful and plcarmg to him, aiid fo becomes ^ part of his happinefs.

Or if what they mean, yvho fay that all love comes .fror>> felf-love, be not, that our loving fuch and fuch particular nerfons and things, arifes from cur love to happinefs in general, but from a love to love cur own happinefs, whicl;i ponfiOs in thefe obje61s > ^o, the reafon yfhy we love b.ene-voience to our friends, or neighbours, is, becaufe we love cur happinefs, confii^ing m their happinefs, which we take pleafure in : r—— iViIl the notiop is abfurd. For here the ^0*^(51 it made the caufe of that, oi which it is the cifet5t.: our hippinefs, confining in the happinefs of the pftfon,bft-

■ ■^' ■'"^" loveds

l-oved, is mide the caiife of our love to that perfon. Whereas,the truth plainly is,that our Jove to the peiTon is the caufe of our delighting^ or being happy in his happinefs. How Gomes our happinefs to conilft in the happinefs of fuch as we iove, but by our hearcs being firil united to them iil iatfecfiion, fo that we as it were, look on them as our felvesj andfo on th'eir happinefs as our ov/nf

Mem who have benevolence to others, have pleafurd Ivhen ihey fee others happinefs, becaufe feeing their happinefs gratifies feme inclination that was in their hearts before. They before inclined to their happinefs ; which wajS by benevolence or good-will 3 and therefore when they fee their happinefs, their inclination is fuited, and they ara pleafed. But the Being of inclinations and appetites h prt-Qr to any pleafure in gratifying thefe appetites.

2. Self-love, as the phrafe is ufed in comnion fpeechj moft commonly fignifies a man's regard to his confined private felf^ qr iove to himfelf with refpc(5t Xa \i\% privaVs mtereji:^

By private intereft I mean that which moft immediatel3f confifls in thofe pleafures, or pains, that are perjonal. Fof there is a comfort, and a grief^ that fome have in others pleafurcsjor pains 5 which are in othersoriginally,but are derived to them, or in fome meafure become th^ir'si by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleafures at^.d pams that are originally our own, and not vvhat we have by fach a participation with others-Which confill: in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain perfonal inclinations implanted in our nature; fuch as the fenfitive appetites and avernons. Sirch alfo is the dif-pofition or the determination of the mind to be pleafed with external beauty, and with all inferior fecondary beau* ty, confifling in uniformity, porportion, Scc. whether iti things external or internal, and to diflike the contrary de-formify. Such alfo is the natural difpofition in men to be pleafed in a perception of their beinj; the objeds of the honor and love oFothe^t? a«^d difpleafed with others b'^atr^.d atid contempt. For pleafures and oneafine/Tes pf this kind are doubtkfs as much'owi'ng to an imm^^iats tletermina-

V % tigi3

^0 The Nature of true Virtue. CnAP.It^

iion of the mind by a fixed law of oiir nature, as any of thd pleafures or pains of external fenfe. And thefe pleafufes arfi properly of the private and perfonal kind ; being not by any participation of the happinels or for row ol others^ through benevolence. Tis evidently meer felf-love, that appears an this difpofitioti. It is eafy to fee, that a man's Jove to himfelf will make him love love to himfelf, and hate hatred to himfelf. And as God has conftituted our nature, felf-love is exercifed iri no one difpoHtion more than in this. Men, probably, are capable ot much more pleafure and fain thro' this determination of the mindgthah by any other perfonal inclinationjor averfion, whaifoever. Tho* perhaps; we don't fb very often feeinftances ot extreme ftiffcring by this means, as % feme othersjyet we often fee evidences of «nen*s dreading the contempt of others more than death t and by fuch inftances may conceive fomething what meri iwould fuffer, if univerfally hated and defpifed ; and may yeaionably infer fomething of the greatnels ot the rnifery, that would arife under a fenfe of liniverfal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view pFthe Deity, as incomprehenfibly arid immenfely great, fo that all other Beings are as nothing and vanity.- together with a fenie of his immediate continual prefence, and an infinite concern with hirri and dependence upoii

him,— and living conftantly in the midft of moft clear

and ftipng evidences and manifeftations of his hatted and! contempt and wrath.

But to return, -Thefe things may be fufficient to

explain what I mean by private interelt ; in regard to •which, felf-love, mod properly fo called, is immediately

exercifed. , : =

And hcJ'e I would obferve, that if we take felf-love in this fenfe, fo love to fome others may truly be the eflfe£i of felf-love ; i. e. according to the common method and order, which is maintain'd in the laws of nature. For no created thing has power to produce an efFe6t any othcrwife <han by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man fhould love tfrofe that are of his party, when there are dif-iferent parties contending one with another ; and that are Warmly engaged on his fide^ and promote his interef:,—

this

this is the natural confequence of a private felf-love. Indeed there is no metap]:iyrical neceffity, in the nature of things, that becaufs a man loves himfelf, and regards his own intereft, he therefore (hould love thofe that love him^ and promote his intereft •, i. e. to fuppofe in to be other-jwife, implies no contradi6tion. It will not foiiow froiH any abi'olute metaphyfical neceflity, that becaufe bodies have folidity, cohefion, and gravitation towards t\\Q centre df the earth, therefore a vveight fufpended on the, beam of a balance Tnould have greater pow^r to coanter-b^lancs a weight on the other fide, when at a diftance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction, that it fhould be otherwife : but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the author of nature obferves in the laws of nature he has eftabliihed. Neither is there any abfolute neceflity, the contrary implying a contradi6tion, that becaufe ihure is an internal mutual attraction of the parts ot the earth, or any other fphere, whereby the whole becomes one folid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around ir, Ihould alfo be attra<5ted by it, and thofe that are neareft, be attracfted moft. But according to the order and proportion generally obferved in the laws of nature, one of thefe effcdts is conrie6ted with the other, fo that it is juftly look'd upon as the fame power of atti"adtioh in tfhe globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, with that which attra^s the parts of the earth* themfelves one to another ; only exerted under different circumftances. By a like order of nature, a mln*s love to thofe that love him, is no more than a certain expreflion or effect of felf-love. No other principle is needful in order to the efTec^t^ it nothing intervenes to counter-vail the natural tendency of felf-love. Therefore there is no more true virtue in a Man's thus loving his fri(^nds meerly from felf-love, than there is in felf-love irfelf, the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man's being difpofed to hate thofe that hate him, or to refent injuries done him, arifes from fe!f-love in like manner as the loving thofe that love us, and bein* thankful for kindnefs fliewn us.

But it is faid by fome, that 'tis apparent, there is fome thsr principle concerned in exciting the paffions of gratitude

^W^^^elfafHre of true Virtues Chap.IV,

tude and anger, befides felf-love,^viz. a moral fenf^, or fenfe of moral beauty and deformity, deterrainiog the minds, of all mankind to approve of5 and be picafed with virtue, and to difapprove ot vice, and behold it with difplicence \ knd that their feeing or fuppofing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindnefs of a benefador, or oppofition of an adverfary, is the occafion of thefe affedticns of gratitude or anger. Otherwife, v\'hy are not thefe afFedions excited in us towards inanimate things, that do Us good, or hurt ? Why don't we experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field \ And why are we not angry with a tempeft, or biaft-ing mildcvy, or an overflowing fiream \ We are very differently aifedted towards thofe that ^^ us good from the virtue of generofity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or Help us, which are deftitute of reafon and will. ' Now concerning this^^ 1 would make feveral remarks.

i. Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger can't proceed from felf-love, might argue in the fame way* and with equal reafon, that neither can thefe afFe<5lions a». fife from love to others : which is contrary to their owa tcheme.

They fay, that the reafon why we are affe<5ted with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral fenfe : which they fay, is the efl^cft of iha^ principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind—~ But now I might fay^ according to iheir own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arife from love to o-fhers, or love to the public, or any Tenfe of mind that is the fruit of public aft^c^tion. For, how differently are we affecfled towards thofe that do good or hurt to the public fron} underfianding and will, and from a general public

Ipirit, «r public motive^- I fay, how differently affected

are we towards thefe,trom what we are towards fuch inani-Bfiate things as the fun and the clouds, that do good to the publicj, by enlightning and enlivening beams and rcf re filing; ^^^wers J or mildew, and an ©vcrflowing ftream, that does h.urt to the public,by deftroying the fruits of the earth ? "teaj if Tuch a i;ijid of argumeiit be goodj it will prove that

giatitud^

gratitude and anger cannot arife from the united Influence 9f felf'love, and public love, or moral fenfe arifing from public affedtion. For, if fo, why are we not afFe6\ed towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the fame manner as to them that ^re proiitabie or hurtful to both on choice and defign, and trotn benevolence, or malice ?

2. On the fuppofuion of its being indeed fo, that men love thofe who love them, & are angry with ihofe who hate them, from the nruural influence of felf-love ; 'tis not at sU llrange th^t the auihor of nature, who obferves order, uniformity and harmony in eftablifliing its laws, ftiould fo order that it fhould be natural for felf-love to caufe the ^ind to be Effected differently towards exceedingly different objc<5ts 5 and that it fiiould caufe our heart to extend iifelf in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify felf-love, vt^irhout fenfe or will, and in another manner t.owards Beings which we look upon as having underfiand-ing and will,, like ourfelves, and exerting thefe faculties in pur favor, and promoting our interefl from love to us. No wonder, feeing w^e love ogrfelves, that it fhould be natural to us to extend fomething ot that fame kind of love which we have f^r ourfclves, to them who are the fame kind of Beings ^s ourfelves, and comply with the inclinations .of our felf-love, by expreffing the fame fort of love to-.wards us. '

3. If w^e fhould allow that to be univerfal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercife of fomeliind of mo-r^I fenfe (as 'tis granted, there is fomething that may be fo railed.) All the moral fenfe, that is effential to thofe af-fedtions, is a fenfe of Des^irt ; which is to be refer'd to that fenfe of juftice^ before fpoken of, confining in an ap-prehenfion of that fecon/Jary kind of beauty, fliat lies in , iiniformity and proportion : which foives all the diificulty

in the objec^^ion, This, or feme appearance of^it, to a

narrow private view, indeed attends ^11 anger and gratitude. -Others love and kindnefs to us, gr their ill-will and inju-i'ioufnefs,appears to us toif/^rz>.^our love, or our refentmenr. Or, in other words, it feenis to us no other than^z^, that *^s the,)^ l9ye us, and do us good, y/e alfo (houJd Jove thetn>

and

f^2. i he Nature of true Virtue. Chap.II^

and do tbepi good. And fo it (ecmsjuj, that when other$ ^hearts oppcfe us, and they fforn their hearts do us hurt, 'cue hei;rts ftiould oppofe them, and that we (hould defire they themfeives may fuffer in Jike manner as we have fuf-fered : i. e. there appears to us to be a naiuraJ agreement, proportion, and adjuftment between thei'e things. Which is indeed a kind of moral fenfe, or fenf^ cf a beauty in moral things. But, as was before Ihiwn, it is a moral fenfe of ^ fecondary kind, and is intirely different frci;i a fenfe or'reJi(h of the original efiential beauty of ;rue virtue ; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. TJierefore cioubtlefs 'lis a great tni/lahem any to fuppofe, all that moral fenfe which appears and is cxercifed in a knCc of dr/afy is the fame thing as a Jove of virtue, or a difpofition and detef,mination of mind to be pleafed with true virtuous becuty, conijAing in pubjick bcnevolcpce. Which may b^ further ccnfirm'djif it becoisfidered that even with refpedi to 4fenfe ofju/Uce or ^//^r/,coniirting in uniformity [and agree-jr.ent between others actions towards us, and our adfions towards them, in a way of well-doing, or of ill-doing] *tis jnot abfolutely necelfary to the being of thefe paffions of gratitude and anger, that there (hculd be any notion of ^uftice in them, in any publick or general view of things : /«—— as will appear by what iliall be next obferved.

4. Those authors, who held thnt that moral fenf$ vbich is natural to all man-kind, confjrts in a natural re-Xi^ of the beauty of virtue, and fo arifes from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all^ they hold that true virtue toniifts in publick benevolence. Therefore, if the afFedtions of gratitude and anger nccef-fariiy imply fuch a moral fenfe as they fuppofe, then thcfe siFechicns imply feme delight in the publick good, and an averficn of the mind to publick evil. And if this were fo, then every time any man feels anger for oppofition he meets with, or gratitude for any favour, there muft be at ieaft a fuppofition of a tendency to publick injury in that ©ppofition, and a tendency to publick benefit in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true \ As, in (uch inftances as thefe, which, 1 prcfume, :RQnc will d-eny to be pofTible, or unlike to any thing that

ever

ever happens among mankind. A ftiip's crew^irter into a confpiracy againft the mafter, to murder hhn, and run away with the (hip, and turn pirates : but betore they bring their matters to a ripenefs for execution, one oi thein repents, and opens the whole deflgn ; whereupon the reit aVd apprehended and brought to juilice. The crew are enraged with him that has betray'd them, and earneft]y feck opportunity to revenge themfelvcs upon him — ■-— —And for ftn inflance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infeft^d the neighbouring country, have a particular houfb whither they refort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their conful-tations for carrying on their pernicious defigns. Tiie ma-giflrates and officers of the country,after many fruitlefs en*-deavours to difcover their fecret haunt and place of refort^ at length by fome means are well informed where it is> !3nd are prepared v/ith fufficient force to furprize them, and fieze them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they underftand they vrill all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, fome perfon is ^o kind to thefe robler.s, as to give them notice ot their danger, fo as juft to ^ive them opportunity to efcape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for l-:is kindiiefs. —-—^ Now in fucli inftanccs, I think, it is' plain, that there is no fuppolition of a public injury in that which is the occafion of their anger 3 yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any fuppoiicion of public good in that which excites \.\iz\x gratitude ; neither has pubiick benevolence,or moral fenfe, confiding in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be fome afFeetion, be-fides a fenfe of uniformity and proportion,that has influence in fuch anger and gratitude, it is not public affedion or benevolence, but private afFe6lion ; yea, that affediori which is to the highefl degree private, conlifting in a man's iove of his own perfon,

5. The paflion of an^er^ in particular, fecrhs to have been unluckily chofea as a medium to prove a fenfe and determination to delight in virtuCj confiding in benevolent*, RUurai to all mankind,

^ For,

For, if that moral fenfe which is excrcifed in anger, v/ere that which arofe from a benevolent temper of heart, being rio other than a fenfe or relifh of the beauty of benevolence, one would think, a difpofition to anger ft-iould increafe, at leaft in fome proportion, as a man had more of a fv/eet, benign, and benevolent temper : which feems fomething difagreable to reafon, as well as contrary to experience^ which fhews that the lefs men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the miore are Ihcy difpofed to anger and deep refentment of injuries.

And though gratitude be that which many fpeak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind ; and though it be true, there is a gratitude, that is truly virtuous, and the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues isn abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occafion to (hew afterwards) yet 1 think, what has been ©bferved, may ferve to convince fuch' as impartially con-fider it, not only that not all anger, or hating thofe which hate us, but alfo that not all gratitude, or loving thofe V/hich love us, arifes from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.

Another fort of afFedions, which may be properly re-fer'd to felf-love, as itsTource, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of 3iature's laws, is affedlions lo fuch as are near to us by the ties of nature ', that we look upon as thofe whofe Beings we have been the occafions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whofe circumftances, even fror^^ the firft beginning of their exiflence, do many ways lead them, as it were neceffarily, to an high efleem of us, and to treat us with great dependence^ fubmiffion and compli-snce ; and whom the conftitution of the world makes to be united in intereft, and accordingly to a(St as one in innu-incrable ciYairs, with a communion in each other's afTe^li-ons, defires, cares, friendfhips, enmities, and purfuits. Which is the cafe of men's afreclion to their children.—• And in like manner felf-love will alfo beget in a man fome (degree of afFec5\ions towards others, with whom he has connedticn in any degree parallei.«-«—A^ to the opinion of

ihols

Chap. IV. ^^^ Nature of true Virtue^, tsff

thofe that afcrlbe the natural afFecSlion there is between parents and children, to a particular injiin^ of nature, i (hail take notice of it afterwards.

And as men may love perfons and things from felf-Iove, fo may love to qualities and chara6lers arife from the fame fource. Some reprefent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphyfical refining, to make it out, that men approve of others from felf-love, whom they hear of at a didiince, or read of in hiftory, or fee reprefented on the ftage, from whom they exped no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not confidered, that what we approve of in the firfl place, is the character ; and from the charadler we approve the perfon. And is it a ftrange thing, that men lliould from felf-Iove like a temper or charader, which iti its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency ot felf-love ; and which, we know by experience and felf-evidence, without metaphyfical refining, in the general tends to men's pleafure and benefit ? ■■■ And on the

contrary, fliould difiike what they fee tends to men's pain and mifery ? ■ Is there need of a great degree of fubtilty and abftraftion, to make it out, that a child, which has heard and feen much, ftrongiy to fix an idea, of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattle-fnake, fhould have aver-fion to that fpecies or form, from felf-love ; fo as to have a degree of this averfion and difguft excited by feeing even the pidtuie of that animal ? And that from the fame felf-love it fliould be pleafed and entertained with a lively figure and repreientation of fome pleafant fruit, v/hich it has often tafted the fweetnefs of ? or, with the image of fome bird, which, it has always been told, is innocent, and whofe pleafant finging it has often been entertain'd with ? —« Though, the child neither fears being bitten by the picSture cf the fnake, nor expedls to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird fing. I fuppofe none, will think it difficult to allow, that fuch an approbation or difguft of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleafures of tafte and hearing, and its averfion to pain and death, through felf-love, together with the habitual connexion of thefe agreeable or terrible ideas v*?ith the form and qualities of thefe objeds, the ideas of which are im-prciTed on the miud of the child by their images.

X z Anj>

And where is the difficutty of allowing, that a child or vnan may hate the general charadler of a ipiteful and malicious man, for the like reafon as he hates the general nature of a ferpent ; knowing, from reafon, inftrucftion and experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind^ $s well as Ipite or poison in a ferpent ? And if a man may from felf-love difgpprove tlie vices of mahce, eavy, and o-thers of that lort, which naturally tend to the hurl of mankind, why may he not from the fame principle approve th© comrary virtues of meeknefs, peaceablenefs, benevolence^ charity, generoiity, ju(\ice, and the facial virtues in general ; which, he as ealily and clearly knows, naturally t'ea4 to the good of mankind I

'Tis undoubtedly true, that feme have a love to tjiefe virtues from a higher principle. [But yet 1 think it as certainly true, that there is generally in mankind, a fort of ^Approbation of them, which arifes from felf-lovs.

Besides what has been already faid, the fame thing further appears from this ^ that men commonly are moft af--fecfled towards, and do moil highly approve, thofe virtues which agree with thejr intereft moft, according to their - various conditions in life. We fee that perfons of low condition are ei^pecially, enamour'd with a condefeending, SiCcefRble, affable temper in the great ; liot only in thofe "whofe condefcention has been ^ejtercifed towards them-ielves ; but they will be peculiarly taken with fuch a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when

they meet with it in hiftory, or even in romance.-^ The

poor will moil highly apptove and.commend liberality.-^^— The weaker fex, who efpecially need afli(Vance and protection, will peculiarly efieem and applaud fortitude and ge-licrofity in thcfe of the other fex, they read or hear of, or have reprcfented to theai on a ftage.

Ail think it plain from^/hat has been obferved, that r^aen may approve, an4-be difpofed to commend a be»evo-jent temper, fpom felf-love, fothe iiigher the degree of bfe-Rcvolence is, the more may tJiey approv-e of it. Whfch will 5:ccx)unt for fome kind of approbation, from this priri-^ipicj even of love to enemies > vi^. as a man's loving his i enemies

enemies Is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of

temper ; the degree of it appearmg from the .obftacles

it overcOiTies.

And it may be here obferved, that the confideration of the tendency and influence of felf-love may (hew, how men in general may approve oi jufiUe from another ground, belides that approbation of the fecondary beauty there is in unl^formiry and proportion, which is natural to all. Men from their infancy fee the necefTity of it, not only that it is neceilary for others, or for human fociety ; but they iinci the neceffity of it for themfelves, in inftances that continually occur : which tends to prejudice them in its favor, and to fix an habitual approbation of it from felf-lxjve.

And again, that forementioned approbation of ju(\Ice and dcferr, ariftng from a {Qn{e. of the beauty of natural a-greement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex, and indiredl influence to caufe men to approve benevolence, and difapprove malice j as men fee that he who hates and injures others, deferves to be hated and punifhed, and that he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does them good,deferves himfelf alfo to be loved & rewarded by others, as they fee the natural congruity or agreement and mutual adaptednefs of thefe things. And having always feen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind -with the idea of being hatvd and punifhed, which is difa-p greabic to felf-love ; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connefted and aflbciated with the idea of being lovV cd and rewarded by others, which is grateful to felf-love. And by virtue of this.aflociation of ideas, benevolence it-felf become's grateful, and the contrary difpleafing.

Some vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of felf-love, thro' an habitual connexion of ideas of contempt with it 5 contempt being what felf-love abhors. So it may oftert b« with drunkennefs, gluttony, fottifhnefs, cowardice, floth, niggardlinefs.——The idea of contempt becomes afTjJciated with the idea of fuch vices, both bccaufe we are ufed to obferve that thefe things are commonly ob'. jetSss of contempt, and alfo find that they excite eomempt HI Qurfelves,-*——Some of them appear marks of Jitilenefs,

i. e.

•^

fjo ^Ihe Nature of irus Virtue. Chap. V.

I. e. of fniall abilities, and weaknefs of mind, and infuffici-

ency for any confiderable efFe<5ls among mankind.— By

others, men's influence is contradted into a narrow fphere, and by fuch means perfons become of lefs importance, and more infignificant among mankind. And things of Jittle

importance are naturally little accounted of. And fome

of thefe ill qualities are fuch as mankind find it their inte-rcft to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human fociety.

There are no particular moral virtues whatfcever, but what in fome or other of thefe ways,& moftol them in feveral of thefe ways5Come to have fome kind of approbation from felf love, Without the influence of a truly virtuous principle ; nor any particular vices, but what by the fame means meet with fome difapprobstion.

This kind of approbation and difllke, thro' the joynt-influence of felf-love and afTociation of ideas, is in very many vaflly heightned by education ; as this is the means of a ftrong, clofe, and almoft irrefragable aflbciation, in innumerable inftances, of ideas which have no connexion any other w ay than by education ; and of greatly flrcngthning that aflbciation, or connexion, which perfons are led into by ether means : as any one would be convinced, perhaps more effedually than in -mofl other ways, if they had opportunity of any confiderable acquaintance with Jmerican favages and their ciiildren.

CHAP. V.

Of natural conjctenccy and the moral fen/e,

TH E R E is yet another difpofition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind ; which, if we consider the confiiience and harmony of nature's laws, may alio be look'd upon as in fome fort arifing from felf-love, or felf-union : and that is a difpofition in man to be uneafy in a cohfciouffiefs of being inconfiflent with himfelf, and as it were, againft himfelf, in his own anions. This appears particularly in the inclination'

of the mind to be uneafy in the confcloufnefs of doing that to others, which he (hould be angry with them for doing to him,if they were in his cafe,and he in theirs ; or, of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be difpjeafed with them for neglecting to do to him.

I HAVE obferved from time to time, that in pure love to others ( i. e. love not arifin^^ from felf-love) there's an union of the heart with others ; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it fo extends ilfelf as to take others into a man's felf : and therefore it implies a difpolition to feel, to defire, and to a6l as tho* others were one with curfelves. So, felf-love implies an inclination to fed and a6t as one with ourfelves : which naturally renders a feniible incon-fiftence with ourfelves, and felf-oppofition,in what we ourfelves chufe and do, to be uneafy to the mind : which will caufe uneafmefs ot mind to be the confequence of a malevolent-and unjuft behaviour towards others and a kind of difapprobation of a6\s of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we (hould be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a perfon for doing that to us, which we (hould incline to and infift on doing to him, if we were exacftly in the.fame cafe, is to difagree with ourfelves, and contradiil ourfelves. It would be, for ourfelves both to chufe and adhere to, and yet to refufe and utterly rejetft, as it were the very fame thing. No wonder, this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that fuch a felf-oppofition, and inward war with a man's felf, naturally begets unquietnefs, and raifes diflurbance in his mind.

J A THUS'approving of a6\ions, becaufe we therein aft as in agreement with ourfelves, or as one with curfelves,—-and a thus difapproving and being uneafy in the confcicuf-nefs of difagreeing ar d being inconfiiient with ourfelves in

vvhat v;e do, > is quite a different thing from approving

or difapproving a6tions becaufe in them we agree and arc united with Being in general : which is loving or hating £6tions from 2 fenfe of the primary beauty of true virtue,and

odioufnefs of fm. The former of thefc principles is

private : the latter is public and truly benevolent in the iiighelt fenfe. The former (i, «. an inclination io agree

OQ Tbs feature of true Virtue, Cjjisp. V<

with ourfelves) is a natural principle : but the latter (i. c, an agreement or union of heart to the great /yHem, and ta God, the head of it, who is all and aii in itj is a divine principle.

In that uneailnefs now mentioned, confifls very much of that inward trouble men have from refle<5tions of con-fcience : and when they ar^-free from this unesfinefs, and are confcious to themfelves, that in what they hav'e a6ted towards others, ftiey have done the fsme which they fhcuM have expeded from them in the fame cafe, then they hav© what is called peace of confcience, with refpcdl to t"hefc adiions. And there is alfo an approbation of confcience^ of the condudf of others towards ourfelves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or puniflied by them, and are conlcious to ourfelves that if we were in their cafe, and they in ours, we fhould in like manner, blame, condemn,; and punifli tncm. And thus men's confciences may juflify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of Gcd's greatnefs, their relation to him, the benefits' they have received from him, the manifeflations he has made of his will to them, &c. firongly imprefTed on their minds, a confcioufnefs is excited within them of thofe re-fentments, which would be occafion'd in themfelves by aa injurious treatment in any wife parallel.

There is fuch a confcioufnefs as this oftentimes within men, imply'd in the thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly give an account of. Unlcfs men's confciences are greatly ftupify'd,. it is naturally and necelTarily fuggefied ; and does habitually, fpontanecufly, inflantsneoufly, and as it were infenfi-bJy arife in the mind. And the more fo for this reafcn^ ^'/z. that we have not, nor ever had from our infancy, sny other way to coi.ceive of any thing which other perfons a(5l or fuffcr, or of any thing about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourfelves 2Te confcious of in the acfls, pafTions, fenfations, volitions, &c. which we have found in our own minds j and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means, in the place-of another ; or as it were fubf\itusing ourfelves in their place. Thus, we havsno conception^ la gny degree, what

underftandiTig->

Chap. V. ^^^ Nature of true Virtue. i6f

underftanding, perception, love, pleafure, pain, or defire are in others, but by putting ourfelves as it were in their fiead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of fii<?h things ia our own minds by confcioufnefs, into their place ; making fuch an alteration, as to degree and circumftaqces, as what we obferve of them requires. * fis thus m all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental, and not corporeal things ; and every thing that we ccnceiveof, belonging to others, more than (hape, fize, coinplexion, fituation, and motion of their bodies. And this is the^nly way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the. Godhead, We never could liave any notion what underftanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created fpirits or in God, if we had never experienced what underf^anding and voliticn, love and hatred are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by confcioufnefs, we can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeablenefs and other imperfections, and afcrib$ them to God. Which is the only way we come to be ca« pable of cunceiving of any thing in the Deity,

But though it be fo, that men in thinking of others dq as it were put themfelves in their place, they do it fo naturally, or rather habitually, inftantaneoufly, and without itx. purpofe, that they do it infenfibly, and can fcarce give any account of it, and many would think llrange if they were told of it. " -So It may be in men's fubflituting themfelves in others place in fuch exercifes of.confcience as have been fpokrn of : and the former fubftitution leads to the latter, in one whofe confcience is not greatly ftupitied. For in all his thoughts of the other perfon, in whatever he apprehendsjof conceives of his moral coiidu^ft t© others or £b himfeif, if it be in loving or hating i^im, approving or condemning him, rewarding or punifliing him, he necef-iarily as it were puts himfelf in his fUad, for the foremen-^ioned reafon ; and therefore the more naturally^ eaffly 5.nd jquietly fees whether he being in his place ftioiild approve jQf coadeiTJ), be angry or pleafed as he is.

ursi

Natural confcience confifts in thefe two things.

I. In that which has now been fpoken of : that difpo^ fition to approve or diCapprove the moral'treatment which paiTes between us and others, from a determination cf the mind to be eafy, or urieafy, in a confcioufnefs of our being confiftent, or inconfifteni with ourfelves. Hereby we have a difpofition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are confcious to ourfelves that we treat him fo as w^e fhould expe<5t to be treated by him, were he in our cafe and we in his ; and to difapprove of our own treat"^ ment of another, when we are confcious that we (hould be difpleafed, with the like treatment from him, if we were in his cafe. So we in our confciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are confcious to ourfelves, that if we were in his cafe, and he in ours, we (hould think it juft to treat him as he treats us ; and difapprove his treatment of us, when we are confcious that we fhould think it un-jufi, if we were in his cafe. Thus rhcn's confciences approve or difapprove the fentence of their judge, by which

they are acquitted or condemned.-. But this is not all

that is in natural confcience. Befides this approving or difapproving from uneafinefs as being inconfiftent with ourfelves, there is another thing that muft precced it, and be the foundation of it. As for inftance, when my conscience difapproves my own treatment of another, being confcious to myfelf, that were 1 in his cafe, 1 fhould be difpleafed and angry with him for fo treating me, the queftion might be afked, but what would be the ground of that fuppofed difapprobation, difpleafure and anger, which I am confcious would be in me in that cafe ? *" ■ ■ That difapprobation muft be on fome other grounds.

Therefore,

2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or difapprobation cf natural confcience, is the fenfe of de-fert, which was fpoken of before : confifting, as was ob^ ferved, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury and refentment and punilh-ment ; or between lovirig and being loved, between fhew-ing kindnefs and being revvarded, &:c. Both thefe kinds

of

Chap. V. 27;/? Nature of true Virtue. its^

of approving or difapproving concur in the approbation or difapprobation of confcience : the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's confciencv^ difapproves ot his treatment of his neigKbour, in the firft place he is confcious that if he were in his neighbours ftead, he (hould refent fuch treatment, from a fenfe of juftice, or from a fenfe of uniformity and equahty between fuch treatment and re-fentment and punifliment 5 as before explained. And thea in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not confident with himfelt, in doing what he himfelf (hould refent in that cafe ; and hence difapproves it, as being naturally averfe to oppoiition to himfelf.

Approbation and difapprobation of confcience, in the fenfe now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice ; to €vei*y thing whatfoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind v^hich does not confine its view to a private fphere, but will take things in general into its confideration, & is free from fpeculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be refolved into love to others, either God or creatures, ^o men eafily fee the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favored by others. And all vice, fin, or moral evil fummarily confiding in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, viz, hatred or malevolence, fo men eafily fee the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them aad fufFering ill from them, or from him that adts for all and has the care of the whole S^yftem. And as this kn^t of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, fo this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and difapprobation, which is grounded upon it, arifing from an averfion to feif-inconfillence and oppofition. For in all cafes of benevolence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourfeives in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it, and fo of reflecting, or being confcious to ourfeives, how we fhould like or diflike fuch treatment from others. Taus natural confcience, if the underftanding be properly enlightned, and errors and blinding ftupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins, its voice with it in every article.

154 The jStature of true VirtM. Chap.V;

And thus, in particular, we may fee in whatrefpe<5l this? naiural confcience that has been defcribed, extends to true virtue, confiliing in union of heart to Being in general, and fupii:me love lo God. For, aJtho' it fees not,or rather does fioi taftc its pmnary and eflenfia) beautyj i. e. it taftes nd fwcemefs in benevolence to Being in genera), (imply confi-dercd, or loves it not for Being in generaKs fake (for no* thiiig but general benevolence itfelf can do that) yet this natural confc.cnce, common to mankind, may approve of it from that unuormiiy, equality and juthce, which there is in it, and the dement which vs ken in the contrary, confiliing in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated ot Being m general. Men by natural confcience msy lee the jui^ice (or natural agreement J there is in yielding all to God, as A^e receive all from God ; and the jultice there is m being his that has made us, and being wihingly fo, which is the fame as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of ourBeinj, as we are for our Being itfelf, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on wht>fe will we are univerfally and moft perfectly dependent ; and alfo the juflice there is in cur fupreme love to God, from his goodnefs,-—- the natural agreement there is between our having fupreme refpe<^\ to liim who exercifes infinite goodnefs to us, and from whom we receive all well-being. --—> Befides that difagreement $.nd dilcord appears worfe to natural fenfe (as was obferved before) in things nearly related and of great importance : and theiefore it mull appear very ill, as it refpec^s the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the creator and his creatures. And 'tis eafy to conceive hov; that fenfe which is in natural confcience, fliould fee the defert of punifhment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz. oppofition and enmity to Being in genera). For,- this is only to fee the natural agreement there is between oppofing Being in general, and being op-pofed by Being in geixcral 5 with a confcioufnefs how that if we w^re infinitely great, we (hould expL<5l to be regarded according toouf greatnefs, and [hould proportionably refent ^ontemj>t. Thus natural confcience, it well intorm'd, will a'5prove of true virtue, and will difapprove and condemn tiu-yv.int of it, and oppofition to it ; and yet without feeing the true beaiaty of it. Yea^ if men*s confcie«ces were fully

enlightned

CHAP.r. 57;(? Kature of true Virfu£^^.^

enlightned, if they were delivered from being confined to a private fphere, and brought to view and confider things in general, and delivered from being ftupefy'd by fenfual ob--je6ls and appetites, as they will be at the day of judgment they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and thofe afFecflions and a6tions that are confident with it, and fubjrdinate to it. For they muft fee that cjnfent to Being in general^ and fupreme refpecfl to the Being of Brings, is moll jafl; and that every rlfin''' which is incorjfi tv'nt with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want ot it, is unjuft> and deferves the oppolitioiv of univerial exiftenee.

Thus has God eflabliihed and ordered, that this prlncr-pie of natural confcience, which though it implies no fuch thing as actual benevolence to Being in general, nor any delight in fuch a principle, fimply confider'd, and (o implies no truly fpiritual lenfe or virtuous tafte, yet fliould approve and CO uiemn the fame things that are approved and con-tdemned by a fpiritual fenfe or virtuous tafte.

That mcJral h^^^ which is natural to mankind, (o far ^% it is difinterefted, and not founded in afTociation of idea§, is the fara:J with this natural conscience that has been d6» 'fcribed. The fenfe of moral good and evil, and that dlfpo-iition to approve virtue, and difapprove vice, which mea have by natural confcience, is that moral fenfe, {o much Intiifed on in the writings of many of late : a rnifunder-ftanding of which feems to have been the thing that has tnifled thofe mjralifts who have intiifed on a difiaterefted moral (en^Q^ univerfal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a-difpofition to true virtue, confiiling in a benevo-Jent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made ufe of ^by thefe v/riters, do indeed p»-ove that there is a moral fenfe or tsfJe, univerfal ^mons; men, di(lin6l from what arifes from feif-love. Though 1 humbly conceive, there is fome confufimv in their difcourfes on the fubjedt, and not a proper dif-tin6tion obferved in the inftances of men's approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpofe, being inflances of that approbation of virtue, that was defcribedj which arifes tfo«x felt-love. But otljer inftances

•y^rxrxr »

jnHances prove that there is a moral tafte,or fenfe of moral good and eviJ, natural to all, which don't properly arife f rem felf-Iove Yet I conceive there are no inftances of this kind which Kiay no: be reter'd to natural confcience, and particularly to that which 1 have obferved to be primary in the approbation of natural confcience, viz. a fenfe of defert and approbation oi that natural agreement there is, in manner and meafure, in jufticc. But 1 think it is plain from what hat been faid, that neither this, nor any thing elfe wherein conliUs the fcnfe of moral good and evil, which there is in natural confcience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous tafte, or determination of mind to rclifli and delight in the cfTennai beauty of true virtue, arifing from a virtuous benevolence at heart.

But It further appears from thig. ■ Tf the approbation of confcience were the f^jme with the approbation ot the inclination of the heart, or the natural difpofuion and determination of the mind, to love and be plcaled with virtue, then ap[ robat'ion and condemnation of confcience would always be in proportion to the virtuous lemper ot the mind ; cr ratherjthe degree would be juft tlie fame. In that perfon who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the teftimony of confcience in favor of virtue would be e-qually full'; But he that had but little, would have as little a degree of the teftimony of confcience for virtue, & againft vice. Bur, I think, the caie is evidently o^herwife. Some men,thro*the llrength of vice in their hearts,will go on in fin againft clearer light and Wronger convictions of confcience, than others. If confcience's approving duty and difappro-ving fin, were the fame thing as the exercife of a virtnous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating fin, then remorfc of confcience will be the fame thing as repentance : and juft in the fame degree as the finner feels remorfe of confcience for fin, in the fame degree is his heart turned from the love of (in to the hatred of it^ inafmuch as they are the very fame thing.

Christians have thegreateft reafon to believe, from the fcripturcs, that in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when fuiners fliall be call'd to Enfwci betoi^ ihcir judge, and all their wickednefs, in all ' it*

Chap. V. 77;<? Nature of true Virtue. i6y

its aggravations, brought forth, and clearly manifefted in the perfedt light of that day, and God will reprove them, and fet their fins in order before them, their conlciences will be greatly awakened "^nd convinced, their mouths will be flopped, all ftupitiity of confcience will be at an end, and confcience will have its full exercife : and therefore their confciences will approve the dreadful fentence or the judge againft them, and feeing that they have deferved fo great a punifhment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion 1 am oppofing, would be the fame thing as their being brought to the fuUeft repentance ; iheir hearts being perfe6tly changed to hate fin and love holinefs ; and virtue or holinefs of heart in them will be brought to the moft full aud perfedt exercife. But how much otherwife, have we reafon to fuppofe, it will then be I viz. That the fin and wickednefs of their heart .will come to its higheft dominion and compleatefl exercife ; that they (hall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickednefs, even as the devils are ! VVhen God has done waiting on finners, and his fpirit done finving with them, he will not retrain their wickednefs, as he does now. But fin fliall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer J:e-ftrained or kept under. 'Tis proper for n judge when fre condemns a criininal,to endeavour fo to fet his guilt before him as to convince his confcience of the jufiice of the fentence. r his the almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, fo as moff ihoro'ly to awaken and convince the confcience. But if natural conference, and the difpofition of the heart to be pleafed with virtue, were the fame, then at the fame time that the confcience was brought to its perfe(5t exercife, the heart would be made perfe(5t!y holy j or, would have the exercife of true virtue and holinefs in perfecfl benevolence of temper. But inflead of this, their wickednefs will then be brought to perfe(5fion, and wieked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be fent away as curfed mto everlaff ing fire prepared .or the devil .and -his angels.

But fuppofing natural confcience to be what has been defcribed, all thefe dirliculties and abfurdities ^re wholly avoided. Sinners, vvhen they fee the greatnefs .of the Bc' 4ng, whom thej have Jiv^d in contearpt of^ and iniebelli-

pn

^-

J 68 ^he Nature of true Virtue. Chap.VL

on and oppofition to, 2nd have clearly fet before them their, obligations to him> as their creator, prefeiver, benefactor, &c. together with the degree in which they have a6led as enemies to him, inay have a clear fenfe of the defi>t of Jheiriin, conXifting in the natural agreernent there is between fuch contempt and oppofirion ot fuch a Being, and his defpifing and oppofing them ; between their being and £<5ting as fo great enemies to luch a God, and their fufTer-ing the dreadful confequcnces ot his being &a6tipg as their great enemy : and their being confcious within themfelves ©f the degree of anger, which would natural'y arife in their own hearts in fuch a cafe, it they were in the place and Hate of their judge. In order to thefe things there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, relifhing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The Gcnfcience may fee the natural agreement between oppofing and being oppofed, between hating and being hated^ uithcut abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper cf mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holinefs. Thefe things have np neccfTary de» j)endence one on the other.

G II A P. VL

CJ f articular inflin61s of vioture^ ivhich in Jorne rcffeHf relenible virtue.

'*"*r^HERE are various difpcfiticns and inclinations natural -*■ to men, which depend on particular laws ot nature, determining their minds to certain affedic ns and adlions towards particular objects ; which laws feem to be ef^ab-lifi'ijed chiefly for the prefervation of mankind, tho' not only for ihis^ but ^Ifo for their comfortably fubfifling in the i/vorld. Which difpofiticns may be called injllnSls^

Some cf thefe inf^in.cls refpe^ only ourfelves perfonally : luch are many of our natural appetites and averfions. Some cf them are not wholly perfoi<al, but more fecial, and extend lo ethers ; fuch are ihe mutual iaciinations betw een

t^e^

Chap. VI, ^^<^ Nature of true Virtue. i6^

the fexes, &c. « Some of thefe difpofitions are more ex*

ternal and fenfitive : fuch are fome of our natural incJina-tions that are perfonal ; as thofe that relate to meat and drink. And of this fort alfo are fome difpofitions that are more focial, and in fome refpe6ts extend to others : as, the more fenfitive inclinations of the fejies tov/ards each other. Befides thefe inftin6\s of the fenfitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental : confifting in affe6lions of tlie mind, which mankind naturally exercife towards fome; of their fellow-creatures, or in fome cafes towards men in general. Some of thefe inftindls that are mental and focial, are what maybe called kind aiFedions ; as having fomething in them of benevolence, or a refemblence of it. And others are of a different fort, having fomething in them that carries an angry appearance ; fuch as the paffion of jealoufy between the fexes, efpecially in the mal© towards the female.

'Tis only the former of thefe two laft mentioned forts,"' that it is to my purpo/e to confider in this place, viz. thofe natural inftindls which appear in benevolent affecflions, or which have the appearence of benevolence, and fo in fome refpeds refemble virtue. Thefe I (hall therefore confider i and fhall endeavour to fhew that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.

That kind a£ev5\ion which Is exerciCed towards thofe who are near one to another in natural relation, particu-jarly the Jove of parents to their children, called natural affedion, is by many refer'd to inftin6t. I have already confidered this fort of love as an afFe6^ion that arifes from felf-love 5 and in that view, and in that fuppofition have fhewn,'it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural afFe(5tion is more properly to^be refer'd to a particular inftind of nature, than to felf-love, as its caufe, I fball not think it a point worthy of any contro-verfy or difpute. In my opinion, both are true ; viz. tliat natural sffe6\ion is ov/ing to natural inf^indt, and alfo thatE k arifes from felf-love. It may be faid to arife from inftind", ss it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an afredtion arifmg from felf-love ; becaufe, Cho' it arifgs from a law of nature, yet that is fuch a lav/ as

Z according

.Jf7o ^'^^^ Nature of true Virtue. Chap, vr,

xvccordimg to the order and harmony every where obferved among the laws ot natyre, is cqane<51ed with, and follow? i?cm felf-love : as v as (hewn fcefore. However, it is not SfieccfTary to my prefent purpofe, to infi-ft oh this. P'orif it be fo, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relatione, is not properly to be afcribcd to felf^Iove, as its caufe, in any relpe6t, but is to be efteemed an afFedtion arif.ng from a particular independent inftindt of nature, v.'hich the creator in his vvifdom has implanted in men for the prcfervation ami well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been obferved, and I humbly conceive, proved before fchap. II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural in-f\in6t, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to fome particular perfons cr private fyftem, however large that fyflem may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, fo long as it contains but an infinitely fmall part of univerfal ex-ji^ence, and fo hears no proportion to this great and univerfal fyftem, fuch limited private benevolence, not s-

rifing from,nor being fubordinate to benevolence to Being isi general, cannot have the nafture ©f true virtue.

However, it may not be amifs briefly to obferve now*:, that 'tis evident to a demonftration, thofe afFecStions cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from thefe two things.

Flrjf, That they don't arife from a principle of virtue. A. principle of virtue, I think, is own'd by the

jnoft confiderable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or public affe6lion : and 1 think it has been proved to be union of heart to Being fimply confidered ; which implies a difpofition to benevolence, to Being in general. Now by the fuppofition, the afiftcSlions we are fpeak-ing of do not arife from this principle y and that, whether we fuppofe they arife from felf-love, or from particular iri-fundts : becaufe either of thofe fources is djiverfe from- a principle of general benevolence. And,

5'ft:5»J/y,THESE private affe6Vions,If they do not arife from general benevoIence,& they are not connedled with it in their Srft cxiftence, have no tendency to produce lU This appear^

pears from what has been obferved: for being not dependent on it, their detach'd and unfubordinate operation rather tends to, and impUes oppoiitioa to Being in general, thari general benevolence-j* as every one fees and owns with re-fpecSl to lelf-love. And ther^ are the very fame reafons V^hy any other private afKsdion,confined to limits infiaitely (hort of univerfal exiftence,, Ihould have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a lingle perlbn.——Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections v/hich don't arife from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

PoR the reafons which have been given, it Is undeniab/y true, that if perfons by any nneans come to have a benevolent affedlion limitsd to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or ths public community they belong to, tho* it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an inftincTc or other caufe determining a perfonto benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created fenllble natures throughout the univerfe, excluiive of union of heart to general exiftence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which difpofes to a fupreme regard to him, nor fubordiaate to fuch divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

If what is called natural affedllon, arlfes from a particular natural inftinit, fo, much more indifputabiy, does that mutual af?e<5tion which naturally arifes between the fexes., I agree with Hutchefon and llurm in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind afF(e«5fions between the fexes, that are truly diverfe from all inchnations tofenfitive pleafure, and don't properly arife from any fucii inclination. Therein doubtlefs a difpofition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual con.placcnce, that are not naturally and nece0*arily conne6ted with any fenfuive deiires. But yet *tis manifefl fuch affet5lions as are limited to oppofite fexes, are from a particular inftindt, thus dirctfling&hmitin^ them^ and not arifing from a principle of" general benevolence ; for this has no Tendency to any fuch limuation. And tho* thefe aSediions don't properly arife fiwiu the fjnlltive de-

Z 2 iires

tyz 7he Nature of irue^ Virtue. Ghap.VI,

lires which are between the fexes, yet they are implanted by the author of nature chiefly for the fame purpofe, viz. the prefervation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make perfons willing to forfake fatfffer and'mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the fake of a ftated union with a companion of the other fex^ and to difpofe to that un'en in bearing and going through with that ferieB of fabourS,' ■ anxieties, and pains requifite to the Being, fupport and e-I ducation of a family of children. Tho' not only for thefes ends, but partly alfo for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage-relation.--—But 1 fuppofe, few (if any) will - deny, that the peculiar natural dilpofitions there are to mutual affedion between the fexes, aiife from an inftindl or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifeft frorii ■what has been faid already, that thofe natural difpofition^ cannot be of the nature of trtre virtue.

. An'OTheR affedlion which is owing to a particular in* fiin6t, implanted in men for like purpofes with other in-ftindts, is that pity which is natural to mankind, when they fee others in great diftrefs. — 'Tis acknowledged, that fuch an afFedlion is natural to mankind. But I think it e-

l vident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular inftin6f, and is not of the nature of true virtue. 1 am far from faying, that there is no fuch thing as a

1 truly virtuous pity among mankind. For 1 am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is any wh^re to be found among them, arifes meerly from natural inftin6f, or, that none is to be found, which arifes from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to fenfitive Beings. Yet at the fame lime I think, this is not the cafe with all pity, or with that difpofnion to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think 1 may be bold to fay, ttiis does not arife from general benevolence, nor is truly

' of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.

If all that uneafmefs on the fight of others extreme diftrefs, which we cail pity, were properly of the nature of •benevolence, then they who are the fubjeds of this pafTion, \ muft needs be in a degree of uneafiasfs in being lenfible of

the

the total want of happinefs, of all fuch as they would be difpofed to pity in extrenie diftrefs. For that certainly is the mod direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good-will, to deiire the happinefs of its objedl. But now this is not the cafe univerfally, where men arc oifpofed to exercife pity. There are many men, with whom that is the cafe in refpe6t to feme others in the world, that it would not be the occafion of their being fenfibly affected with any uneafinefs, to know they were dead (yea men who are not influenced by the confideration of a future ftate, but view death as only a cefTation of all fenlibility, and confe-quently an end of all happinefs) who yet would have beeii moved with pity towards the fame perfons, if they had fsen them under fome very extreme anguifh.—r—— Some mea would be moved with pity by feeing a brute-creature under extreme and long torments, who yet fuffer no uneafinefs in. knowing that many thoufands of them every day ceafe to )ive, and fo have an end put to all their pleafurc, at butch-iers fhambles in great cities. *ris the nature of true benevolence to defire and rejoice in the profperity and plea-fure of the object of it ; and that, in fome proportion to its degree of prevalence. But perfons may greatly pity tliofe that are in extreme pain,, whofe pofitive pleafure they may ftill be very indifferent about. In this cafe, a man maybe much moved and affecfted With uneafinefs, v/ho yet would be affe(5led with no fenfible joy in feeing figns of the fame^erfon's or Being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleafure.

Yea, pity tri^y not only be without benevolence, but tnay coniifl: with true malevolence, or with fuch ill-will as fhali caufe men not oialy not to defire the pofitive happinefs of another, but even to defire his calamity. They may pity fuch an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. .A man may have true malevolerice towards another, defir-ing no pofitive good for him, bat evil : and yet his hatred hot be intinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he fees the perfon whom he thus hates, in mifery far beyond his ill-will, he may then pity him : becaufe then the natural inftincSt begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural inftincl, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than it goej^ or to the v,

limits

4

4 'T^^^ ISfature oj^true Virtue. Chap.W

limits of the degree of mifery It wifhes to its obje^. Men may pity others under exquifite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had feen their profperity. And fome men have fuch a grudge againft one or another, that they would be far from being uneafy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the cafe with them, 'tis manifeft that their heart is void of benevolence towards fuch perfons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the fame time they are capable of pitying evfn thefe very perfons, if they ihouid fee them. under a degree of mifery very much difproportioned to their ill-will.

These thlno^s may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different trom true virtue, and not arifing from z difpciition of heart to genera) benevolence : but is owing to a particular inftin£t, which the creator has implanted ia •mankind, for the fame purpofes as moft other inftinds, viz, chiefly for the prefervation of m.ankind,though not exclulive of their well-being. The giving of this inftind is the fruit of God's mercy, and an inftance of his love of the world of mankind,& an evidence that though the world be fo finful, 'tis notGod's defign to make it a world of punishment: and therefore has many ways made a merciful provifion for men's relief in extreme calamities : and among others has given mankind in general adifpofition to pity; the naturalexercifes whereof extend beyond thofe whom we are in a near con-re6tion with, efpecially in cafe of great calamity ; bicaufe commonly in fuch cafes men ftand in need of the help of others befidc their near friends, and becaufe commonly thole calamities which are extreme, without releif, tend to men's deftrudion. This may be given as the reafon why men are fo made by the author of nature, ,that the) have no in{lin6t inclining as much to rejoice at the fight of others great profperity and pleafure, as to be grieved at their ex-, treme calamity, I'iz. becaufe they don't ftand in equalnecefli-■ ty of fuch an inflin(51 as that in order to their prefervation.-But if pure benevolence were the fource of natural pity, doubtlefs it v.-ould operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cafes of others great profperity; a§ in compaffion ic wards them in great mifery.

Ths

Chap. VII. ^^^^ Nature of true Virtue* ijj

The in{\In6ls God has given to mankind In this world, which in fome refpeils refemble a virtuous benevolence, arc agreable to the ftate that God defigned mankind for here, where he intends their prefervation, and comfortable fubfiftence. But in the wofld of punifhment, where th« ftate of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of thefe merciful defigns to anfwcr, there, we have great reafon to think, will be no fuch thing as a difpoBtion to pity, in any cafe ; as alfo there will be no natural afFecfion toward near relations, and no mutual afFedion between oppofite fexes.

Ta conclude what I have to fay on the natural inftlndt difpofing men to pity others'' in mifery, I would obfcrve, that this is a fource of a kiAd of abhorrence in men of fonie vices, as cruelty and oppreflion ; and fo, of a fort of approbation of the contrary virtues, hamanity. mercy, &c. Which averfion and approbation, however, fo far as they arife from this caufe only, are not from a principle of trus virtue.

CHAP. VII.

The reafons ivhy thofe things that have ieen mentioned^ which have not the effence of virtue^ have yet bj many been mijlaken for true virtue.

'Tp HE firft reafon that may be given of this, is, that •*- altho* they have not the fpecific and diftinguiihing nature and efTence of virtue, yet they have ibmething that belongs to the generd nature of virtue.- The general nature of true virtue is love. It is exprefled both in love of benevolence and complacence ; but primarily in benevolence to perfons and Beings, and confequently and fccon-

darily in complacence in virtue, as ha:> been fliewn.

There is fomething of the general nature of virtue in tbofe natural afFedions and principles that have been mentioned^ in both thofe iefpe<5U, - - -

sy6 1 he Nature of true Virtue. Chap. Vii.

In many of thcfe natural affecSVions tliere is fomething of the appearance of love to perfons. In fome of them there appears the tendency and efFed of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a fort of benevolence in them, tho' it be a private benevolence, and in feveral refpecffs falls fliort of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.

The lart mentioned pafEon, natural to mankind in their prcfent fiate, 'vi'z>. that of pity to others in diftrefs, tho' not properly ot the nature of l©ve, as has been demonftrated, yet has partly the fame influence and efFecl with benevolence. One efFefSt of true benevolence is.to caufe perfons to be uneafy, when the objeds of it are in diffrefs, and to (defire their relief. And natural pity has the fame eiFe6t.

Natural gratitude, tho* in-every inftance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, becaufe perfons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards perfons on <:ertain occafions, whom they have iio real and proper friend(hip for, as in the inftance ot ^aul towards David^ once and again, after Davidh fparing his life, when he had fo fair opportunity to kill him : yet it has the fame or like operation and effe6l with friendlhip, in part, for a feafon, and with regard to fo much of the welfare of its obje6l, as appears a deferved requital of kindnefs received. And in other inftances it may have a more general and abiding in^ fluence, fo as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men from natural gratitude do really vvith a fort of benevolence love thofe who love them. From this, together with fome other natural principles, men may love their near friends^ love their oyyrn party, Jove their country, ^'c.

The natural difpofitlon their Is to mutual afFe(5llon -be-tweeen the fexes, often operates by what may properly be called love. There is often times truly a kind both of be^ jievoknce and complacence. As there alfo is between pa«. jrents and children,

Tbvs> thefe things have fomething of the general na* iture .of virtue, which is ioye ; and efpecially the thing laft

* pientio.iie4

iChap. VU. ^^^^ Nature of true Virtue. ly^^

mentioned have fomething of a love cf .benevclence,-What they areeffentially defeftive iujis^tlnt they are private jn their nature, they don't arife from any temper of benevolence to Being in general, nor have liiey a tendency to 2ny fuch effcil: in tlteir operation. But yet agreeing v/ith. .virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within theic own private fphere : i. e. they appear beautiful if we con« iine our views to that private fydem, and while vv'e (hut all other things they {land- in any relation to, out of our con-iideration. If that private fyllen; contain'd the.fum cf uni-* yerfal exiftencc, then their beaevolence would have true beauty ; or, in other words, vvculd be beautiful, all things confidered : but, now it is not fo. Thefe private fyftema are fo far from containing the fum of univerfal Being, or comprehending all exiftence which we ftand rtiated to, that ^t contains but an infinitely fms.lJ part of it. The reafon why men are fo ready to take thefe private «ife(5tions foe true virtue, is the n^rrownefs of their views; and above all, that they are fo ready to leave the divine Being cut of theic view, and to neglecfl him in their confideration, or to regard liim in their thoughts as tho' he were not properly belonging to the fyftem of real exiQence, but as a kind of fhadowy> iimaginary Being, And tho' moll: men allow that there is a God, yet in their ordinary view of things, his Being is not apt to come into the account, and to have the influence and efFe;^ of a real exiftence, as 'tis with other Beings whichL they fee, and are converfant with by their external fenfes* In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward fenfations of difplicencc and approbation which rife in their iYiinds,'t1s not a thing; natural to themtobe under the infiuencs of a view of theDeity.as part of the fyflem,and as the head of the fyfte.m, and lie who is all in all, in comparifon of whom all the reft is nothing, and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to be accordingly imprefs'd and affeded.

Yea, we are apt thro* the narrcwnefs of our views, iri judging of the beauty of afFe(51ions and acStions to limit our confideration to only a fmall part of the created fyftem.« y/hen private altecf ions extend themfelves to a confiderable number, v/e are very ready to look upon iliem as truly v'rtr.ous, and scccrdingiy to applaud them high'yo

A a Thi??

SyU The T^ature of true Virtue. Chap.VIL

Thus it is with refpe6t to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For tho' his private fyfiem contains but a fmall part even of the world of mankind, yet being a confiderable number, thro' the contra(5\e4 limits of the mind and the narrownefs ofhis views,they are ready to fill hismind and engrofs his fight, and to feem as if they were all. Hence among xhcRomans love to their country was the higheft virtue : tho' this affection of theirs, fo much extolled among them, was employ'd as it were for the deftruclion of the reft

of the world of mankind. The larger the number is,that

private affe<51ion extends to, the more apt men are, thro' the narrownefs of their fight, to miftake it for true virtue ; be-eaufe then the private fyftem appears to have more of the image of the univerfal fyfiem. Whereas, when the circle it extends to, is very fmall, it is not fo apt to be look'd upon virtuous, or not fo virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children.

And this is the reafon why felf-love is by nobody mifia'-ken for true virtue. For tho* there be fomething of the general nature of virtue in this, here is love and good-wiil, yet the obje6l is fo private, the limits fo narrow, that it by no means engrofles the view; unlefs it be of the peifon hinjfelf, who thro' the greatnefs of his pride may imagine him'felf as it were all. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vaftly greater extent: a.nd tho' felf-love is far from being ufelefs in the world, yea, 'tis exceeding neceflary to fociety, befides its diredly and.greatly feeking the good of one, yet every body fees that if it be not fubordinate to, and regulated by, another more e^itenfive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the fyfiem he is related to. And tho* this is as true of any other private affection, notwithf^anding its extent may be to a fyftem that contains thoufands of individuals, and thofe private fyflcms bear no greater proportion to the whole of univerfal cxifl:ence, than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent to the view and comprehenfion of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were ally or at leafl as^Jf^Wr^i^f/^^^^^'^^^^^ the univerfal fyftem. : V . ^\

Thus I have obferved how many of thefe natural principles, which have been fpoken of, rcfemble virtue in its pri-mary operation, which is bcneygknce, Many of them

£if»

Chap. VII. ^^^ Naf^ure of true Virtue. ly^ '

alfo have a refemblance of It in its fecondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itfelf. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as comflion to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, confiftmg in a fenfe and re-lifli of the effential beauty of virtue, confifting in a Being's cordial union to Being in general, from a fpirit of love to Being in general. As particularly, the approbation of confcience, from a fenfe of the inferior and fecondary beauty which there is in virtue, confiding in uniformity, and from a fenfe of defert, confining in a fenfe of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, fhewing kindnefs and receiving kindnefs. So from the fame principle, there is a difapprobation of vice, from a natural op-polition to deformity and difproportion, and a fenfe of evil defert, or the natural agreement there is between hating asd being hated, oppofmg and being oppofed, &c. together with a painful fenfation naturally arifing in a fenfe of felf-oppo-fition and inconfiftence. ■ Approbation of confcience is

the more readily miftaken for a truly virtuous approbation, becaufe by the wife conftitution of the great governor of the world (as was obferved) when confcience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, tho' not as to the ground and reafon of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is againft it, or that falls fhort of it ; as was fliewn before. And indeed natural confcience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's ftead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to dlftinguifl^ right and wrong.

It has alfo been obferved, how that virtue, confiding in benevolence, is approved, and vice, confiding in ill-will, is dilliked, from the influence of felf-love, together with aflb-ciation of ideas, in the fame manner as men diflike thof« qualities in things without life or reafon, with which they have always conne6led the ideas of hurtfulnefs,malignancy, pernicioufnefs ; but like thofe things wiih which they habitually conne6l the ideas of profit, pieafantnefs, com-fortablenefs, &c. This fort of approbation or likirg of virtue, and diflike of vice, is eafily miftaken for true virtue, not only becaufe thofe things are apprgvcd by it that have the

A « * nature

'fSo The Nature cf true Virtue, CHAP.VIh

nature of virtue, and the things difliked have the nature of vice, but becaufe here is much o\ refcmblance of virtuous approbation, it being con?.placence from love ; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to Being ini general, but from felf-love.

There is alfo, as has been fliewn, a liking of fome virtues, and diflike of fome vices, from the influence of the natural in(lin6^ of pity. This men are apt to millake for the exercife of true virtue, on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the obje^fs of complacence are v;hat have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, fuch as humanity, mercy, tendernefs of heart-; &c. and the contrary very odious ; but befides, the approbation is not meerly from felf-iovc, but from compafiion, sn afFcvStion that refpcds olhers, and refembles benevolencej ks has been fhewn.

Another reafon, why the things which have been mentioned, are miftaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true negciiive moral gcodnefs in them. \Vj a negative moral goodnefs, 1 rhean the negation or abfence of true moral t;vil. They have this negative moial goodnefs, becaufe a \- Ibeing vvithout them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. ' Thus, the exercife of natural confcience in fuch and fuch clec^rees, v;herein appears fucli a meafure of an awakening orlfenfibilityoT confcience, tho^ it be not of the nature of rcalporuive virtue or true moral goodnefs,yet lias a negative moral goo'dner3 j becaufe in the prefent flate of things, it is an evidence of the abfence of that higher de-.: gree'of wickednefs, which caufes grea'tinfenribility or flupi-' tlity of confcience.- For fin, as was obferved, is not only Bgainft a fpiritaal and divine fenfe of virtue, but is alfb a-; gainft the di6iates ot that -moral fenfewhichiiis'. in natural \ confcience.' ■ No wonder, that this fenfe being lof^.g oppoftd \ and'often conquered, grows wetiktr. All fin has its fource \ from feinfhnefs,or from felf-love, hot fubordinate to regard o Being in general. And natural confcience chiefly ccn-iifls in a fenfe of defert, or the natural agreement between [ Jin and mifery. But if felf were indeed/'<•//, and fo rrtore \ i:onfiderable than all the world belldes, there would be no i iii defert in his regarding himfelf above all^ and making all i ' " •' - ot'her

©ther interefts give place to private interefl.— And no won-cler that men by long ading from the felfifli principle, and by being habituated to treat themfelves as if they were all\ increafe in pride, and come as it were naturally to look oa themfelves as «//, and {o to lofe entirely the lenfeofill de-fert in their making all other interefts give place to their

own. And no wonder that men by often repeating adls

of fin, without punilhmcnt, or any vifible appearance cf approaching puniihment, liave lefs and iefs fenfe of the con-ne<5tion of fm with puniihment. That {^a^^ which an a-wakned confcience has of the defert cf (in, ccnfifts chiefly in a fenfe of its defert of refentment of the Deity, the fountain and head of univerfal exigence. But no wonder that by a long coniinued worldly and fenfual life, men more and more Icfe all lenfe of the Deity, who is a fpiritual and invifible Being. The mind being long involved in, and en-grofs'd by feniitive objects, becom.es fenfuaiin all its operations, and excludes all vievvs and impreffions of fpiritual ohjectj, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus the confcience and general benevolence are entirely, different: principles, & fenfe of confcience differs from the holy complacence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet vvickednefs may by long habitual exercife greatly dimiriiih a fenfe of confcience. . So that there may be negative moral goodnefs, in fenfibility of confcience, as it may be an argument of the abfenge ot that higher degree of wickednefs, which caufeth ilupidity of cqnfcience.

So wlj:h refpevft to natural f^ratUude^ tho'there may be no virtue m.eeriy in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree, of felhOinefs, fo that a man.is come to look upon himfelf as all, and others as nothing, and fo their refp.e<5l and kindnels as nothing.. Thus an increafe

of pride diminifhes gratitude. So does fenfuality, or the

increafe of fenfual appetites,cc coming more and more under the power and impre/Iion of feniible obje61s, tends by degrees to make the mind infenfible to any thing t]{Q-, and thofe appetites take up the v/hole foul ; and thro' habit and cuftom the water is all drawn out of other channels5in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one ^haiinel,

... . In

1^2 The Nature of true Virtue, Chap. VlL

In like manner natural af?eclion, and natural pity, tho* not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminifl"ked greaiJy by the increafe of thofe two principles of pride and fenfua-lity, and as the confequence of this, being habitually dif-pofed to envy, malice, &c. T^hefe lufts when they prevail to a high degree may overcome and diminifli the exercifc of thofe natural principles : even as they often overcome and diminifli common prudence in a man, as to feeking his own private inlerefl-, in point of health, wealth, or honor, and yet no one vvili think, it proves that a man's being cunning, in feeking his own perfonal and temporal intereft has any thing of the nature and efisnce of true virtue.

Another renfcil why thefe natural principles and af-fei5\ions are miOaken for true virtue, is, that in fevtral re* fpecls they have the famie efFe6l, which true virtue tends to ; efpecially in thefe two ways -

1. The prefent Aate of the world is To ordered and ccn-flituted by the v/ifdcm and goodnefs of its fupreme ruler, that thefe natural principles for the moft part tend to the good of the world of iriankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental alixclicn, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general ten'.;vo]ence,which feeks & tends to the general good. But this is no proof that thefe natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For felf-love is a principle that is exceeding ufeful and neceflary in the world of mankindo So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirft, &c. But yet nobody wifl affert, that thefe have the patureof true virtue, - -■ '■>'.'■

2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this refpec5t, that they tend feveral ways to reftrain vice, and prevent many af\s of wickednefs.—---So, natural af-fccTticn, love to our partyl or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acSts of injuftice towards thefe perfcns ; Mvhich would be real wickednefs -=——Pity preferves from cruelty, w^hich would be real and great moral evil.—Natural confcicnce tends to rcOrarn fm in generrJ, in the present (late of the world.- ■ But neither can this prove thefe principles themfelves to be of the nature of true virtue, for fo is this prefent Hate of mankind ordered by a merciful

ciful God, that men's felf-Iove does in innumerable re-fpecfts reilrain from a6ts of true wickednefs 3 and not only fo, but puts men upon feeking true virtue : yet is not irfelf true virtue, but is the fource of all the vackednefs that is in the world.

Another reafon v;hy thefe inferior affections efpecially fome of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are af-fedtions of the fame denomniation, which are truly virtuous. Thus, for inftance, there is a truly virtuous piiy, or a com-pafTion to others under affliiStion or mifery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be fufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there v/ere no particular in-fiinfl, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is eafy to fee how benevolence, wliich fecks another's ^ood fnould caufe us to defire his deliverance from evil. And this is a fource of pity far more extenfive than the other. It excites compaflion in cafes that are overlook'd by natural inftinc5l. And even in thofe cafes to which inftindt extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the cafe, the pity which is exercifed, may be called a virtuous compafli*

on. » So there is a virtuous ^r^j/Z/W^, or a gratitude th^t

arifes not only from felf-love, but from a fuperior principle of difinterefted general benevolence. As* 'tis manifeff, that when we receive kindnefs from fuch as we love already, w§ are more difpofed to gratitude, and difpofed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is deftitute of any fucli friendly prepoffeflion, Therefore, when the fuperior principle of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates the affair> it may be called a virtuous gratitude.— So there is a virtuous iove o^ jujiice^ arifing from pure benevolence to Being \h general, as that naturally and Jieceflarily inclines the heart, that every particular Being fliould have fuch a (hare of benevolence as is proportion'^d to its dignity, con-lifting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is intirely diverfe from an apprehenfion of juflice, from a fenfe of the beauty of uniformity in variety : as has been particularly fliewn already. And fo it is eafy to fee how there may be a virtuous fenfe of defert different from what is natural and common. And fo a virtuous ^i?;z-fckmmfnej^^ or a lanc^iAed confcience..-T--r^And ss when na •

tural

ja

^84 The Nature of true Virtue.' Chap.VIII.

tural affea'icm have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are diredkd and determine^ hereby.they maybe called virtuous, fo there may be a virtuous love Of parents to children,and |Detween other near relatives, a virtuous love of our tovsn, or country, or nation. Ye^, ^nd a virtuous love between the fexcs, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with inflindl, and virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner ot its o| e-ration, and may guide it to fuch ends as are agreable to thq great ends and purpofes of true virtue.

GE^^UINE virtue prevents that increafe of the habits of pride and fenfuality, which tend to over-bear and greatly diminilh the exercifes of the forcmentioned ufetul ar.d nc-cefTary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolence fofiens and fweetens the mind, and makes it ynore fufceptible of the proper influence and ej^ercife of the gentler natural inflindls, and direds ever}''one into its proper channel, and determines the exercife to the proper manner and meafure, arid gui^jcs all to the befl purpoies.

CHAP. yiiL

In ivhat refpech virtue cr moral good ts fQunded in fentimcnt ; and hew Jar it is Jounied ;V| the rcafon ^nd jiature of things,

'T^ HAT which is called virtue^ is a certain kind of beau • •^ tiful nature, form or quality that is obfcrved in tilings^ That form or quality is called beautiful to any one beholding it to whctn it is beautiful, which appears in itfelf agreable or comely to him, or the view or idea of wliich is immediately plcafant to the mind. 1 fay, agreable i?i iifelfd^ud ip:7mdiai£!y pleafant, to diflinguifn it from things which in thcmfelves are not agreable nor pleafant, but cither indifferent or difagreable, which yet appear eligible and agreable indire61]y for fomething t\h that is the ccnfequence ot ihcm, or with which they are connc<5ted. Such a kind of indirect agreablcnefs or cligiblencfs in tliingSjHot for thcmfelves,but

' ■ fcr

Chap. VIII. The Nature of true Virtue. i%^

for fome thing elfe, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleafvng and delightful in itfelf, then it is called beautiful ; and this agreablenefs or gratefulnefs of the idea is what is called beauty. It i^ evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or fenfation or beauty, is by immediate fenfation of the gratefulnefs of the idea caljed beautiful -, and not by finding out by argumentation any con(equences,or other things that it ftands connected with ; any more than tafting the fweet-nefs of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and confequences. And this manner of being afFe6led with the immediate prefence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore,.on any reafonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful, or not 5 but on the frame of our ininds, whereby they are fo made that fuch an idea, as fdon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beauti'tul. '

Therefore, If this be all that is mernji by them who affirm, virtue is founded in fentiment and not in reafon,that they who fee the beauty there is in true virtue, don't perceive it by argumentation on its connexions and conffquen« ces, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain Ipi-rltual fenfe given them of God, wheieby ihey immediately perceive pleafure in the prefence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are dire<5th gratified in the view or con-Cemplation of this obje(5t, this is certainly true.

• But if thereby is meant, that the frame of mind, or inward fenfe given them by God, whereby the mnd is dijpo° fed to delight m the idea or view of true virtue, is gjvtn arbitrarily, fo -that if he had pleafed.he niighi h?'e g.ven a contrary fenfe and determination of mind, Ah»ch would liave agreed as well with the neceflary naiuie of fhings, this J think is not true. *■

Virtue, as I haveobferved,confifts in the cordial confent ©r uiiton of Being to Being in general. And, as has alfo been obferved, that frame ot mind, whereby it is difpofed to re-li(h and be pleafed with the view of this, is benevolence or "union of heart itfelf to Being in general, or a univerfally fe§nevolent frame of mind : becaufe he whofe temper is to

B b love

iB6 7he Nature of true Virtue. eHAP.VlIli

love Being in general, therein muft have a difpofition to approve and be pleafed with love to Being in general. Therefore now the queftion is, whether God in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, a6ls fo arbitrarily, that there is nothing iri the neceffary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper miglit have agreed or confifted as well with that nature of things, as tiiis I

And in the/yy?placel obferve, that to affert this, w^ould be a plain abfurdity, and contrary to the very fuppofition. For here 'tis fuppofed, that virtue in its very effence con-iifis in agreement or confent of Being to Being, Now certainly agreement itfelf to Being in general muft necefTarily agree better with general exiftence, than oppontion & contrariety to it,

I OBSERVE fecondly^ that God in giving to the creature fuch a temper of mind, gives that which is agreable to what is by abfolute neceffity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often pbferved, God himfelf is in effecTe iBeino- in general ; and without all doubt it is in itfelf ne-cefT^ry, and impoffible it Ihould be otherwife, that God fhould agree with himfelf, be united with himfelf, or love )iimfelf: and therefore, whea he gives the fame temper to his creatures, this is more agreable to his necefiary nature^ than the oppofite temper : yea, the laiter would be inE-nitely contrary to his nature.

Let it be noted, thirdly^ by this temper only can created Beings be united to, and agree with one another. This sppears, becaufe it confifts in confent and union to Being in general ; which impHes agreement-and union with every |>artlcular Being, except fuch as are oppofite to Being hi general, or excepting fuch cafes wherein union with them is bv fome means inconfiftent with union with general exiftence. But certainly if any particular created Being^were cf a temper to oppofe Being in general, that would infer tlie moft'univerfal and greateft pofiible difcord, not only ^f creatures with their creator, but cf created Beings one

ith another.

v.HAP^VIII. 7!^' Nature of true Virtue. iZy

Fourthly^ I observe, thera is no other temper but this^ that a man can have, and agree with himfelf, or be without felf-inconilftence, i. e. without having fome inclinations and reli(hes repugnant to others. And that for thefe rea-fons. Every Being that has underftanding and will, necef-farily loves happinefs. For, to fuppofe any Being not to iove happinefs, would be to fuppofe he did not love what was agreable to him ; which is a contradiction : oratleaft would imply, that nothing was agreable or eligible to him, which is the fame as to fay, that he has no fuch thing as choice, or any faculty of wilL So that every Being who has a faculty of will, mufl: of necefTuy have an inclinatioa to happinefs. And therefore, if he be confiftent with himfelf, aad has not fome inclinations repugnant to others, he tnuft approve of tliofe inclinations whereby Beings defire the happinefs of Being in general, and muft be againfl a difpoiition to the mifery of Being in general : becaufe c-therwife he would approve of oppofition to his own happinefs. For, if a temper inclined to the mifery of Being in general prevailed univerfally,'tis apparent, it would tend to univerfal mifery. But he that loves a tendency to univer-fal mifery, in effedt loves a tendency to his own mifery : and as he neceflarily hates his own mifery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.— And befidss, it neceflarily follows from felf-love, that men love to be loved by others ; becaufe in this others love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in ef-fe6l love the hatred of themfeivcs : and fo would be incon-fiilent with themfelves, having one natural inclination con-trai'y to another.

These things may help us to underfland why that fpi-ritual 2nd divine fenfe, by which thofe that are truly virtuous and holy, perceive the excellency of true virtue, is iii the facred fcriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, iinderftanding, &c. If this divine fenfe were a thing arbitrarily given,without any foundation in the nature of things, it v^'ould not properly be called by fuch names. -For, if there were no correfpondence or agreement in fiich a fenfe with the nature of things, any more than there would have hitn in a divcrfe or contrary feiife, the idea we obtain by \ ^■bii ^irituAi feafc could in vw refpect bs faid to be a know- '

)§ 7he Nature of true Virtue. Chap; Vllfc

ledge or perception of any thing befides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no reprefentation of any thing without. But lince it is oiherwife, fince it is a-greable, in the refpe6ts abovementioned, to the nature of things and efpecially fince *tis the reprefentation and image of the moral perfe6tioh and excellency of the divide Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it be-, jng fo, hereby lerfows have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be (hewn, if it were necefi'ary to the main purpofe of this difcourfe) in many refpeiSis uflift perfons to a right underftanding of things in genera!, to underftand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concerii our inierefl ; and afTifts us to iee the nature of them, and the truth of ihem^ in' their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this fpiri-tual fenfe, and the prevalence of thofe difpofitions that are contraiy to it, tends to darken and diftracSl the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confolmd men's underftanding-s.

And as to that moral fenfe, common to mankind, which there is in natural confcience^ neither can this be truly faid to be no more than a fentiment arbitrarily given by the creator, without any relation to the necefl'ary nature of things : but is ertablifhed in an agreement with the nature of things ; fo as no fenfe of mind that can be fuppofed, of a contrary iiature and tendency could be. This will appear by ihefe two things.-

I. This moral fenfe, if the underflanding be well informed, and be exercifed at liberty and in an extenfive manner. Without bein^ reftrained to a private fphere, approves the v<:ry fame things which a fpiritual and divine fenfe approves ; and thofe things only ; though not on the fame grounds, ncr with the fame kind of approbation. There-tore^'as that divine fenfe has been already fhewn to be a-greabie to the necefTary nature of things, fo this inferior ^oral fenfe, being fo far corrcfpondcnt to that, muft alfo fo ;r agree with the nature of things.

2. It has been (hewn, that this moral fenfe confifts in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that by the fuppofiti-on it is agreable to the nature of things. Foi therein it confifts, viz. a difpofition of mind to confent to, or'.ilce, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement yf (^q nature and form of one thing with another. And certair^ ly fuch a teniper of mind as hkes the agreement of things to the nature of things, is more agreable to the nature of things than an oppofue temper of mind.

HeJie it may be obferved =*—As the ufe o^ language i%

for mankind to exprefs their fentiments or ideas to each o-ther, fo that thofe terms in language, by v/hich things of a moral nature are fignified, are to exprefs thofe moral fenti- « ments or ideas that are common to mankind ; therefore \ 'tis, that moral fenfe which 'is in natural confcience, that chiefly governs the ufe of language among mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in thefe matters among mart-kind ; 'tis indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and <2vil. hy luch words, right and wrong, good and evil, when ufed in a moral fenfe, is meant in common fpeech that which deferves praife or blame, refpecSl or refentment. But as has been often obferv'd, mankind in general have a i^nk of defert, by this natural moral fenfe.

Therefore here may arife a dueltion, which may d^ ferve to be confidered, viz Seeing it is thus, that fentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called , by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and j 'tis apparent, that fentiment, atlcaftasto many particulars, | by fome means or other is different in different perfons, in 1 different nations ; that being thought to deferve praife by f one, wnich by others is thought co be worthy of blame j how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the fentiments of men with relation to the nature of things I ■

In order to the anfwering this queflfon with dearnefsj \V^ may be divided into two : viz-. Whether men's fentiments

ot

;o Ihe Nat are 0/ true Virtue. Chap. Vlllj

6f moral good arK^evil are not arbitrary, or rather cafiial ^nd accidental ^^nd, whether the way of their ufing words in what thev/^^aJl good and evil, is not arbitrary, wjthout rcfpecSl io/^Y common fentiment in all, conformed to the : iture^things ?

TO the firft, I would obferve, that the general difpoii-;ion or fenfe of mind exercifed in a fenfe of defert of efteeiii or refentment, may be the fame in all : though as to particular objecSls and occafions with legard to which it is exei-^^ cifcd, it may be very various in different men or bodies of ^nen, through the partiality or error that may attend the viev/ or attention of the mind. Jn all, a notion of defert of love, or refentment, m^y confift in the fame thing, iii general, viz. a fuitablenefs, or natural uniformity and agree-inent between the sffedtions and ads of the agent, 2nd the afiedions and treatment of others fome way concerned ; or the natural agreement between love (or fomething that fome way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love ; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated ; the natural agreement between hating (or fomething that fome way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I fay, this general notiori of rdefert may be the fame : and yet occafions and objedls throtigh variety of apprehenlions about thefe occaliohs and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reafon of the partial attention of the mind, may be ektremely various ; and example, cviftom,education,and aflbciation may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But 'tis needJefs to dwell long on this, fince things which liave been faid by others (Mr. Hutchefon^ in particular) may abundantly fhew, that the differences which are to be found among different perfons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inco-nfiftent with a general moral fenfe, Alimon to all mankind.

Nor, fecondly, is the ufe of the words, good and evil, right and wrong, when ufed in a moral fenfe, altogether unfix'd and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and viev/s, that occafion the forementioned variety of fentiment. For tho' the fignification of words is determined by ufe, y?t that which governs ift the ufe of tenths

is generator common iife. And mankind. In v^hst thev would fignify by terms, are obliged to aim at a confiftent ufe : becaufe it is eafily found that the end of language-which is to be a common medium of manifefting JJeas and' fentimcnts, cannot be obtained any other way th.r^ by / jconfiftent ufe of words ; both that men (hould be conhT-^nf with themfelves, and one with another, in the ufe of then. But men can*t call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-deferving, confiftently, any other way than by calling things fo, which truly deferve praife or blame, i. e. things, wherein (all things confideredj there is moft uniformity in connecting with them praife or blame. There is no other way th^v\fiey can' ufe tlvefe terms confidently with themfelves. ^ Thus, if thieves or traitors may be an^ry with Informers, that bring them to juftice, and call their behaviour by odious names, yet herein they are inconfiftent with themfelves ; becaufe, when they put themfelves in the place of thofe that have injured them, they approve the fame things they condemn. And therefore fuch are capable of being convinced, that they apply thefe odious terms in an abufive manner. So, a riation that profecules an am« bitious defign of univerfal empire, by fubduing other nations with lire and fword, may affix terms that fignify the higheft degrees of virtue, to the condu6l offuchasfliew the moft engagecL .,ftable, refol.ute fpirit in this affair, and do moft of this pjoddy wofk. - But yet they are capable ot being convinced,, that they ufe thefe terms inconfiftently, and abufe language in it, and io having their mouths ftop-

ped. -sAnd not only will men ufe fuch words inconfilt-

ently with themfelves, but alfo with one another, hy,i)flngr them any otherwife than to fignify true merit 6r ill-deferv-ing, as before explained. For there is no wayelfe, wherein men have any notion of good or ill-defert, that mankind in general can agree in. Mankind in general feem to fuppofe iome general ilandard or foundation in nature for an univerfal coniiftence in the ufe of the terms whereby they ex-prefs moral good and evil ; which none can depart from .but thro' errocand mif^ke. .Tkis is evidently fuppofed in •all difputes they ma^s. havfe one witp' ancliier, about right and wrong ; and in all endeavors ufed to evince'or prove that-^ny thing is either good or evil, in a moral fenfe,

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